

UNIVERSITY YOUTH AND POLITICS IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF METU
ENGINEERING STUDENTS

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ENGINEERING STUDENTS**

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ABSTRACT

UNIVERSITY YOUTH AND POLITICS IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF METU ENGINEERING STUDENTS

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Today, where the whole world is changing and transforming radically and rapidly, the life experiences and all relationships of the young people who are at the "crossroads of all social reproduction processes" (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007:3) are changing and transforming in parallel. It is important to look at the new labor regime created by the neoliberal economic model that started to be implemented in the 1980s and the ideological, political, and cultural climate that accompanies this regime, in order to understand the life experiences of today's youth and to reveal its characteristics. Accordingly, this thesis study aims to examine how METU engineering students, who are among university youth, define politics under a neoliberal authoritarian regime, how they perceive the political field, and the characteristics of the relationship they establish with the political field. In this context, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 20 students studying at the METU Faculty of Engineering in Ankara, the capital city of Turkey.

Keywords: Youth, Politics, Political Participation, Neoliberalism, Political Parties

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE ÜNİVERSİTELİ GENÇLİK VE SİYASET: ODTÜ MÜHENDİSLİK ÖĞRENCİLERİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Tüm dünyanın radikal ve hızlı bir şekilde değiştiği ve dönüştüğü günümüzde “tüm toplumsal yeniden üretim süreçlerinin kavşağında” (Furlong ve Cartmel, 2007:3) yer alan gençlerin yaşam deneyimleri ve kurdukları tüm ilişkiler de buna paralel olarak değişmekte ve dönüşmektedir. 1980'li yıllarda uygulanmaya başlanan neoliberal ekonomik modelin yarattığı yeni emek rejimine ve bu rejime eşlik eden ideolojik, siyasi ve kültürel iklime bakmak, günümüz gençliğinin yaşam deneyimlerini anlamak ve onun özelliklerini ortaya koymak açısından hayati önem taşımaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, gençliği ve siyaset alanıyla ilişkisini ve içinde yaşadıkları toplumun dönüşümlerini ele almayı amaçlayan bu tez çalışması üniversite gençliği içinde yer alan ODTÜ mühendislik öğrencilerinin neoliberal otoriter bir rejim altında siyaseti nasıl tanımladıklarını, siyasal alanını nasıl algıladıklarını ve siyasal alanla kurdukları ilişkinin karakteristiğini incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu kapsamda, Türkiye'nin başkenti Ankara'da bulunan ODTÜ Mühendislik Fakültesi'nde okuyan 20 öğrenci ile yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşme gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gençlik, Siyaset, Örgütlenme, Neoliberalizm, Siyasi Partiler

“Arkadaşlar bize bakıyor”
ARKADAŞLARA...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AB: Avrupa Birliđi (The European Union)
- ABD: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (United States of America)
- ADYÖD: Ankara Demokratik Yüksek Öğrenim Derneđi (Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association)
- AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
- AP: Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
- ASELSAN: Askeri Elektronik Sanayi (Military Electronic Industries)
- CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (The Republican People's Party)
- CKMP: Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant Nation Party)
- DB: Dünya Bankası (World Bank)
- DEV-GENÇ: Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu (The Revolutionary Youth Federation of Turkey)
- DİSK: Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (The Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey)
- DP: Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)
- DTCF: Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi (Faculty of Languages and History-Geography)
- Eğitim-Sen: Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası (Education and Science Workers' Union)
- FKF: Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu (Federation of Idea Clubs)
- HDP: Halkların Demokratik Partisi (The Peoples' Democratic Party)
- HFÖD: Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrencileri Derneđi (Law School Students' Association)
- IMF: International Monetary Fund
- İŞİD: Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti (The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria)
- İYÖKD: İstanbul Yüksek Öğrenim ve Kültür Derneđi (Istanbul Higher Education and Culture Association)
- İYİP: İyi Parti (IYI Party)

- KESK: Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (The Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions)
- KHK: Kanun Hükmünde Kararname (Statutory Decree)
- LGBTİ: Lezbiyen, Gey, Biseksüel, Transgender, İntersex (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender)
- Memur-Sen: Memur Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Public Servants Trade Unions)
- MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)
- MTTB: Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Turkish Students' Union)
- NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- ÖDP: Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (Freedom and Solidarity Party)
- ODTÜ: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi (Middle East Technical University)
- ODTÜ-DER: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Derneği (Middle East Technical University Association)
- ODTÜ-ÖTK: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Öğrenci Temsilcileri Konseyi (Middle East Technical University Students' Representatives Council)
- ROKETSAN: Roket Sanayii ve Ticaret A.Ş. (Roket Industry and Trade INC.)
- SBF: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi (The Faculty of Political Science)
- SDP: Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi (Socialist Democracy Party)
- SSCB: Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
- SYKP: Sosyalist Yeniden Kuruluş Partisi (Socialist Refoundation Party)
- TEKEL: Tütün, Tütün Mamulleri, Tuz ve Alkol İşletmeleri A.Ş. (Tobacco, Tobacco Products, Salt and Alcohol Enterprises Inc.)
- TGB: Türkiye Gençlik Birliği (Youth Union of Turkey)
- THKO: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (The People's Liberation Army of Turkey)
- THKP-C: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (The Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front)
- TİP: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Workers' Party of Turkey)
- TKP: Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Communist Party of Turkey)
- TMMOB: Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği (The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects)

- TÖB-DER: Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği (All Teachers' Union and Solidarity Association)
- TÖS: Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası (The Turkish Teachers' Union)
- TSİP: Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi (The Socialist Workers' Party of Turkey)
- TÜBİTAK: Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu (The Scientific and Technological Research Institution of Turkey)
- Türk-İş: Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Turkish Confederation of Trade Unions)
- TÜİK: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkish Statistical Institute)
- YÖK: Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu (The Council of Higher Education)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Today, youth and their participation in politics have become an influential agenda and discussion topic both in the world and in Turkey. In these discussions, the general argument is that youth and their relationship with politics show different characteristics compared to the years before the 1980s, which were characterized by the neoliberal transformation. This argument is supported by academic studies that show that the youth participation rate in traditional politics has decreased. In this context, different studies have emerged to understand the reasons for the current characteristics of the youth's engagement with the political field. The change in the relationship of youth with politics after the 1980s has attracted attention also in Turkey, and the reasons for this have been discussed from different perspectives. While some of the studies in this context interpreted youth as apolitical, some try to understand the reasons for changes in youth's relationship with politics. However, the re-emergence of the youth as the subject of social and political movements and the fact that they played a very active role in the revolt movements that emerged against the neoliberal order, mainly in the world and in Turkey after 2010, have led to new debates and studies on youth and their participation in politics. In response to the claims that the youth has become apolitical and not interested in politics anymore, these studies claim that the youth's perceptions of politics and political participation have drastically changed because of the neoliberal transformation process, and these changes have resulted in new participation forms and new political agendas of the youth. This discussion is also carried out in Turkey in the context of revealing new trends regarding youth participation in politics. The transition to the neoliberal accumulation strategy was realized with the coup in 1980 in Turkey. It has been institutionalized as a regime by the AKP government for 20 years. Many studies claim that the process

started with the coup is a breaking point regarding youth and their relationship with politics.

Where the whole world is changing and transforming radically and rapidly, the life experiences of young people have changed and transformed in parallel because youth is “*at the crossroads of all social reproduction processes*” (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007:3). Therefore, the neoliberal regime, which started with the change of production relations, inevitably affected the youth and other forms of relations. In line with this, it is also essential for this study to consider youth and their relationship with the political field and the transformations of the society in which they live. Looking at the new labor regime created by the neoliberal economic model that started to be implemented in the 1980s and the ideological, political, and cultural climate accompanied by this regime is vital in terms of understanding the life experiences of today's youth and revealing the characteristics of the relationship youth established with the political field.

The relationship of youth with politics is essential in Turkey quantitatively and qualitatively. According to TÜİK's 2021 data, 12 million 893 thousand 750 young people live in Turkey today. In other words, 15.4% of Turkey's population consists of young people between the ages of 15-24.¹ In Turkey, where the number of young people is considerably higher than in other countries, youth participation in politics is becoming an important issue. On the other hand, university youth have a significant proportion of the young population in Turkey. The higher education net enrolment rate is 43.4% in the 2019-2020 academic year.² This means almost half of Turkey's youth population is studying at universities. The unemployment rate among young people is breaking the historical record of 25.3%. At the same time, between 1950-1980, when the youth was most involved in the political field, university youth played a significant role. It became the determinant of the youth movement of that period and Turkey's politics. Therefore, understanding the character of today's university youth's

¹ (TÜİK Instutive, 2021)

² (TÜİK Instutive, 2021)

relationship with politics is also crucial in revealing the effects of neoliberal authoritarian processes on youth and their relations.

METU, where the field research of this study was carried out, is a critical university in Turkey's social struggle history. In that sense, METU's history is a history of social struggles. With the increasing social struggle in the 1950s, the youth struggle began to develop and strengthen within METU. If there is a difference in the character of the youth's relationship with politics today, METU constitutes a valuable field in revealing this difference. In this sense, it would be an excellent example to look at the struggle experiences of the youth developed in METU to understand the perception of the political field and their perspectives on politics at that time. Understanding the perception and attitude of current METU students towards politics and the political field is also crucial in understanding the effects of neoliberal transformation on youth.

In this context, this study is important in analyzing young people's perceptions of the political sphere and its relationship with it and the ideological, political, and cultural effects of the neoliberal authoritarian regime. Political participation can be defined as struggling to build the world you want to live in to change the existing situation. In this sense, the role of "*vanguards of social change*" is often attributed to young people representing the future (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007:137). In today's Turkey, which does not present a very bright picture for the youth, this study is important in terms of examining the character of the youth's relationship with the political arena and tracing the youth's capacity and possibilities to establish the country they want to live in.

In this context, in light of these discussions, this thesis aims to examine how METU engineering students, which are part of university youth in Turkey, define politics, how they perceive the political field, what are the characteristics of the relationship between youth and political field under a neoliberal authoritarian regime in Turkey.

To understand the character of the youth's relationship with the political sphere under neoliberal authoritarian Turkey, this study will try to find answers to the questions of how the youth defines politics and the political sphere, what kind of character the youth creates under the new social structure created by neoliberalism, and how the characteristics of neoliberalism that develops with authoritarianism affect the way the youth relate to the political sphere through findings of the field study.

This study is based on the field research conducted through semi-structured in-depth interviews with 20 students studying at the Faculty of Engineering at METU, located in Ankara, the capital city of Turkey. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. The tape recorder was used in these interviews, and all interviews were manually transcribed. The first 15 of the interviews were held before the pandemic. To see the effect of the pandemic period on the students, short 10-minute interviews were held with these interviewers while the pandemic process continued. The last five interviews took place eight months after the pandemic. METU have students that regularly participates in political and organized collective actions and activities, albeit in limited numbers. METU has a student profile that regularly participates in political and organized collective actions and activities, albeit in limited numbers. It was thought that interviewing organized students in METU, which is also known by the public for its political student population, would not be appropriate for the issue that this research has problematized. For this reason, in this study, in parallel with the research question students who are already involved in a political organization were especially excluded from the study. It is thought that interviewing students who are not engaged with any political party or political community is essential in understanding the general characteristics of the relationship of university youth with the political field. The interviewees were selected from among students who are not involved in any political organization, community or act together. Ten of the interviewees are female, and ten of them are male. An effort was made to pay attention to the diversity between departments within the faculty. Of the interviewees, 5 are Mechanical Engineering, 5 are Civil Engineering, three are Metallurgical and Materials Engineering, 2 are Computer Engineering, 3 are Industrial Engineering, and 2 are Electrical and Electronics Engineering students. While selecting the interviewees, especially those who were organized and engaged in the political field, were excluded. Two of the interviewees attended private primary and secondary school. Two of them studied at a private school (congregation) on scholarship. One of them studied at a private school (it was not asked whether they had a scholarship or not). Fourteen of the interviewees define their source of livelihood as their family. While three students described it as scholarships and family, two students defined it as scholarship and study. Thus, it can be said that thirteen of the interviewees came from lower-middle-class families, while seven of them came from middle-upper-class families.

Today, unlike many universities in Turkey, METU has a special meaning for this study because it is a university where political life continues. Even if students are not involved in any political organization, they can see the posters of various organizations, read their leaflets, and have more information about them than students in other universities. It is thought that METU is also a critical field research area in terms of examining the effect of political activity in daily life on the political perspective of youth. It is thought that being familiar with the culture and structure of the school is effective in the examination. For this purpose, it was considered that the people to be interviewed in the study should have been studying at METU for at least three years.

Engineering is referred to as a high-status profession. Therefore, it is thought that how the students studying in this faculty perceive the threat of insecurity in the years close to graduation and how the threat of unemployment affects the view on politics can be an essential perspective. In addition, it is thought that the engineering faculty students are the most affected part of the education system, which is suitable for the understanding of educating technical personnel by the market. It is thought that the effects of the relationship between education and economic capital can be represented in engineering faculty students. Considering all these, the study was conducted with engineering faculty students of METU.

During the interviews, it was informed that the names of the interviewees would be hidden to enable them to express themselves freely and comfortably. In addition, the interviewees were informed about the research aims and that the research results would only be used for academic purposes. However, during some interviews, the interviewees expressed that they hesitated to express their opinions openly. I would like to state that I had difficulty persuading the students for the interview due to the research subject. I had to make use of my personal relationships to find interviewees.

There were some advantages and limitations when doing the fieldwork. The first limitation concerns the size of the study's sample. Although attention was paid to the diversity of the sample, the study was limited to METU students. A larger sample would better reflect the analysis of how youth perceive politics and organization in Turkey. This study was carried out with a limited number of people using the in-depth

interview method. Therefore, this study has no representativeness claim. Although it does not aim to generalize the results to all university students in Turkey, it is thought to be a guide in revealing university students' perceptions about politics and organizations in Turkey. Finally, the situation that emerged as both an advantage and a disadvantage in this study stemmed from my position as a METU student. Although I am both a METU student and a person from within the youth movements, it allowed me to understand the perceptions of the youth in a more comprehensive way. Still, it created a disadvantage in ensuring objectivity in the interviews. However, throughout the study, I tried not to let my personal experiences and thoughts spoil the objectivity of the research.

1.1 Conceptual Framework

The concepts of youth and youth participation in politics began to be discussed in the literature after the emergence of youth as a social category with modernism. Youth, which is the common subject of many academic disciplines, has been interpreted and defined in different ways according to other interests. The difficulty of conceptualizing the concept of youth in an absolute way is because young people in different parts of the world have different characteristics and live under other conditions. It is beyond the scope of this study to include various definitions of youth in different disciplines. However, it is thought that it is essential to look at the different meanings of youth, which is the main subject of this study, in terms of understanding how youth is shaped in the historical and social conditions in which it takes place. Therefore, different definitions of youth within the scope of youth studies literature will be discussed.

It is thought that looking at how youth participation in politics has changed and developed throughout the historical process is necessary to understand and define youth participation today. Therefore, following the definitions of youth, the evolution of youth participation in politics from the existing literature will be outlined.

In this context, it will be tried to reveal how the youth in Turkey is handled in the literature with the neoliberal authoritarian process of Turkey. Finally, literature on how the neoliberal ideological process affects youth and their relationship with politics and the forms and characteristics of youth participation in politics, which have transformed over time, will be included in this section.

1.1.1 Youth and Political Participation

There are four approaches to the conceptualization of youth within youth studies. These are youth as a social group, as a life stage, youth as a generation, and youth as a class. These approaches made definitions of youth based on the general characteristics of youth. Still, it should be taken into account that the heterogeneous totality of youth may show different features in different social structures. Even young people outside these definitions may be influenced by socioeconomic dynamics differently in the same social structure.

The first approach, which sees the youth as a social group, is concerned with the social-psychological specificity of the youth itself. In this approach, *youth* is defined as the period when the individual's self-identity is formed and searches for values that will shape their consciousness. Thus, unlike other social groups, *youth* is defined as a socio-demographic group that can be distinguished by the characteristics of its social status brought by its age due to its socio-psychological characteristics. This definition does not allow us to evaluate the youth, the historical and structural conditions, and the transformation and change experienced there. With this approach, youth is defined only as a unique group in the process of searching and finding themselves, so their characteristics shaped by social relations cannot be explained. In addition, defining youth in this way causes us to overlook how the social and ideological hegemony created by the different accumulation regimes shapes the values and subjectivities of the youth.

The second approach defines *youth* as a life stage and sees youth as a transitional, thus, an intermediary stage. In this approach, youth is seen as a phase of the transition from dependence to autonomy, education to work, parental home to independent housing, and adult life. In this sense, this period is defined as a position of deficiency, which has not yet become an adult (Yentürk, Kurtaran, & Nemetlu, 2008). The structural-functional youth theory under the discipline of sociology also defines *youth* as a transition period. According to structural functionalists, society is an interrelated and systematic whole. Changes and transformations in the social structure include the youth, who are a part of the society, and the changes in the social system affect the youth and every aspect of the society. It is expected that the youth, who will take place in the changing social structure with their adult roles, adapt to the norms and values of

the newly formed society and integrate with the society at this transition stage. In this approach, youth is defined as a period of social semi-dependence, framed by laws and cultural norms, that bridges the dependency of childhood and the independence of adulthood (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007). Since youth is still "incomplete" and dependent on adults, they need to be guided by adults. Therefore, the youth is defined in terms of adults, and the youth is not conceptualized on the social relations established by themselves.

Nowadays, the third approach, which defines youth over generations, is widely used to describe the characteristics of youth. The concept of social generation was first used by Karl Mannheim. Mannheim defined generation as a particular age group living in the same period and having the necessary political awareness to be the driving force of social change that consciously and collectively reacts to a specific historical period or event (Rebughini & Colombo, 2019:2). The use of the concept of a generation has differed from how Mannheim defines it today. Mannheim, with his definition, attributed to the generation a feature such as having a specific political project or utopia as the sum of conscious political subjects. Today, however, the concept refers to the collective experiences of people who agree on what does not work but do not yet know what will work, rather than a group of people who share a political project or utopia (Rebughini & Colombo, 2019). According to this approach, youth are categorized by their year of birth as The Silent Generation (1925-1945), Baby Boomers Generation (1946-1964), Generation X (1965-1980), Generation Y (Millennium: 1980-2000), Z generation (the year 2000 and later). The generation debate attributes specific dominant value systems to people based on their birth year. For example, according to this categorization, while generation X is hardworking, responsible, and has strong attachments, generation Z gives more value to material things, defined as ambitious and selfish. Also, for the Z generation, attachment to anything other than themselves is meaningless (Özdemir-Yücesan, 2019). However, this concept is insufficient to explain how and why the character traits attributed to young people according to generations result in this way. This approach hides the effects of the periods in which generations live on the youth. For example, the Z generation is affected directly by neoliberalism's economic and political crisis and its insecure and futureless labor regime. The adverse effects of the existing capitalist system are rendered by defining the characteristics of the Z generation in a self-appointed way.

Since political participation is a fundamental concept for democracies, as mentioned above, it has been defined with many different ideas and forms by many scientists in the literature. While political participation was initially limited to only election activities, forms such as party campaigns, collective action, direct and indirect actions, and political violence are included with the expansion of the content. Van Deth expanded the definition of political participation to include the current forms and content of political participation today, with the definition he made in 2014 as political participation “as a voluntary activity by citizens in the area of government, politics or the state” (Deth, 2014). This definition included all current forms of participation, emphasizing that political participation should include an activity. It should be carried out by citizens, not politicians or experts, and it should arise from concerns about the government, the state, and politics (Öz Döm, 2020).

The issue of participation in politics has also started to develop with modernism as a fundamental concept in youth studies. The study of youth participation in politics, which started coinciding with this period when the youth was considered a political category, has evolved and developed with the changing and transforming social and political structure.

The classical approach to explaining youth participation in politics has developed over the socialization theories of Eisenstadt and Coleman. According to this approach, the social position of young people is formed by their participation in existing institutions and regulations (Forbrig, 2005). In parallel with this approach, Parsons conceptualizes the participation of young people as their integration into the structure of society by internalizing dominant social norms (As cited in Forbrig, 2005). This definition of youth participation is about controlling young people and regulating their activities in accordance with the requirements of the state system. This approach, which theorizes participation in relation to the approach that defines youth as a life stage mentioned above, perceived youth as a threat that would disrupt the social order, rather than prioritizing the self-realization of young people or their existence as an independent category, and therefore defined *participation* as a way of integrating young people into the system.

The later understanding of youth participation was developed by T.H. Marshall, and it was shaped around the concept of citizenship (Forbrig, 2005). This approach necessitates the participation of young citizens for social rights and responsibilities. At the same time, it requires young citizens to "belong" to their nation and to have the responsibility to contribute to its welfare. In this way, the youth was transferred from a passive, contented position to an active, responsible position. In parallel with this, the political participation of youth in communist Eastern Europe during the period when socialism and communism existed was explained with the concept of "juvenilization" (Forbrig, 2005). In this approach, youth political participation is understood as an interaction, and participation is defined as a process that ensures the development of both young people and society. From this point of view, young people are seen as a group that creates new values and changes and "renews" society through their active participation in social life. This approach is parallel with Lüküslü's approach, which sees the youth as both constructed and constructors (Lüküslü, 2009). She claimed that in the founding years of the Republic in Turkey, the youth was shaped both by the principles and values of the newly established nation-state and shaped as the founder of the newly established nation-state. However, the understanding saw youth as a threat came back after the 1980s because of the student movements that rose worldwide against the system. Thus, the approaches to youth participation in politics have returned to the understanding aimed at their integration into the existing social order again.

After the 1970s, with neoliberalism, the economy was depoliticized and was freed from regulation and auditing. In addition, with globalization, the capital was freed from the constraints of time and space and gained fluidity. This new accumulation regime spread the flexible, precarious, and casual forms of employment. The ideological, political, and cultural climate necessary for implementing these economic transformations was provided with depoliticization policies. This period was when ideological, legal, and institutional arrangements were carried out to distance the masses from the political arena. It had an impact on the relationship of youth with politics, together with all segments of society. Thus, the decrease in youth participation in politics was revealed in studies conducted after this period. It has been emphasized that this

situation, which has begun to be described as political apathy or apolitical, is valid for society in general but becomes more chronic in the context of youth (As cited in Tanyaş, 2015). Based on this view, studies have followed two main lines. The first line tried to understand the reasons for the decline in youth participation in politics in the traditional sense. In contrast, the other line sought to identify new tendencies in youth participation in politics. In the studies that formed the first trend, it was underlined that in order to understand the new characteristics of the relationship of youth with politics, it is necessary to look at the transformations that took place in the economic and social structure with neoliberalism. In an environment where the agenda and content of the policy change along with the conscious depoliticization policies of neoliberalism, it has been emphasized that the reasons for the youth's changing relationship with the political field should be addressed in the context of socio-economic, socio-political, and ideological transformations of societies (Tanyaş, 2015).

The second tendency in these studies claims that young people's interest in politics has not decreased but has gained new forms and meanings due to these transformation processes. In these studies, they argue that the nature of politics changed itself, so the new relationship of youth with politics cannot be understood by using old definitions and old concepts of politics and the political field. This understanding has become the dominant view in youth studies literature.

This argument is based on the classification of forms of participation in politics. Forms of participation in politics are classified as "conventional" and "unconventional." The first group includes forms of participation such as voting, party memberships, lobbying, following political news in the media, discussing politics with friends, etc. In contrast, the second group includes social protests, boycott movements, mass petitions, occupation movements, "unofficial" strikes, and changing consumption patterns for ethical or political reasons (Öz Döm, 2020). The recent general trend in youth studies is the argument that conventional forms of participation are decreasing, but unconventional forms of participation are gradually increasing. The reasons for this transformation are also discussed through the impact of the transformation in the economic, political, and social fields after neoliberalism on the youth. Before the transition to the neoliberal economic order, politics, state, and societal relations were based on class struggle. In this period, when the union struggle of the working class

was strong and shaped by the struggle for rights of all segments of the society, and political processes were determined through parties, classes, and ideological debates. Giddens conceptualized the politics of this period as emancipatory politics. According to him, after neoliberal transformation, emancipatory politics has been replaced by lifestyle politics in which individual self-realization is aimed with the values described as self-defining (Kolarz, 2011).³ According to this argument, the content of the political agenda has shifted from material values to post-material values. Therefore, instead of class-based movements, the new agenda of political movements are environmental movements, discrimination, anti-war, terrorism, employment, the justice system, global companies, sustainable development, children's rights, human rights, animal rights, student rights, sexuality, bullying, harassment, etc. (Tanyaş, 2015).

The third approach in the debates on youth's participation in politics is whether the way young people participate in politics can be described as a generational shift compared to the past (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007). This approach agrees with the first one about the effects of neoliberal transformation on youth's life experiences and their relationship with the political field. However, they argue that nothing definite can be said yet whether this change has led to not only a quantitative but also a qualitative transformation in the perception of the youth towards politics. According to this, today's greater individualization of young people's experiences in the labor market weakens traditional, class-based political allegiances. It causes young people to resort less to collectivist solutions (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007). On the other hand, studies with this approach state that the claim that emancipatory politics has been replaced by the politics made around the post-materialistic values defined as lifestyle politics should be approached with skepticism. The inclusion of young people in new social movements is another main argument of those who claim that there is a generational shift.⁴ However, according to third approach, the new form of social movements

³ Giddens defines this kind of politics as "...life politics concerns political issues which flow from processes of self-actualisation in post-traditional contexts, where globalizing influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely processes of self-realisation influence global strategies." (Kolarz, 2011)

⁴ In the studies carried out to understand today's changing social structure, today's society has been tried to be explained with different concepts such as late capitalism, late modernism, postmodern society. While the concepts of late capitalism/late modernism claim that today's society has undergone dramatic changes, it has not changed completely because the structural determinants have not

precisely demonstrates the intersectionality of emancipatory politics and lifestyle politics together. The anti-globalization movement, which emerged as an example of new social movements and emerged against the destructive effects of neoliberal capitalism on the political, social, and economic order, shows that old structures still determine the lives of young people. Moreover, this is still a political agenda topic for young people. However, it also shows that they prefer a way of participating in politics, which is more network-based, horizontal, decentralized, and alternative lifestyles, as opposed to the political participation forms of the past, as a form of participation in lifestyle politics. As Beck argues, political movements can simultaneously engage in struggles to reduce global risks and promote the right to develop alternative lifestyles (Beck, 1992). From this point of view, this approach argues that all of the different levels of participation of young people should be taken into account, that all forms of participation exist simultaneously, and that we are at a stage where a generational shift cannot yet be mentioned. That lifestyle politics and emancipatory politics are intersectional with each other (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007).

1.1.2. Approaches to the Youth's Political Participation in Turkey

Youth in Turkey emerged as a social category with modernization in the 19th century, parallel to the trend in the world. In parallel with the understanding that sees the youth as a citizen mentioned above, the youth was burdened with the mission of "saving the homeland" during the establishment of the Republic, including the last period of the Ottoman Empire. Lüküslü described the youth in this period as "both constructors and constructed," as explained above. Neyzi, parallel to Lüküslü, described the youth of this period as guardians of the state (Demet Lüküslü, 2009). While the youth adopted the values and principles of the newly established country in this period, they also took the responsibility of developing it by dedicating themselves.

In the period between 1950 and 1980, the understanding that saw the youth as "guardians of state" evolved into an understanding that saw the youth as a "threat" against the national interest with the revolt of the youth against the existing system

changed, so this society can be seen as a late modernism society, while the concept of postmodern society claims that today's society is completely different from the previous one and that modernism has come to an end.

and the state (Forbrig, 2005). However, it is possible to say that young people continue their duty to protect the state in this period. As will be explained in detail in the following sections, the youth rebelled against the representatives of the political field, which they thought were harming the Republic, to protect and advance it (Lüküslü, 2009). The understanding that sees the youth as a threat, anarchist, and terrorist continues from this period to the present day.

In line with the world's trend, the youth's participation in traditional politics began to decline due to the impact of the 1980 coup in Turkey, which will be analyzed in detail below, and the neoliberal transformation that followed. During this period, youth began to be defined and criticized as "apolitical youth" both in academic literature and daily use. Similar to the youth studies literature in the world, youth studies in Turkey have shown two trends after this period. Research investigating the reasons for the distant attitude of youth towards the political organization, as the first tendency, found that young people do not trust political parties and do not trust the political order (Tanyaş, 2015). In the second trend, a distinction was made between conventional forms of political participation and unconventional forms of political participation and emphasized that young people were involved in politics through new participation tools rather than non-apolitical traditional participation tools. With the influence of the youth movements that started to rise again after 2010, this second trend has gained weight in youth studies. Instead of the understanding that sees the youth as apolitical, research investigating the new participation tools of the youth has increased. Especially after the Gezi Protests in 2013, the perception that young people are not apolitical and that the way they participate in politics changed has become widespread.

Although all these approaches regarding youth participation in politics provide important data and perspectives, the fact that similar to the hegemonic "There is no alternative" discourse of neoliberalism, they presume the social conditions in which the youth live unchangeable. Therefore, this point of view ignores the social change capacity of the youth, which causes the character of the youth's relationship with the political sphere to not be evaluated in a comprehensive way. In other words, analyzing the youth's relationship with the political field with such an approach causes the glorification of the massiveness of the Gezi Movement and the new social movement repertoire it created for the new period, on the other hand, it does not provide a useful

analytical tool for answering the question of why the character of the Gezi movement, which positions itself as anti-government, does not create a new political movement that includes the political style and agendas of the new period.

In this sense, this study aims to examine the character of the youth's relationship with the political sphere, together with the impact of the wider hegemonic processes that determine the society they live in, in order to search for traces of the capacity to create social change, which is necessary for today's youth to create the country they want to live in.

1.1.3. Neoliberal Authoritarianism in Turkey

While the establishment process of neoliberalism was completed rapidly during the AKP government that came to power in 2002, Turkey's authoritarianization process accelerated. In some of the studies on the AKP period, instead of addressing the transformation of AKP, and therefore Turkey, as an authoritarianism process, they argue that unlike the first years when the AKP came to power, it carried out an authoritarian turn at some stops in the following years. The basis of this claim is that in the first years of the AKP came to power, steps were taken in line with the US and its economic policies (IMF, WB policies) to provide legitimacy in domestic and foreign policy. On the other hand, it is the beginning of implementing democratic-looking policies such as the Kurdish expansion and Alevi expansion under the EU harmonization process. However, even in these years, the appearance of democracy needs to be questioned. In this sense, instead of the argument that the AKP was democratic in its first years and then underwent an authoritarian transformation, in this study, Poulantzas's claim is considered to be a better tool to explain Turkey and the AKP years, which was authoritarianism is the current and usual state form of neoliberalism (Karahanoğulları & Türk, 2018:405).

In 2006, after the EU accession negotiations stopped, the reforms made within the scope of the EU harmonization process were also stopped, and democratic discourses such as the Kurdish expansion were quickly replaced by nationalist and political Islamist discourses in line with the tradition. Therefore, we see that this search for legitimacy came to an end with the 2007 general elections (Atılğan et al., 2015:873-875).

In order to reduce the effects of the economic crisis that shock the world deeply in 2008, this model was supported with state resources. It has been tried to keep the construction-oriented experience alive with mega projects such as Kanal Istanbul, 3rd Airport, 3rd Bridge, Three-Storey Bosphorus Crossing Tunnel, Nuclear Power Stations, construction of the world's third-largest border wall with a length of 564 km to the Syrian border, etc. (Karahanoğulları & Türk, 2018:405). Natural assets have been plundered at great speed, both through these projects and through privatizations. However, the interruption of capital inflows to the country due to the crisis experienced in the world, the decrease in demand and thus the decrease in profitability expectations created a crisis in the Turkish economy, which is dependent on hot money flow and speculative values. Therefore, AKP's consensus-based policy has reached its limits both politically and economically.

The acceleration of the authoritarianism process coincides with this multifaceted crisis that the AKP is beginning to experience. The AKP government, operating a process quite parallel to Poulantzas' definition of the neoliberal authoritarian state. Poulantzas defined these characteristics as:

Concentration of power in the executive power; blurring of the separation of powers; transformation of the boundaries of public and private spheres; arbitrary policies restricting civil liberties; a rapid decline in the role of political parties and the transfer of their functions to the bureaucracy; the rise of technocracy; increased use of physical and symbolic violence by the state; the creation of a giant web of social control; the transfer of power from an official and open level to a 'core' executive group, thus replacing public information with state secrets; in order to realize all this, the legal system of the rule of law is turned upside down and finally the process progresses in a contradictory and inconsistent character, giving the impression that it is blind (As cited in Karahanoğulları & Türk, 2018:406).

Similar to Poulantzas, Boukalas identifies two general tendencies in authoritarian neoliberal states. These; the consolidation of executive power at the expense of state-level legislative and judicial apparatuses, and the marginalization and suppression of large sections of society by criminalizing their political activities and use of democratic channels (As cited in Kaygusuz, 2018:283). While the first trend allows neoliberal authoritarian states to use excessive force, it also strengthens political parties and the parliamentary system by giving all power to the executive. As a result, it also blocked any control over execution. The feature of the second trend means that

the state gradually shifts from trying to stay in power by consent to clinging to power by force.

1.1.4. The Character under the New Capitalist Culture

The character of today's youth has been mainly influenced by the labor regime created with neoliberalism and the ideological, political, and cultural climate that made the institutionalization of this new labor regime possible.

The labor regime is characterized by flexibility, fragmentation, casualization, and temporality in late capitalism. This new labor regime, which is shaped by short-term, flexible, temporary, part-time employment forms created a new worker profile. This profile is characterized by flexibility, accessibility at any time, can be employed, being open to constant change, constantly improving oneself, ready for a new start every day, and does not expect any guarantee. In this new regime, individuals are made responsible for increasing their employability by improving their skills or acquiring new skills, investing in themselves, and capitalizing on themselves. Thus, the neoliberal accumulation strategy created a new precarious labor regime (Aksu et al., 2021).

A precarious labor regime means that the future is uncertain and never guaranteed. All of this creates a subject who feels the need to constantly improve oneself, compete with others, focus on the present by trying not to think about the uncertainties of the future, and cope with new risks that are constantly emerging. The characteristics of this new worker in the new capitalism, where flexibility, insecurity, superficial and temporary relationships, and lack of commitment are the determinants of the new work relations, are not limited to business life but become determining all the relationships established by the new subject. Thus, impermanence, non-attachment, avoidance of commitment, and belonging become the lifestyle of the new subject.

Not being attached to anything in the new social structure created by the new nature of the economy, being open to all kinds of options, and the fact that uncertainty and instability are the basic norms have also affected the young people's life experiences and understanding of how they live. Manuela du Bois-Reymond said that every individual becomes a project in this new age, and every plan for the future becomes an ever-changing blueprint. He claimed that "I do not want to commit myself" is a

strategy used by young people to cope with the imminent challenges of the emerging environment where everything is changing so fast (Bois-Reymond, 2012:63-79). The spread of uncertainty in all areas of life causes young people to avoid committing to something. This situation has also led to a change in the sense of belonging among young people. The sense of belonging is one of the important motivations for political participation. It is accepted as one of the main motivations for political participation, as people who feel belonging to the society in which they are involved provide more participation in the political arena (Öz Döm, 2020). Being aware of having common needs or concerns with others not only encourages doing something for people who have the same problems as themselves but also strengthens the belief that one can change. However, today, under the competitive structure of the new society created by neoliberalism, individuals have difficulty feeling that they belong to the society, a group, or a person. The structure of the sense of belonging that requires mutual dependence and trust is quite contradictory to the new nature of neoliberal society.

With the principle of "no long term" the constantly changing, short-term, new society structure that requires individuals to constantly compete to make progress has caused the old values such as trust and attachment to change has caused the sense of belonging of people to be damaged (Sennett, 2002:23-25).

The fact that coping with individual problems is often inconclusive also damages young people's belief in hope and change, which is another important motivation for political participation. In the face of this situation, which is well riveted with the rhetoric of "there is no alternative" to neoliberalism, young people find it difficult to see the possibility of another life, and their vital motivations, such as hope to struggle, are negatively affected.

It is important to emphasize that today's emerging distrust of politics and its representatives is not directed only to the representatives of the political field but can be encountered even in the minor relationships that young people establish in daily life. The fact that trusting requires a feeling of belonging and naturally taking responsibility for that relationship and devoting oneself makes it difficult for young people to take part in the collective in terms of their characters shaped under the social structure created by neoliberalism.

Beck defined the society created by neoliberalism as a risk society (Beck, 1992). Stating that all the values that characterize the industrial society have undergone a historical transformation and, as a result, a risk society has emerged, Beck said that uncertainty had replaced predictability and certainty under neoliberalism. Individuals are forced to struggle with these uncertainties individually in this emerging society (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007). Sennet similarly stated that the flexible, fragmented, and casualization of the labor structure of the new capitalism created new forms of oppression for individuals, which in turn affected their emotional and psychological well-being (Sennett, 2002:140).

Another dimension of this situation is the understanding that causes the problems experienced by people stemming from the political, economic, and social structures of neoliberalism to be perceived as their failures. The widespread understanding that sees structural problems such as poverty and unemployment as individuals' deficiencies and mistakes causes the individualization of the risks brought by social life. Therefore, the ways that the new individual, who perceives the problems he is experiencing as his own individual problems, resorts to solutions are directed towards individual rather than collective ones. This new order, which prevents the formation of collective identities, therefore reduces the capacity of collective action. Furlong and Cartmel express this situation in these words: "The individualization of risk may mean that situations that would once have led to a call for political action are now interpreted as something that can only be solved individually through personal action. The search for solutions to entrenched inequalities tends to become focused on individual 'deficiencies' rather than social and economic structures" (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007:6).

However, it is essential to emphasize that although this risk created by neoliberalism is a fact that makes it difficult for the growing youth to form a collective identity, it does not entirely eliminate the possibility of developing a collective identity. The rapidly increasing youth unemployment created by neoliberalism, insecure employment conditions, and the ever-increasing debts of the youth bring the feeling of anger among the youth. It is possible to say by looking at the movements that emerged after 2011 that the ways necessary for the combination of anger with hope are not entirely blocked. However, how to make these ways more open remains an influential agenda.

1.2 Outline of Chapters

To begin with, in the second chapter, the period between 1950-1980, which is mentioned as the rise of the youth movement, will be examined through the struggle agendas and practices of the youth in order to reveal the characteristics of the relationship established by today's university youth in Turkey with the political field and to examine the character of the alleged change in this relationship.

Secondly, the 1980 coup, which is expressed as a breaking period in terms of the history of social struggle in Turkey, and the dynamics of the economic, political, and social transformation experienced after it will be tried to be examined in the context of today's youth and its impact on youth movements.

Thirdly, the characteristics of the AKP period, which covers the entire lives of today's youth, will be tried to be examined from the effect on youth and youth movements. The struggle experiences of the youth, such as the Gezi Movement and the METU road protests that have developed in the last 20 years, will be examined to understand the youth's view of the political field and the relationship they have established with it. Finally, in this section, the transformation of METU before and after 1980 in terms of understanding the youth, which has particular importance in terms of the history of social struggle in Turkey and is the subject of field research, and the current effects of this transformation in terms of youth movements will be tried to be revealed.

Chapter 3, in the theoretical and conceptual framework, will be tried to analyze whether the tendencies that emerged in the analyses on the participation of youth in politics are valid for the university youth in Turkey today, based on the findings of the field research. In this context, first of all, to determine the policy agendas of the youth, the areas that they see as problems in the country will be tried to be revealed. Then, it will be tried to examine how the youth defines the parliamentary and non-parliamentary political parties, which represent the traditional form of participation in Turkey, which is thought to be determinative in the youth's perception of the organization. In this context, it will be tried to reveal how young people evaluate the ruling parties, opposition parties, and opposition political parties outside the parliament and determine their effects on the youth's perception of the organization.

In Chapter 4, the effects of the neoliberal authoritarian transformation, which started in the 1980s and gained momentum under the AKP rule, on today's youth will be tried to be analyzed from the field research findings in the context of the discussions in the literature. In this context, it will be attempted to examine the transformations created in the sense of belonging of the youth. Secondly, the effects of the years under AKP rule on the change in beliefs and feelings of hope, which are among the main motivations for youth participation in politics, will be analyzed with the relationships of youth with the political field. Finally, in this section, the impact of the change and transformation experienced through the consequences of the rise of authoritarianism with neoliberalism in Turkey on the possibility of organizing and creating social change among young people today will try to be revealed.

The fifth chapter briefly evaluates the conclusion derived from the research.

CHAPTER 2

YOUTH AND POLITICS IN TURKEY

Since the 19th century, youth has become one of the important subjects in Turkey's political field. However, the period after the 1960s is crucial in terms of youth movements. From this period to the 1980s, first-time youth appeared in the political field as an organized movement. In this period, youth, with their organized power, shaped mainstream politics and became the driving force for all social struggles of that time. It is important to emphasize that the 1960s was a period when not only the youth but the whole society became politicized. The working class, peasants, civil servants, and young people took part in the political field as active subjects in an unprecedented way in the history of Turkey. Also, political ideologies such as socialism and nationalism began to find resonance in society in this period (Atılğan et al., 2015). The coup in 1980 was a major breaking point for Turkey. It is possible to say that the formation of today's political, economic, and social structure began on this date. (Karahanoğulları & Türk, 2018).

As said in the introduction part, this thesis examines the characteristics of today's Turkish youth's relationship with the political field. In parallel with the aim of the study, in this part, the effects of the historical and structural transformations of Turkey on youth and youth movements will be evaluated.

In this context, in this section, firstly, the rise of youth movements, their political agendas, practices, and their relationship with the political field in the period from the 1950s to the 1980s will be presented. It is thought that revealing all these features of the youth movement of this period will enable us to more clearly determine the effects of the transformation experienced after the 1980 period on today's youth. Secondly, the 1980 coup, which was a breaking period in terms of Turkey's social struggle

history, and the dynamics of the economic, political, and social transformation that followed, will be examined in the context of today's youth and its impact on youth movements. It is thought that this period, which is characterized by the policies implemented for the depoliticization of society and of the authoritarianism process that developed with neoliberalism, has deeply affected and transformed the youth and the relationship they have established with the political sphere today, together with the whole society.

Thirdly, the view of today's political, social, and economic structure will be tried to be given to understand how today's youth view politics, how they evaluate the political field, and how they relate to it. With the AKP coming to power after the 2002 elections, the neoliberal authoritarianism process gained momentum and became institutionalized. It is possible to describe the process that developed with the AKP government and continues today as another breaking point (Atilgan et al., 2015). While trying to present today's political and social structure in general terms, it will also try to put the characteristics of the struggle of the youth against the transformation experienced in this process. In this context, the struggle experiences of the youth, such as the Gezi Movement and the METU Road Protests that have occurred in the last 20 years, will be examined to understand the youth's view of the political field and the relationship they have established with it.

Lastly, METU will be examined as a separate topic in this section. As mentioned, METU is a critical university in Turkey's social struggle history. It is thought that revealing the transformation of METU and its current effects in youth movements will make it easier to understand the youth and their perspectives, which are the subject of the field research. In this context, two different periods of METU (before and after 1980) will be examined under two separate topics.

2.1 University Youth and Politics in Turkey between 1950-1980

Although the period between 1950 and 1980 was experienced under different accumulation models in Turkey, these years could be roughly described as the process of Turkey's integration into the world capitalist system. As a result of this articulation process, Turkey has become increasingly dependent on other countries and foreign capital and has experienced successive economic crises. The independence of the

economy was lost with the policies that the IMF wanted to be implemented in return for the debt. The country's political independence was also abolished by becoming a member of NATO (Atılğan et al., 2015: 518-656). The DP and AP governments that came to power in this period increased the oppression and violence “to solve” the economic crises and restricted fundamental rights and freedoms. In the period that continued until 1980, it could be said that the crisis of representation continued by reaching larger dimensions. When the fragmented political representation structure, coalition governments disintegrate one after another, the parliament’s functionless due to disagreements between the parties, the interruption of democracy and its institutions by coups and memorandums, combined with the economic crises experienced one after another; the struggles for social rights and social opposition rapidly increased and became politicized (Atılğan et al., 2015). During this period, opposition to the representatives of the political field rose, struggles for rights began in different parts of the society and spread rapidly throughout the country.

This period started in the 1950s has critical importance in terms of youth and its struggle. In this period, the youth emerged as the subject of the political field in the social struggle, became developed, and gave direction to it. At that time, 60% of the Turkish population consisted of young people under the age of 25 (As cited in Demet Lüküslü, 2009:59). However, it is important to emphasize that the main constituents of the youth, which is mentioned as the political field subject, were mostly university youth. The university youth quantitatively constituted 1% of the youth at that time (As cited in Demet Lüküslü, 2009:61) identified the problems of Turkey with the responsibility of being the minority of the society that had the chance to have education, organized for the solution of these problems and entered the political field to try to make Turkey a better country. This period was a period in which the sense of belonging that young people felt towards the country was relatively high. As it was mentioned in the introduction republican era, the youth was the segment that symbolized the society of the future. It was expected to act with the responsibility of protecting and developing the homeland (Lüküslü, 2009:69). It is possible to say that the youth carried this assigned role and responsibility in the period between 1950 and 1980.

The main agenda of the first years of the youth's struggle in this period was anti-imperialism and the struggle for independence. The youth thought that the policies caused Turkey to become an increasingly foreign-dependent country. Thus, they argued that Turkey's problems can only be solved by creating a fully independent Turkey (Atılğan et al., 2015:518-656). In this context, being against Turkey's relations with the USA, its agreements, and the military bases established by NATO in-country constituted the main theme of the first years of the youth struggle. It could be said that the atmosphere of relative "freedom" brought by the 1961 Constitution written after the 1960 coup is critical in terms of the development and strengthening of the social opposition. The definition of the right to resist, form a union, and be a member of the constitution has strengthened the struggle rising from different parts of society.

Industrialization, which developed in parallel with Turkey's integration process with capitalism, increased the number of workers in the factories, accelerated the migration from the village to the city, and caused an increase in the slums (Atılğan et al., 2015:518-656). With the effects of the economic crisis being felt and implementing the austerity policies mandated by the IMF, the workers started to take the streets and organize with strikes and struggles for rights. They established unions for different sectors, and again in this period, they combined the power of the unions under the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DİSK). Statistics made in July 1967 showed that the Turkish working class made 175 strikes and 3,229 contracts between 1963 and 1967 when the whole society was rapidly politicized (Atılğan et al., 2015:616). The Turkish Teachers' Union (TÖS) was also established during this period with the organization of teachers. The December 15 TTU strike took place with the participation of 80% of teachers (Atılğan et al., 2015:614). Poor and landless peasants also took their place among those who fought for their rights in this period. Tobacco, hazelnut, garlic, chickpea, and beet producers took action for their rights and organized occupations. Youth also struggled with the peasants in their actions.

The first mass action of the Federation of Idea Clubs (FKF), the left youth organization of the period, which will be mentioned in more detail later, was carried out together with tobacco-producing peasants in Akhisar and Ödemiş. (Çalışkan, 2002:19) The Workers' Party of Turkey was founded on February 13, 1961, also in this period (Atılğan et al., 2015:569). The social struggle has risen in this way with the

politicization of the whole society. It is important to emphasize that the youth's main supporters of all this social mobility. As mentioned above, the youth did not see their own problems as separate from the country's problems and struggled to solve the problems with the responsibility they felt for the country. They fought together with the workers, peasants, and teachers who overflowed the streets with the struggle for rights, and youth took the lead in politicizing these struggles. The youth showed significant participation in the occupations of the peasants, the strikes of the workers, and the actions organized by the teachers; they have made anti-imperialism, and the struggle for independence the main agenda of these rising struggles and have enabled these struggles to get stronger by uniting. The youth's meeting with socialist ideas and thoughts during this period effectively enlarged the struggle by including all demands of all segments of society in the struggle for rights (Atılgan et al., 2015:518-656). The ideological and political positions of the youth movement began to emerge during this period well. The youth had established various organizations and associations according to their political positions and ideologies. It could be said that two ways appeared in this period in terms of youth organizations: right and left youth organizations. It is important to look closely at the structure and functioning of the organizations established by the youth in this period to understand the perspective of the youth movements of this period on organization and their relations with the political field.

2.1.1. Youth Organizations between the 1960s-1980s

In this period, the first organizations formed by students who adopted the leftist view in universities were established Socialist Idea Clubs. These clubs, which organized extensive discussions among university youth, united in 1965 and formed the Federation of Idea Clubs. The leaders of FKF consisted of young people who adopted the perspective of TİP (Atılgan et al., 2015:594). In this sense, it can be said that TİP has made an important contribution to the development of FKF. According to Özbudun, although the Turkish society of the period seemed to be a politicized society, this politicization was not done through political parties but went through associations, organizations, etc. (as cited in Demet Lüküslü, 2009: 79). There was a parallel situation in terms of youth movements. In this period, the youth was organized and politicized by using tools such as organizations, student clubs, and associations they founded.

Although the youth who had a very distant approach to the Republican People's Party (CHP) and other right-wing parties and initially developed close relations with TİP, they will begin to display a distant attitude towards TİP as a result of the emergence of some ideological differences and the methods of the struggle between TİP and the youth (Demet Lüküslü, 2009:80). It could be seen that there was a distance between the youth and political parties in this period as well. The youth in this period chose the path of struggle by becoming politicized through the organizations they founded.

In the 1960s, FKF struggled with the demands of university students in Turkey, organized university occupations, boycotts, and protests to demand university reform to democratize universities, and involved students in decision-making mechanisms regarding university management movements mostly resulted in achievements. It could be said that the most distinctive feature of the youth organizations of this period was that they did not see their own problems as separate from the problems of the country and that they organized the struggle for anti-imperialism and the independence of the country in a way that would unite demands of all social segments. While the struggle for anti-imperialism continued unabated, a period of intense attacks was started. In 1968, there was a period known as the '68 protests worldwide. All students in Europe and America took to the streets with many demands, especially university reform. Students around the world also held large meetings, occupied universities, and organized boycotts during this period. It was impossible that this atmosphere around the world would not affect Turkey. The current student movements in Turkey gained momentum in this period. In 1968, the first boycott took place in the Ankara Faculty of Languages and History-Geography (DTCF), with the university youth demanding university reform. The occupation and boycotts, which spread to all big cities in a short time, became more and more massive. Furthermore, it ended with the achievements of the students (Bürkev, 2016:71).

However, it should be noted that unlike the ones in the world, the attacks done by the rightist exceeded the university reform demands of the student movement in Turkey and turned into an anti-imperialist struggle, which put Turkey in a different position from the student movements in the world. The rising right-wing student movements against the rise of leftist opposition student movements made Turkey different from

the rest of the world. In this sense, it is essential to look at the right-wing youth organizations developed in Turkey.

The increasing prevalence of leftist and socialist ideas and the demand for independence started to cause discomfort in the anti-communists and the ruling classes. One of the distinguishing features of this period is the inclusion of violent methods in the social struggle by right-wing organizations (Atılğan et al., 2015:590-594). During the period, in which social opposition gradually gained strength and started to unite around socialism, right-wing organizations attacked the protests and began to injure and kill students. In 1966, crowded demonstrations were held in Ankara, Istanbul, and İzmir against the 6th Fleet (which was described as the symbol of American imperialism), visiting Turkish ports. Right-wing students supported by the AP attacked these demonstrations, and they injured many leftist students. As the youth organizations on the right, there were the Turkish Anti-Communism Association, Grey Wolves, and the National Turkish Students' Union in this period. They carried out aggressive actions such as attacking the activities of the social opposition and raiding the buildings and congresses of the TİP (Atılğan et al., 2015:591). Although the establishment of the National Turkish Students' Union (MTTB) dated back to 1916, it became an effective youth organization in 1965. This Union, which pioneered the meetings to condemn communism, existed as a formal umbrella organization for both Islamists and nationalists during these years. When it came to 1969 after the Islamists and nationalists put up separate candidates, this partnership was dissolved, and the Unity remained with the Islamists. Politicians such as Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Bülent Arınç, Devlet Bahçeli took part in various levels of the MTTB (Atılğan et al., 2015:590-594).

One of the other right-wing organizations of the period was the Grey Wolves, formed by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). MHP was founded on February 9, 1969, by changing the name of the Republican Peasant Nation Party founded by Alparslan Türkeş. In his speech at the RPNP Istanbul Youth Branches Congress, Türkeş also expressed the founding aims of the MHP by saying: "The bastards who want to drag our country into lawlessness, the bondage of communism. Will be crushed" (Atılğan et al., 2015:593). As it could be understood from these words, the MHP has defined itself in terms of anti-communism since its establishment and stated that its methods

also include violence. The Grey Wolves, known as the youth branches of the MHP, started to organize based on faculties in different universities after 1967. The members of this association who attended the commando camps were trained for actions such as raiding the meetings of socialists, breaking the windows of the bookstores, etc. The ‘‘Mustafa Kemal March Against Imperialism’’ held during this period exemplifies this violence. This march went down in history as ‘‘Bloody Sunday’’.⁵ Islamist and nationalist groups attacked the demonstration on anti-imperialism organized by labor unions, professional organizations, and student organizations after the prayer in congregation. 2 people were killed, and 124 people were injured as a result of this attack (Atılğan et al., 2015:590-594).

As the social opposition grew in different areas, the violence of the attacks intensified. Thereupon, FKF, the organization of the opposition youth of this period, changed its name to the Revolutionary Youth Federation of Turkey (DEV-GENÇ) due to the necessity of fighting together against the increasing right-wing violence experienced by all social segments. DEV-GENÇ has been an essential pillar of the youth movements developed after the 1971 Memorandum.

Due to ideological and political differences, DEV-GENÇ was divided into two organizations, the People’s Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO) and the Turkish People’s Liberation Party-Front (THKP-C). These two organizations, which saw the armed struggle as the way to protect themselves and ensure the liberation of Turkey against the rising right-wing violence during this period, carried out various actions throughout Turkey.

In the period that started with the Military Memorandum on March 12, 1971, Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan, and Hüseyin İnan, three of the leaders of THKO, were imprisoned and stood trial for the death penalty. Thereupon, to stop these executions, one of the leaders of the THKP-C, Mahir Çayan, and his friends, together with the feeling of revolutionary solidarity, kidnapped 3 British in NATO’s Ünye base and took them hostage with the demand for THKO’s militants’ release. As a result of the operation in Kızıldere, except for Ertuğrul Kürkçü, Mahir Çayan (26) and his friends

⁵ (‘‘Kanlı Pazar’’ın 45. Yıldönümü,’’ n.d.)

were killed by the soldiers. Then, on May 6, 1972, Deniz Gezmiş (24), Yusuf Aslan (25), and Hüseyin İnan (23) were put to death.

In her book titled ‘‘Türkiye’de Gençlik Miti’’, Demet Lüküslü presented an argument that took place in most of her studies examining the youth movements of the period. According to Lüküslü: ‘‘In 1968, the university occupation and boycotts were so strong that they could gather different youth around the problems of the university education system. When this movement became more politicized and believed in the necessity of resorting to violence, the broad masses withdrew their support, leading to further marginalization of the movement.’’ (As cited in Demet Lüküslü, 2009:80). The picture above invalidates this argument because, as emphasized above, the youth struggle in this period did not deal with student problems separately from the country’s anti-imperialism and independence issues. In a context where the whole society was politicized, the youth movement was able to gain power, rise, and expand by being more politicized. The claim that it was marginalized by the armed struggle and withdrew the support of large masses could be falsified by looking at the solidarity and signature campaigns launched against the executions and the large-scale actions carried out just before the process that resulted in deaths.

The social struggle that arose during this period was broken with the military coup in 1971. Leftist students, intellectuals, academics, workers, and villagers were detained, tortured, arrested, and died under torture. As Nihat Erim said after the 71st Memorandum, this period hit all left opposition groups like a sledgehammer.

The recovery of the left movement after March 12 took the year 1974. It is possible to say that the political crisis continued in this process until 1980, and the representation crisis continued under fragmented political representations and coalition governments. This period, in which economic policies that continue to be implemented today and today’s political representations emerged, combined with the financial crisis resulting from the reflection of the economic crisis in the world to Turkey. The rise in inflation due to the economic crisis has reduced the incomes of the working class. Accordingly, the struggle of the working class increased, unionization rates increased, and strikes, workplace occupations, and marches began to leave their mark on the period. Similarly, teachers organized by establishing the All Teachers’ Union and Solidarity

Association (TÖB-DER) instead of TÖS, which was closed in 1971. The villagers carried out actions in the struggle for rights, organized meetings to end the exploitation, and fought against the black market, which was the biggest problem of the period. Although the struggles became widespread in all segments of society, the youth was the most important actor of this period as well. (Atılğan et al., 2015:668-675) Wherever they are in Turkey, those who have suffered injustice, landless peasants, producers, slum people whose slums are wanted to be demolished, workers going on strike. The youth took part in the struggles of all segments of society and organized the struggle with them shoulder to shoulder.

Lüküslü defined the general tendency of university students in Turkey as authoritarian and elitist during this period. (Demet Lüküslü, 2009) To exemplify these tendencies, she used the quantitative researches made about that period. For instance, she proposed that the reason for the popularity of the "administration for the people" response, when compared to "administration by the people" among students' leaders, is the authoritarian tendencies of students. (Demet Lüküslü, 2009:66-70) At the same time, she expressed that the university youth of this period was youth who was ready to sacrifice themselves for the country, similar to the first generation of the Republic, by supporting it with quantitative research; however, she claimed that this picture began to take a beating in the 1970s and university students' loss of their primary role with the massification of university education makes them authoritarian and elitist because they saw themselves as superior to the "uneducated public" despite losing their primary function. (Demet Lüküslü, 2009:66-70) It is evident that such a thing could not define the authoritarian tendency. In particular, ignoring this feature of university youth, who were in solidarity with all social segments described above, and considering their sense of responsibility as authoritarianism may both cause an incomplete, wrong definition of the university youth of the past. Erroneous conclusions could be reached by comparing today's youth over the past. In addition, the examples of democracy put forward by the university youth, both in the decisions they took and the implementation of these decisions, show that the youth was quite different from the authoritarian and elitist tendencies.

When we look at the other agendas of the youth struggle in this period, we see that the demand for life safety and freedom of learning came to the fore.⁶ Although the 1971 coup inflicted heavy damage on the left opposition groups, it strengthened the right organizations and gained time to organize. As a result, the revolutionary youth movements that started to recover after 1974 faced more severe and intense attacks than before 1971. Groups led by the MHP attacked left-wing and opposition students, and the scale of the attacks gradually increased. School occupations, dormitory raids, knife, and armed attacks have started to cause students to be unable to enter universities. Under these circumstances, the students organized themselves against these attacks after March 12.⁷

Parties and organizations representing the left in this period can be listed as TİP, Socialist Workers' Party of Turkey (TSİP), Socialist Revolution Party (SDP), Revolutionary Path (DEV-YOL), and People's Liberation. (HK), and Liberation (Atılğan et al., 2015:706-707). On the other hand, the DEV-YOL was the movement that came to prominence on a mass scale. The leading cadres of these organizations have still consisted of the youth. Still, the DEV-YOL had become the revolutionary organization of the people by organizing in the villages and factories at an incredible speed. Students also established their organizations in this period.

The first youth organizations established in this period were İYÖKD (Istanbul Higher Education and Culture Association) in Istanbul and ADYÖD (Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association) based in Ankara (Çalışkan, 2002:219). However, these two associations were closed in a short time by martial law. After this situation, the students established an association again and organized forums in universities where every anti-imperialist and anti-fascist young person could participate. In the forums, where long discussions on the problems and agendas of the youth were held, it was decided to elect three faculty representatives to determine the association's founding principles. Faculty representatives also gathered among themselves and formed an upper forum. Every decision taken was discussed by the broad masses of young people and submitted for approval in school forums. Then these decisions were put into

⁶ (1960'lardan 1980'lere Gençlik ve Mücadelesi Dev-Genç Savunması, 2011: 129-132)

⁷ (1960'lardan 1980'lere Gençlik ve Mücadelesi Dev-Genç Savunması, 2011:129-132)

practice together with the elected administration (Çalışkan, 2002:219-223). These organizational efforts of the youth, which take the bottom-up organization as a model, set an excellent example of democracy. In addition to İYÖKD and ADYÖD, various organizational activities have been started in high schools. METU Association (ODTU-DER), which will be discussed in more detail in the METU section, was the first university-wide association established after March 12 (Çalışkan, 2002:223).

The characteristic that describes the 60-year adventure of METU is opposition. The history of METU can also be considered as Turkey's history of social struggle. While the intellectual knowledge of the university widened the perspective of the struggle, the dynamism of the youth caused them to exist as the most influential subject in the history of social struggle, to shape and direct it.

2.1.2. METU in the Period until the 1980 Coup D'état

METU is also an iconic place for the youth movement. METU is involved in shaping youth movements that started to flourish again after 1980 and at every stage of the resistance against the AKP government today. It is indisputable that the political and social structure experienced today is quite different. It is a fact that the youth and their reaction and organization are also different. In this sense, it is undoubtedly important to look at the historical development of METU to understand how the youth's view of organization has been shaped and what kind of transformations have taken place in their perceptions of politics.

METU was founded in 1956 by the USA. It was managed by an American consultant, in addition to being covered by the USA at all costs (Çalışkan, 2002:3-10). Unlike other universities in Turkey, it had a special regulations and was managed by a board of overseers. The education language was English. American faculty members were giving lectures to students selected through special examinations. The establishment of METU reflected the social and political conditions (Americanism) in the 1950s, as detailed above. METU, which was established for the need for technical staff that the USA could use in countries (especially in the Middle East) where it dominated as a result of cheap brainpower creation and a new accumulation model, had an intense curriculum (Çalışkan, 2002:3-10). In the interview former USA Ambassador Commer

gave to journalist Ufuk Güldemir following the burning of his car, it was revealed that this was a conscious and ideological situation:

I think the METU incident was a sign of new development in terms of political science. It is an indication of America's failure to see the political dimension of the issue. In those years, we thought that we could keep METU students out of politics by placing their curriculum in technical fields. The heavy concentration courses in electricity and physics would have prevented students from being politicized, according to our minds at the time. However, it was impossible to keep the university outside the increasingly politicized Turkey (As cited in Çalışkan, 2002:108).

Even though the content of the curriculum as determined by the USA, METU started to change its situation with the opening of the preparatory school in 1966 (Çalışkan, 2002:19). Until then, the school only accepted college graduates and started to have a different profile from other high school graduate students from different parts of society.

The fact that METU selected its students through a unique examination system and that there is a requirement to know a foreign language until the preparatory school board is already in an environment where only a very small minority could go to university. Therefore, the student profile of METU was generally composed of children from middle-upper class families who gave importance to education. For this reason, METU had a different profile from other universities of that period with its relatively outstanding students and had the knowledge and equipment to pass the qualifying examinations. Ten years after its establishment, METU has created the best academic staff. Administrative staff, on the other hand, were selected through a system such as suggestion-appointment by taking the opinions of the faculty members. However, they were selected by the appointment method (Bürkev, 2016:25-31). In this way, democratic functioning was also ensured under the management of METU. Apart from these, the absence of a chair dominance system, unlike in other universities, enabled a non-hierarchical, horizontal relationship between students and academics.

The learning opportunities organized in this way for METU students emerged as a plus advantage in this period. METU Socialist Ideas Club was founded in 1965, and the METU Student Union led to the intensification of anti-imperialism and socialism discussions within the university. Free Thought Clubs, formed by the Grey Wolves and the Justice Party members, started to operate in the school in the first years of this

period. In such an atmosphere, the effects of these discussions became visible in the METU student union elections, and a period of politicization started among all students with posters, leaflets, and discussions held by each group on issues such as worldview and university view. This is why it has been inevitable for METU students, who are rapidly informed about the developments in the world, to show interest in the rising anti-imperialist struggle in Turkey.

As is often emphasized above, METU students, like the students of other universities, started to support the villagers' actions and the workers' strikes. In this period, it is important to look at the olive oil corruption action and the summer activities held in the villages to understand better how university students internalized society's problems.

To examine the "olive oil" corruption that emerged in June 1967, the METU Student Union visited the Aegean region in cooperation with other universities (Çalışkan, 2002: 21-22). The youth, who scanned all the villages from Edremit to Milas, talked about the American exploitation in Turkey in the villages they visited and distributed the brochures they had prepared. They organized summer activities in the villages to better understand the villagers' conditions and understand their relations and contradictions (Çalışkan, 2002:22-26). Within the scope of the summer activities, the problems of the peasant producers were learned by walking around the village for 45 days, the difficulties experienced in the production were observed one by one, the working conditions of the working class, the places they lived in, the land distributions, and what they produced were revealed with a scientific method. The research was carried out on the development rates in the regions and how much the mining enterprises contributed to the area economically and socially. This work was later published as a book. This example, in which scientific and social work is carried out together, is vital for understanding the university youth of this period.

Ercan Enç, who talked about the land occupation in Elmalı in 1967 in "ODTU", the media organ of the Student Union, explains how they carried out these studies:

Turkey is a backward country, and METU students are also university students of society, 60% of whom are illiterate; by cutting off their livelihood, a university student who knows his responsibility, understands the reason for the backwardness of the country, and loves his country and the masses living on its

territory. There is nothing more natural than a university student's desire to get to know their people better, tell them the truth, and go to the vast plains of Anatolia for this purpose (Çalışkan, 2002:26-28).

In this period, the youth could not remain insensitive to the problems experienced by society, and with such a consciousness, they pioneered the organization of all social opposition. As mentioned above, the main agenda of this period was anti-imperialism and the struggle for independence. The burning of Commer's car, one of the most symbolic events of this struggle, took place in METU. On January 6, 1969, when the US Ambassador, known as the "Butcher of Vietnam", visited METU, the students burned Commer's car (Çalışkan, 2002:78-80). To understand the politicization of METU students, it is an essential example that a large number of METU students (4 thousand METU students) petitioned the prosecutor's office by saying "I burned it" to show solidarity with their friends who were arrested after this incident (Bürkev, 2016:104). Volunteering 200 lawyers to defend the arrested youth is an important indicator of how much the anti-imperialist struggle is adopted in society. Students started the occupation of the university in 1969 to denounce what happened in the country and at the university. METU was closed for a month by the academic council due to the events.

Meanwhile, METU student Taylan Özgür, who went to support the Istanbul University Student Union elections, was shot and dead by the police. After this first death, the rising social struggle in 1969 later continued with the right-wing attacks.

METU went to March 12 in such an atmosphere. With the rise of social opposition in 1974, the youth started to recover in METU. During this period, attacks took place in METU, students from METU were targeted at the bus stop, and faculty members were faced with threats and attacks as in other universities. While METU students were fighting for life safety against these attacks, they were also fighting for an autonomous and democratic university, which was one of the important demands of the youth movements of the period. The demand for an autonomous and democratic university includes participation in the administration, democratic organization, rights of representation, and freedom to engage in cultural and social activities organized with boycotts, marches, and protests.

One of the issues that made METU special was that it was the ideological struggle area of all left factions in Turkey from 1975-to 1976. The important discussions of that day revolved around concepts such as fascism, imperialism, and social imperialism. The ideological problems of Turkey's left were discussed with the widest public in METU. In other words, there was ideological enlightenment at METU.

It is important to look at the functioning of ODTU-DER, which was established as the organization of METU students in this period, and later of METU Student Representative Board (ODTÜ ÖTK), in order to understand what kind of management the young people wanted at that time. As while students struggled on the one hand, they also showed how they wanted a process by creating the alternative in these examples.

2.1.2.1. METU Student Association, METU Students' Representatives Council (ODTÜ-DER, ODTÜ-ÖTK)

After the closure of ADYÖD, the METU Commission was transformed into ODTÜ-DER in 1975. In a period of 2 months, approximately 4 thousands of 8-9 thousand students became members of ODTÜ-DER. (Çalışkan,2002:219-223)This participation, which cannot be compared with today in terms of the student organization, was one of the important indicators of the politicization of the period. In those days, the main agenda of ODTÜ-DER in the university was the democratization of education, the students' having to say in the university administration, the improvement of the conditions of the dormitories, and the recognition of ODTÜ-DER as an official student organization in the university.

At the beginning of 1975, METU had quieter days compared to other universities. However, during this period, METU students showed great solidarity against the attacks which started to develop in other universities. The other agenda of ODTÜ-DER was the attacks on other universities at that time and the social opposition that started to rise throughout the country. The revolutionary movement that started to develop throughout the country, and especially the DEV-YOL was very organized in

METU, and ODTÜ-DER provided great resources for this struggle, both in terms of staff, mass, and financial.⁸

The two-day boycott decision taken by ODTÜ-DER to have their demands accepted according to these agendas resulted in the closure of the school by the university rector. After that, a 6-month boycott period started, in which 8,000 people participated in marches, and forums and discussed the decisions together, at the school where 9,000 students took part and the boycott resulted in the acceptance of the students' demands (Bürkev, 2016:204). At the end of this period, ÖTK, which was established in January 1976, became the main organization of METU students. Bülent Forta, one of the heads of ÖTK at the time, defined ÖTK as follows: "The event of ÖTK should be handled as a revolutionary movement's attempt to implement a real understanding of democracy, organization, and struggle in the context of student youth"(Bürkev, 2016:235-244).

The structure of the ÖTK consisted of a representative from each branch, a representative from each department, a student representatives' council consisting of these representatives, and nine member ÖTK administration. In this path, aiming for the self-government of the masses, an understanding of democracy, which tries to involve the whole student segment in the decision-making and management processes, and the formation of a revolutionary alternative in the subjects of informing, using, and producing information has begun to be experienced in METU (Bürkev, 2016:216-220). ODTÜ ÖTK took part in all university bodies, department and faculty committees, academic councils, tender commissions, and disciplinary committees as the representative of students. Everything that happened in these committees was discussed through bulletins, wallpapers, lecture meetings, and large forums attended by all METU students when necessary. In this way, by taking the tendency of each student, they had the chance to develop appropriate policies and fulfill their leadership functions.

The democracy that the ÖTK tries to implement has two main pillars. The first one was, that it subjected the struggle for autonomous and democratic universities to the

⁸ (1960'lardan 1980'lere Gençlik ve Mücadelesi Dev-Genç Savunması, 2011)

struggle of the peoples of Turkey for independence, democracy, and socialism. Secondly, in terms of the methods it uses while trying to implement such a democratic program, the ÖTK represents an advanced understanding of democracy (Bürkev, 2016:241).

Another area led by ODTU ÖTK was academic demands (Çalışkan, 2002) Distributing the lecture notes to the students by printing them, supplying cheap books, providing the conditions for better education by ensuring the dialogue between the students and the lecturers... Almost every lesson in social sciences has been passed with intense discussions and criticisms of one-sided thoughts in the textbooks. Furthermore, the assignments prepared by the students were carried out as research in the literal sense of the word. The associations affiliated with ÖTK have reproduced these works in duplicator or book form and opened them to the discussion of the students. Seminars and panels were organized with the participation of scientists.

From street theatres to international theatre festivals, from choirs to recitals, from discussion meetings in dormitory canteens to large panels where the problems of the country and the world are discussed, and all these to the METU festival organized by the METU arts and culture community with tens of thousands of people... thousands of students, lecturers, workers and the people of Ankara (Çalışkan, 2002:263-266).

What distinguishes METU from other university organizations is that all the constituents of the school, namely faculty members, students, and workers were fighting shoulder to shoulder in a democratic struggle. The consciousness of democracy in METU has developed in such activism. In the discussions that carried over to these smallest units, the ÖTK administration did not take any decision outside of the stadium forums where ten thousand METU students came together. This enabled all students to own all the decisions taken, to follow the decisions, and to take part in these organizations with all their strength. In this way, the sense of belonging and adoption required for the organization is provided.

The youth struggle at METU did not remain as a youth struggle just like in other periods, but they were able to see themselves as part of a general revolutionary struggle, from helping the Van earthquake to working in slums and peasant worker protests taking place in the farthest corners of Turkey.

These developments were not welcomed by the governments of the period. They resorted to various methods in order to control METU and suppress the rising struggle. Every time an action occurs, they have used tools such as closing the school, taking MHP workers to the school, deploying the gendarmerie inside the school, etc. The MC Government appointed Hasan Tan, a name close to him, as the rector of METU for these purposes. This is how the period known as the ‘Hasan Tan cannot be rector of METU’ resistance began (Çalışkan, 2002:273-276).

Faculty members, workers, and students discussed how to fight against Hasan tan in long and wide forums determined their methods and started to organize a campaign. Rector Hasan Tan decided to close METU as a result of this campaign. Upon this decision, students, parents, and faculty members sued the Council of State and they won (Çalışkan, 2002:300). However, Hasan Tan did not implement this decision and continued to keep the school closed. In this period, the agenda of METU students was the right to receive education and the demand for the school to be reopened. With the start of the new term, the school was opened. However, the workers who were taken to the school by Hasan Tan during the time the school was closed began to attack the students (Çalışkan, 2002:331). The boycott decision, which lasted for nine months, started after all these attacks and continued until Hasan Tan resigned. However, the attacks continued after he resigned. The houses of the faculty members were bombed, the bombs were thrown at the students, and the guns were fired. However, METU continued to protect the struggle for democracy with all its constituents until the coup in 1980. September 12 had a heavy impact on METU and the youth movement. Around 1000 METU students were arrested during this period (Çalışkan, 2002:369). The university youth, who were not insensitive to the problems faced by society, in particular METU, was tried to be suppressed by tortures, executions, and unsolved murders.

However, although the happenings after the 1980s will be explained in more detail below, it could be said that METU continues to be a stronghold of opposition in society with the legacy of this period.

2.2. Politics and Youth in Turkey from 1980 to 2002

By 1977, the number of people who died in political murders had reached 319, 1095 in 1978, and 1362 in 1979. Since February 1980, 200 people were killed per month. As a result of the increasing effect of the economic crisis, the political crisis in the political and social area, and the mobilization within the army, a coup was staged in Turkey on September 12, 1980. During the September 12 coup d'état, approximately 650 thousand people were detained and 42 thousand people were sentenced to prison for various periods. Again, in this period, 517 people were sentenced to death and 50 people were executed. Prisoners were tortured in police stations and prisons, and many people died in these tortures. All of the unions affiliated with DISK were closed, and the activities of all associations that were not affiliated with the state were suspended. The parties were closed and the political leaders of the parties were banned from politics for ten years. In short, the September 12 coup d'état passed over all segments of the rising social opposition in Turkey (Atılğan et al., 2015:778-782).

When we look at the happenings after the September 12 coup, it has become quite clear that the main purpose of the coup was to change the suffocating economic model, that is, to create the necessary political and ideological conditions in order to create the economic infrastructure of the neoliberal accumulation regime. It has led to the implementation of the neoliberal policies that were set up with the September 12 coup d'état; under fear and pressure, an apolitical only self-responsible youth project was tried to be implemented and the depoliticization of the society was tried to be ensured.

The first half of the 1980s was experienced in an atmosphere of heavy oppression throughout the country. Executions, detentions, torture, arrests, bans, and censorship became the main agenda of the whole country in this period. While strikes and demonstrations were banned, political parties, organizations, and associations were closed. All social opposition was tried to be silenced with heavy oppression. It can be argued that the youth movement received the most serious blow in this oppressive environment.

The main reason for the September 12 coup d'état was creating a suitable political environment for the implementation of the decisions taken by Turkey on January 24, 1980, for the transition to neoliberalism (Atılğan et al., 2015:778). In this sense, Turkey's experience of neoliberalism started under authoritarian management

practices, similar to many other parts of the world. The January 24 Decisions aims to suppress real worker wages, reduce public subsidies, etc. It was impossible to implement these in a place where the whole society was politicized under the conditions of a strong social-left opposition and workers' movement. These decisions mean the destruction of the rights gained through social struggle (Atılgan et al., 2015:780). With the September 12 coup, the 'obstacles' in front of the program were removed, and the program was implemented.

Although the organized social opposition, which remained outside after September 12, tried to react to the coup with pirate actions and protests, the reactions could not become massive and remained limited in the environment of heavy oppression and violence. During this period, particular oppression was applied to the universities, which were the main centers of social opposition, and intimidation was given by placing tanks inside the schools. With the laws enacted, all political activities within the university were prevented, universities were connected to the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), and political youth were tried to be depoliticized with the policies put into practice (Atılgan et al., 2015:788).

The neoliberal transformation in Turkey was not limited to the economic field. With the rhetoric that no other world was created after the collapse of the real socialism experience, neoliberalism has also tried to exist on ideological and cultural grounds. The neoliberal political culture emphasizes the value of consumerism, individualism, and commodification. As Erdoğan emphasized, the neoliberal ideology aimed to destroy the collective that dominated the previous period in this way (Aksu et al., 2021:113). For that purpose, this ideology claims that the new society is post-ideological, that individuals should be concerned only with their future, and that success or failure is only about the person himself in this society. The new ideology targeted values such as solidarity and collectivity in this period. Young people became individualized by moving away from collectivism and solidarity under the influence of this political-cultural climate (Forbrig, 2005:25-26).

Another dimension of this situation is the individualization of the problems experienced by neoliberalism. Youth now sees the issues (such as insufficient salary, lack of future, unemployment, etc.) arising from living in an individual class society

as their own deficiency and mistakes. Therefore, the way youth resorts to a solution are personal rather than collective. It is claimed that this new order prevents the formation of collective identities, thus, reducing the capacity for collective action. Individualization of risk explained in detail above led youth to think that they are the ones who will determine their faith in this new order, and therefore they are responsible for all that will happen on this path. This is precisely where understanding ‘‘I have to save myself first’’ comes from.

The individualization process developed with neoliberalism brings the identity or problem-based common interest approach to the fore instead of the class-based common interest approach in social movements. When the claims that a historical period of class politics and the understanding of revolution and transformation was left behind with the events such as the dissolution of the USSR and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, combined with the defeat of the left opposition on September 12, class politics and ideologies began to be devalued. Particularly in the 1990s, with the claims that more libertarian sociability could only develop when the politics of identity and recognition replaced class-based politics, civil society became widespread instead of political organizations. This understanding, which aims at a change through radical reforms in the field of which is the subject, rather than the demand for power and system change, forms the infrastructure of the political agendas of the new period. Applying this understanding’s flexible and fragmented struggle strategy is also compatible with the new world order created by neoliberalism. Struggle areas such as women’s rights, minority rights, environmental struggles in connection with increasing ecological problems, and opposition to the war started to form the struggle agenda of this period. Despite all this, the main subject of the resistance in this new era in the world is still the youth. Although the agenda, practice, and methods of the struggle have changed compared to the old period, the youth struggled against the problems that can be included agendas of class politics.

2.2.1. Youth Movements between 1980- 2002

The effects of the transformation described above started to affect the youth in Turkey and the youth all over the world during these years. The evolvement of neoliberal transformation under authoritarian regime practices made the effects of this transformation even more painful. Universities, on the one hand, were marketed in

parallel with the neoliberal transformation, and they started to be transformed from centers where science is produced to places that train people for the market. With the expansion of the capital, foreign companies (such as McDonald's, etc.) established franchises, including universities, and university canteens were privatized, and foreign consumption habits began to be included in the life of the youth. University tuition fees and dormitory fees have gradually increased and it has become more difficult for students to receive an education. Universities, which started to lose their privileged position before 1980, started to fall into disfavor, the period when being a university graduate provided a job guarantee came to an end, and university students were faced with anxiety about the future. On the one hand, students were individualized with the ideological motto "each man for himself", and everyone was condemned to the understanding of "I have to save myself first" against the problems experienced. Thus, the depoliticization of the youth was tried to be ensured, and a competitive youth focused on their own individual life, not interested in social issues was tried to be created. The other side of the neoliberal transformation experienced in the oppressions applied in order to destroy the politics that developed in the universities after September 12.

In Turkey, during this period, gendarmerie stations were established inside the universities, and plainclothes police were brought into the universities. All areas where students could come together and discuss were rearranged so that the tables in the canteens were fixed and prevented from being brought together. A period began when body searches were made at school gates and left-wing publications were not put inside the school. The profile of universities was being tried to be changed with conscious policies. Changing the personnel recruitment system at METU can be given as an example of this. After 1995, the recruitment of personnel in METU was taken from the METU administration and connected to the central state appointment (Bürkeç, 2016: 376). With the new appointment method, 250 new personnel, mainly civilian gendarmes and expert sergeants, were recruited to METU. There is no doubt that this was a conscious choice. The tradition of METU constituents acting together has been tried to be destroyed by conscious policies by the state.

In such an atmosphere, the youth movements recovered in the late 1980s. Although it cannot be compared with the past, the youth tried to struggle against the problems they

experienced despite all the oppressions in this period. As Manuel Castells said, where there is oppression, resistance to oppression is inevitable (As cited in Atvur, 2014:16). It is possible to say that in this period, the youth first tried to organize through student associations. Firstly, Ankara law students founded Law School Students' Association (HFÖD) in 1984 (Bürkev, 2016:392). After realizing that student associations could be established, other school students quickly started to form associations. However, in this period when the oppression was still intense, students who were members of these associations were detained for various reasons, their student loans were cut off, and they were fined or suspended from school. Even though actions were organized to oppose the oppressive practices of YÖK and to ensure that expelled students were taken back, participation was very limited in this environment.

In this period, dispersed student circles could not unite the reactions and establish an axis of struggle over the needs of the new period. Unlike the previous period, youth movements developed as a struggle of resistance, but could not establish a struggle that simultaneously established the alternative and developed to include the whole society. As a result, the organized actions were inconclusive, and the trust in the organizations began to decline in universities, which were currently filled with ideological discourses that organizations and the organization are denigrated, and the left and socialism are outdated.

It should also be emphasized that the decrease in trust in organizations was not unique to youth movements. Another segment that was hit hard by the coup was the trade union movement. The union movement, which started to recover in 1991-1992 after the coup, formed structures such as the Education Union (Egitim-Sen) and Confederation of Public Laborer's Unions (KESK), and although it started to organize struggles, it could not regain its power which was before 1980.

It is also possible to say that similar things were happening in youth organizations on the right. Even though these organizations, which describe themselves as anti-communist and anti-leftist, did not suffer heavy oppression during the 1980s, they lost their power with the new social atmosphere created. Parallel to the fact that youth movements started to show signs of recovery, organizations such as Muslim Youth began to become visible for the first time in the 1990s. Right-wing organizations,

which started to act together with the new cadres placed in universities after 1980 in order to suppress the social opposition in universities, started to gain power if they could not spread to a wide base. The necessity of establishing a new line in terms of the left and revolutionary youth struggle was obvious, it became clear that it was not possible to act with the methods of the old period and the memorization of the old period (Bürkev, 2016:418-422). It can be said that the process of organizing through associations ended in this period. This new period coincided with the creation of the ODTU Platform by the Student Association and student societies at METU.

The replacement of the class-based policies with the new era's identity-oriented policies has started to bring changes in the fields of struggle and agendas in universities. Parallel to the rise of feminism in Turkey, protests for women's rights began to be organized in universities. In 1994, the first March 8 protest took place at METU (Bürkev, 2016:429). Again, in this period, the LGBTI movement started to take place in universities and the first LGBTI community was established at METU (Bürkev, 2016:478).

2.3. Politics and Youth in Turkey since 2002

As already mentioned in the introduction, the change in the political, economic and political structures that started with the transition to neoliberalism in Turkey in 1980 accelerated with the AKP government in the last 20 years has been a breaking point in terms of the relationship between the whole society and politics. While the establishment process of neoliberalism was completed rapidly during the AKP government that came to power in 2002, Turkey's authoritarianization process accelerated. The transformations made in the field of economy in order to adapt to neoliberalism and the AKP's aim of rapid and full implementation of the January 24 Decisions have created a very heavy economic burden on the workers. With a new labour law introduced in 2003, the subcontracting process was accelerated and the subcontracting process was initiated in the public sector. Wages have been reduced, the right of labour agreement have been hindered, and as a result, precarious, flexible work has become the key descriptor of the labour regime. The power of the existing opposition unions was reduced (such as DISK, KESK, etc.), new unions supporting the government were established instead of them and they were strengthened. (Officer Union (Memur-Sen, Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is), etc.)

The share of the private sector in activities that constitute the basic pillars of public services such as education and health has increased incredibly. 86% of the privatizations were carried out during the AKP period. While all of these have reduced the expenditure on public service, they have placed a heavy economic burden on the people. With the neoliberal transformation and the economic crisis, the masses who have lost their rights have been included in a sect and community-based patronage system.

With the 2007 general elections, that the AKP began to shape the political and social space in line with its own ideologies, and that it started to liquidate the obstacles and the Kemalist military and bureaucracy, which it saw as a possible threat to the government, one by one. The members of the sect known as the Fethullah were filled in place of the liquidated cadres. During this period, Fethullahist and other Islamist cadres were placed in the bureaucracy, army, judiciary, and university administrations (Atılgan et al., 2015:873-875).

The acceleration of the authoritarianism process coincides with this multifaceted crisis that the AKP is beginning to experience. In order for the current crisis not to turn into a political crisis, it starts to resort to the methods of authoritarianism, which is the usual state form of neoliberalism. As we will see later, the AKP has increased its authoritarianism as the crisis deepened.

The principle of separation of powers, which is one of the greatest guarantees of the democratic system, was diminished with the constitutional referendum held in 2010 (Karahanoğulları & Türk, 2018). With this constitutional amendment, the executive's control over the judiciary was increased, and the judiciary was brought under the control of the executive by changing the election procedures and structure of members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors and the Constitutional Court. Following the establishment of full dominance over the control and control mechanisms, the AKP accelerated the process of restructuring the society with its own political Islamist ideological orientation. It carried out this process by using all the ideological apparatuses of the state (education, media, etc.).

The political crisis, which started to emerge after the Gezi events, can be seen as the process in which the AKP regime highlights its own struggle for survival. The society

that AKP tried to recreate with its religious conservative rhetoric and policies united on the agenda of defending secularism and secular life against all of these policies. The opposition to the defense of secularism is the first part of the political crisis that the AKP is experiencing. While the AKP was trying to silence the rising social opposition with means such as detention, investigation, and arrest, it also engaged in a power struggle with the Gülen movement, which has been its ally since the first years it came to power. It constitutes the second part of the political crisis. The process, which started with the corruption investigations of 17-25 December, continued until the coup attempt by the Gülen movement in 2016. The AKP, which built a patronage system around political and economic relations with the Gülen movement, as they have expressed over the years with the words ‘we gave everything that they asked for’⁹, liquidated the Gülen movement as a result of conflicts of interest and power within the state.

In the election held in June 2015, the AKP failed to win the majority in the parliament for the first time since it came to power, and for the first time, the AKP could not emerge from the election as a single party. When the negotiations initiated by Davutoglu to form a government did not give results, the President of that time, R. Tayyip Erdoğan, decided to renew the election for the first time in political history, and on November 1, 2015, was determined as the new election day. Between June 7 and November 1, Turkey witnessed the bloodiest attacks in the history of the Republic. The first of these was the massacre that took place in Suruç on July 20, 2015, undertaken by ISIS. With the end of peace talks with the PKK after the elections, violence increased in southeast Turkey and curfews were declared. Within a few months, hundreds of civilian and military personnel lost their lives in terrorist attacks as well as in military operations carried out in Kurdish-populated areas and urban centers. On October 10, the leftist opposition, which thought that Turkey was dragged into a civil war, held a peace meeting in Ankara. The peace meeting turned into a massacre with the bomb attack of ISIS. One hundred two people lost their lives.

Under the influence of such events, Turkey went to the elections again in 2015 and the AKP regained the majority. After these elections, the AKP, which started to strengthen

⁹ <https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7kecv3>

its alliance with extreme-nationalist, extreme-right and Islamist forces, declared those who made the slightest criticism against itself its party terrorists. Academics, intellectuals, students, political parties, and journalists were declared as supporters of the terrorist organization, investigations were launched against them, and arrests were made.

The happenings in Turkey's political life were also reflected in universities, organizations affiliated with ISIS attacked students in universities, and thereupon, student protests were organized in all universities, especially at Istanbul University. With the ISIS threat, oppression was increased in universities, and the ISIS threat legitimized the dissemination of surveillance and control systems.

After the suppression of the coup attempt organized by the Gülenists in the army in 2016, the AKP provided the necessary legitimacy for the consolidation of the regime it wanted. On July 20, 2016, a state of emergency was declared and the government began to rule the country by decree-laws that could not be overseen by the Constitutional Court or other high courts.

The content of the parliamentary system was emptied after the 1980s, and conscious policies reduced the trust in political parties. During the AKP period, the opposition parties in the parliament could not show enough resistance and could not conduct an effective opposition. After the 1980 coup, the extra-parliamentary social opposition, which was harshly damaged, began to seek the struggle for rights and freedom in the streets against AKP's authoritarian tendencies. Since the social structure that the AKP tried to create affected the youth the most, the biggest element of the opposition that emerged during the AKP period was again the youth.

2.3.1. Youth Movements after 2002

The nationwide youth movement has begun to stagnate in the late 1990s. The accumulated anger against the AKP after 2011 caused the youth to start to mobilize again.

However, as in all periods in Turkey, the biggest object of opposition to the AKP was again the youth. AKP tried to make the universities that were the most potential

opposition against itself dependent on itself with various moves throughout its rule, in this context, it reorganized the YOK, changed the appointment system of the members, and made the YOK dependent on the government. The abolition of the autonomy of universities with the 1982 Constitution accelerated during the AKP period. In order to intervene in the decision-making processes of universities, the method of appointment of rectors has been changed, and the last decision-maker in the appointment of rectors has been turned into the president. On the other hand, universities have been turned into places that trained staff for the market and were organized according to the needs of the market, and they have been tried to be places based on production for the needs of capitalism rather than scientific production. Extra sanctions were imposed on universities where the voice of social opposition was raised, the YOK prevented these universities from being staffed, the police were placed at the university gates, and the reactions of the youth to social events were suppressed with police violence.

The process of expelling left, opposition, and revolutionary students from the university by expulsions has been accelerated by the rectors who have been appointed by the AKP throughout the country. Investigations were initiated and penalties were imposed on the smallest actions of the students. In this period, parallel to the general political atmosphere of the period, right-wing organizations began to gain strength in universities, and nationalist and Islamist right-wing organizations began to be organized through clubs.

The period of 2010 and after is an important phase in terms of youth movements. After the Prime Minister of the time, Tayyip Erdoğan, invited all university rectors to Dolmabahçe on December 4, universities organized a series of actions with the idea that calling the rectors to line up in front of the prime minister like civil servants in this way against the autonomy of the university and the idea of a university itself, and they faced heavy police violence. A few days later, on December 8, Burhan Kuzu protested in Ankara by throwing eggs. These actions have started to put the youth movements on the agenda of society after a long hiatus. Later, with the protests that took place in METU, the university youth movement continued and revived, and the Gezi Protests were held in such an atmosphere in 2013.

The AKP government's educational reforms such as the 4+4+4 system, alcohol regulation law, attempts to ban abortion, moves to perpetuate the precarious and flexible labor regime, restriction of rights and freedoms, especially freedoms of expression, and assembly, to implement its neoliberal Islamist project are gradually increasing and caused an uprising that engulfed the whole Turkey in 2013. At the end of May 2013, heavy police violence against groups on guard duty to prevent the construction of a shopping mall in Gezi Park suddenly turned into a resistance that spread throughout the country. The Gezi Movement was the reflection of the AKP's disregard for the rights and freedoms of the regime it was trying to create. The survey conducted by KONDA, a leading social research institute, with 4411 participants during the protests provides a good overview of the profile of those who participated in the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul. According to KONDA, the average age of the participants was 28. 37% were the students and 52% were mostly employed in high-skilled jobs (KONDA, 2014). Although there were organized youth among the participants in the Gezi resistance, the Gezi was mostly composed of unorganized people. While the Gezi resistance voiced its opposition to the AKP government, it also created an alternative based on solidarity, the exact opposite of the values of the new era. The resistance, which continued with the forums in parallel with the organizational practices of the period, faded after a while.

The above-mentioned social and political climate of Turkey after Gezi has also directly affected universities. After The events that took place in 2016, the academics published a statement under the name of Peace Academics calling for an end to the curfews and violence, a major purge was carried out in universities against all opposition faculty members, and universities were tried to be purged of dissenting thoughts in this way. The oppression on universities has increased day by day, and including activities such as festivals, which students do in the field of culture and arts, were prohibited. AKP started to create a new order by ignoring the parliament and other state institutions. After the referendum for the transition to the presidential system, the establishment of the new regime was completed.

However, the AKP government has not succeeded in destroying the rising opposition in society, despite using all the power and possibilities of the state. As the rate of

oppression and coercion increased, the reactions also increased, and the dynamics of social opposition continued to exist within the society.

Similar to its past, METU has continued to be the center of the rising opposition and struggle against the AKP government, although it cannot be compared to the past. In this sense, in the light of all the transformations described above, looking at the years METU spent under AKP rule is important both in order to understand the transformations of the youth movements and to understand how the youth perceive organization and politics today.

2.3.2. METU since the 2000s

Since its establishment, METU has been a university that embodies the dynamics of social opposition. Parallel to the political atmosphere of Turkey, in some periods the opposition within the university organized and rose, and in some periods it stagnated. It is inevitable that METU, which exists as a state university in Turkey, is not affected by the political, economic, and social developments of the period. Therefore, it could be said that the neoliberal authoritarianism process, which started in the 1980s and continued in the 2000s, had a great impact on METU and the youth struggle.

In this period, unlike other universities, METU is still a university where political activity continues even if it is not as strong and organized as before. It is a university where political student organizations can continue their work, organize events, hang posters and distribute leaflets, even though there have been various restrictions recently. Students at METU can see these posters and read leaflets while they go to their classes, and eat in the cafeteria. It is important to emphasize here that the METU is seen a place where the “castle of the social opposition of Turkey” and thus the university has been constantly targeted by the AKP, campaigns to "close the METU" were carried out among the public, and false claims about METU were circulated. This situation can be seen through R. Tayyip Erdoğan’s own words which are¹⁰:

I wonder, did the management and academicians of this school teach these students this job? How to use a slingshot, what type to use, when, in which environment, how to burn car tires or how to make a Molotov, how to throw it to whom. Is that what

¹⁰ <https://www.diken.com.tr/erdogandan-yoke-odtu-talimati-geregi-neyse-yapilsin-takipcisi-olacagiz/>

they were taught? We were students too, we didn't bleed anyone's nose. That's how we came. ¹¹

Although its agenda is mainly to resist the attacks against METU, it continues to be a university where actions can be organized against events taking place in society and confrontations with the police are experienced. In this sense, unlike most universities in Turkey, there is a situation in which METU students continue to be familiar with the political area even if they are not organized.

The dialogue below between a student from the Revolutionary Youth Federation¹², who distributed leaflets in front of the METU Library on the days when this thesis was written, and a METU Library worker is not possible to see in other universities in Turkey. It is not even possible to distribute leaflets, besides encountering a worker who has struggled with students in the university in the past. Even if the social struggle in the past did not result in success, it affected both that period and the future. The dialogue developed as follows:

Worker: Don't you give us a leaflet, hocam?

Student: It is for young people.

Worker: While you were not around, we were revolutionary youth here, we were shouting slogans of “the only way revolution”¹³.

Student: No bro, I didn't say that, I didn't say you are not a revolutionary young man, I said you are not young, I was joking.

Worker: Ahahaha, come on, give us the leaflet.

¹¹ Merak ediyorum, bu okulun yönetimi, akademisyenleri bu öğrencilere bu işi mi öğrettiler? Nasıl sapan kullanılır, hangi cins kullanılır veya araba lastikleri ne zaman, hangi ortamda nasıl yakılır veyahutta molotof nasıl yapılır, kimlere nasıl atılır. Bu mu öğretildi bunlara? Biz de öğrencilik yaptık, biz kimsenin burnunu kanatmadık. Öyle yetiştik, geldik.

¹² Today, organizations that use the names of the movements that developed before 1980 and that embrace these traditions continue to exist. The organization mentioned here is one of today's organizations that has this claim. It should not be confused with the organization that existed before 1980.

¹³ This slogan was the slogan of DEV-YOL.

However, it should not be concluded that today, METU has a widespread and massive youth organization as in the past. Although there are still many active political youth organizations in METU, it is possible to say that they are not widespread and massive. It can be observed that the number of students who identify themselves with a political organization is quite limited. Today, youth organizations and student clubs act together when they want to react to something. Many non-political student clubs and youth organizations in METU can come together, publish joint statements and organize joint actions. However, it is also possible that the content of the issues that are reacted collectively is not political and remains a level of "democratic reaction." Students are more engaged in issues such as the environment, LGBTİ, and women's rights, which are defined as non-political issues themselves.

Of course, METU has also taken its share of the transformation created by the neoliberal authoritarianism process in universities. The profile of METU changed rapidly during this period, new projects were started under the name of university-industry cooperation, and events such as career days organized by companies in the market began to be visible in the university. It has been tried to replace the understanding of the past period with the understanding that "politics is a separate thing, doing science at university is a separate thing."

In parallel with the neoliberal transformation, the reduction of the quality of public education, and the commercialization of education have changed the profile of students who can enter a university like METU, which is at the top of the university entrance score rankings. It is possible to say that the student profile of METU in this period consists mainly of children from middle-upper class families who can afford private tutoring schools and courses.

Unlike other universities, one of the biggest reasons METU has been able to create a different alternative is that all constituents of METU (student, academician, worker) can struggle together. Conscious policies were implemented to disrupt this unity by the government, which put METU on the target board, and the status of METU workers was reduced, and they were removed from being METU constituents started in this period in parallel with the subcontracting process. However, when we look at the process that developed after the 2000s, it could be said that this unity is continued

even if it is not as strong as before. Although the relationship between employees, students, and faculty members is not as horizontal as before, it could be said that a non-hierarchical relationship still continues compared to other universities.

Compared to the previous period, it could be said METU has been more introverted after these years, with the effect of the transformation experienced in Turkish society, and has turned to issues within its own borders as a struggle agenda. In this period, its reaction to the outside was mostly on the issues that concern METU. However, this does not mean that METU students were not present or involved at the height of social opposition. On the contrary, METU students were present at the 1 May demonstrations, Gezi Resistance. The events, social opposition was rising. However, with the effect of the depoliticization processes and the oppression experienced, Student participation in such activities has decreased considerably compared to the past, and this has created the students mainly took the position of defending METU and became more active in the struggle within the university, which is a relatively “safe” area.

Nevertheless, METU has been one of the places that have increased the struggle against the AKP in the past years under AKP rule, both as a result of its tradition and as a result of its ability to remain a relatively democratic environment in which political processes cannot be completely destroyed. Although student clubs do not have a political engagement, they continue to organize joint press statements, actions and protests by coming together on issues that concern the country. In response to the neoliberal transformation experienced, “we are students, not customers” actions were carried out, and students reacted against the private security and turnstile system, which was tried to be put under oppression and control at universities. They came together to improve the conditions of the dormitories and decided not to pay the dormitory fees, and as a result of the struggles, they ensured the renovation of the dormitories. With canteen boycotts, they reduced the prices in the canteen. These actions, which took place before 2010, rose parallel in social opposition and began to have effects all over Turkey. After the TEKEL resistance, the most widespread and the most massive first action against the AKP government was carried out in METU

with the participation of all university constituents, around the slogan ‘‘ODTU is standing, resisting the AKP’’.¹⁴

2.3.2.1 METU is Rising Up, Resisting the AKP

This period, which is known as ODTU Ayakta actions, is both important for ODTU history and the youth movements of this period. This process started on December 17, when the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came to reconnaissance satellite Göktürk 2 was sent into space, and students protested against Tayyip Erdoğan at the TUBITAK building in METU, this process turned into a long-unseen union in METU. The fact that Tayyip Erdoğan came to the METU with 3,000 police officers, the disproportionate use of force, and the gas bombardment of the entire school caused a great reaction both in METU and society. Thereupon, the actions that reacted to this event spread to all universities.

All METU constituents, which have not acted together for a long time, have united to defend the university, its autonomy, and democracy in the ODTU Ayakta process. The Association of Faculty Members and the Alumni Association were involved. A lesson boycott was organized around the slogan "If there are police, there is violence, there is no lesson," which the entire school's participated in on December 20. Following the decision taken at the forum made after December 20, the students started the action of not leaving the school for two days (Bürkev, 2016:537-544). The students, who organized various seminars, panels, and events for two days, held a big march and concert at the end of the 2nd day. Opposition artists of the period participated in this concert free of charge to support the students. During this period, messages condemning METU and academics began to be published by the rectors of other universities. Making a statement on this, Ahmet Acar, the Rector of METU at the time, showed an attitude of protecting his students and academics and stated that he defended the democratic environment of the university.

It is important that METU’s re-emergence in this process, which has enabled METU to become a critical force of social opposition in the past. The reason why this process was critical for the social opposition is that it was the first time a boycott with such

¹⁴ ODTÜ ayakta, AKP’ye direniyor.

serious participation was carried out after coup d'état. Such an action with intense participation, which goes beyond the university agenda, and interferes with the political agenda, has created hope for the entire social opposition. Then, the Gezi Resistance in 2013 and the rising social opposition revealed that the ODTU Ayakta protest was a premise.

The protests, which are known as METU road actions, that took place right after the Gezi Movement are the first protests in which METU communicated with the people of the neighborhood and established a solidarity relationship. However, it could not be compared with the previous period. Students, who opposed a road project planned to pass through METU, organized forums where they planned what they could do. Thereupon, the residents of the 100. Yıl neighborhood next to METU supported the students who set up tents where the road will be built and provided food, drink, blankets, etc. They showed solidarity and defended the actions of the students. This is how the people and students, who were already political under the influence of Gezi, started their resistance. When the school was relatively empty due to the students going on holiday, the workers assigned by Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Melih Gökçek came with dozers. They cut the trees in the area where the road was planned. In the protests that started after this, academics, workers, and students struggled together again (Bürkeç, 2016:547-554). The police again used disproportionate violence against the METU road protests and attacked the students with gas and rubber bullets. Many students, academics, and workers were injured during the protests for about 15-20 days. Although the action did not succeed, it remained in memory as an important resistance to consolidating the unity that started to form again in METU.

With the 2015 elections, METU got its share of the environment that the society was dragged into in Turkey. In the explosion in 2016, students named Berkay Baş and Ozancan Akkuş, who were waiting for the bus by chance, lost their lives. Thereupon, a march and commemoration were organized the next day, again with the participation of all METU constituents, saying, "we want peace, not war." It should be emphasized that it is important courage to be able to organize a demonstration with such a large crowd, even if it cannot be compared to the past, in such an environment where there is a possibility of a bomb explosion at any moment.

In the following years, the pressure on the university continued to increase and festivals were banned. The main agenda of the actions of the last few years before the pandemic was created by the practices of the rector Verşan K k, who came with the appointment method. Alternative festivities were organized by taking actions with broad participation upon the banning of the festivities.

2.4. Concluding Remarks

In this section, firstly, the rise of youth movements, their struggle agendas, and practices, and their relationship with the political field in the period from the 1950s to the 1980s was presented together with the political, economic, and political developments of that period. The most important feature of this period is that the whole society became more politicized than ever before in the history of Turkey and was included in the political area. During this period, the youth struggled with all segments of the society and embraced the problems of the country with the responsibility of being the future of the country. The youth was disturbed by the policies of the governments of the period, objected, and struggled to change these policies. Youth has made agendas that are defined as the problem of the whole of Turkey, such as anti-imperialism and independence, the main agenda of its struggle, and they have struggled around these agendas through political associations and organizations.

It is an important point that the participation rates in the elections gradually decrease in this period. At a time when society is so politicized, this may seem surprising. However, there are basically two important reasons for this situation. The first reason is that Turkish society's trust in the parliament and political parties has decreased due to the effects of the crises. Secondly, the existence of other tools for the political participation of the society, the existence of other channels to convey the demand to speak their word, is the reason for the gradual decrease in the participation in the elections. The difference between today's politics, which proceeds through elections, compared to the past, is also revealed for these reasons. Although the trust in political parties and the parliament has decreased, the elections and ballot boxes have become the only address for voicing objections, since no alternative can be put in place. This is where the vitality of creating channels through which the society can speak its word and convey its demands emerges. In the process that developed after the 1980s, as a

result of the conscious depoliticization policies implemented not only in the youth but also in the whole society resulted in today's picture.

After the coup d'état, especially the opposition organized sections and the oppression on them made the organization a dangerous thing; on the one hand, neoliberalism's removal of the society from collectivity by re-structuring the ideological, political, and social life with its own values, emptied the content of organization and organization. After this period, we can say that social segments started to distance themselves from political organizations. The situation experienced is not only specific to university youth. It is observable throughout society. However, it is wrong to say that depoliticization policies have succeeded and concluded that the new youth is apolitical.

Young people continue to follow politics closely, as their traces can be found in the field research that developed after the 2000s. The subject of the social struggle against AKP, which rose after 2010, is again the youth. They follow the developments in Turkey and the world and continue to react, albeit in different ways. It is a fact that youth movements were affected by the political, economic, and social structure of the period they lived and their transformations. The agendas of struggle brought by the understanding of class-based politics have been transformed until today, and the agendas of identity-based politics have come to the fore as the agendas of struggle. The form of struggle has transformed from the organizational forms of the past period, which brought commitment, belonging, time and responsibility, to a more flexible, fragmented, non-governmental organization that does not require commitment/devotion.

In the light of this background, characteristics of the relationship of today's youth with the political area, and how they perceive politics will be tried to be examined through the results of the field research.

CHAPTER 3

PERCEPTION OF POLITICS AND POLITICAL FIELD

The neoliberal transformation of the youth, which was discussed in the theoretical framework, and the different tendencies regarding the channels of participation of the youth in politics was mentioned. While the first trend claimed that with the neoliberal transformation, the youth became apolitical and did not show interest in politics, the second trend claimed that youth are not apolitical just using new forms of political participation that developed around new political agendas. The third trend claims that the agendas and forms of both participation forms (conventional and unconventional) coexist in today's youth. In this section, it will be tried to analyze whether these trends in these discussions are valid for the political agendas of university youth in Turkey today, based on the findings of the field research.

In this context, firstly, it will be tried to identify the areas that the youth define as a problem today. As mentioned in chapter 2, the political agendas of the youth movement in the past were shaped around the country's problems. In this sense, it is thought that understanding the political agendas of today's youth is important in terms of understanding the relationship they have established with the political field. In this chapter, the areas that the youth define as problems in the country and the political agendas of the youth will be analyzed.

With the transformation that started in the 1980s, the organizations established by workers, peasants, civil servants, and youth, who could be counted among the subjects of the political field in the past, were disbanded, and today the political field is largely limited to the effectiveness of political parties. The changing political field and how its representatives are defined by the youth today determine the relationship that the youth establish with the political field. In the discussions on why the youth take a distanced stance from traditional politics, one of the main arguments is that the youth

do not use conventional forms of participation because they do not trust the representatives of the political field of traditional politics. (Demet Lüküslü, 2009:166-170) Therefore, in the context of this discussion, the second part of this section will be tried to examine how the parliament, which is the representative of the traditional form of participation in Turkey, and the political parties outside the parliament are defined by the youth.

3.1. Political and Economic Matters of Turkey and Youth

Historically, as explained in detail in chapter 2, youth are organized around the problems experienced by them and society and participate in the political field around those issues. In this sense, it is important to look at what the youth see as a problem in Turkey and how they define them, in terms of revealing the reasons for their distant attitude towards the organization and the political area.

In the interviews held within the scope of this thesis, it has been revealed that young people are not satisfied with the situation in Turkey. All of the interviewees answered no to the question of whether they are satisfied with the current situation in Turkey.

The economic problems faced by Turkey appear as the agenda that affects the youth the most. The most important problem for Turkey is the worsening of its economic situation for them. The Turkish economy has been in very bad condition in recent years. The Turkish lira (TL) is losing value against all currencies day by day, inflation is high, unemployment is increasing, youth unemployment has broken its historical record, and the cost of living is causing people to tighten their belts more and more. Under all these conditions, the first topic that young people define as a problem in the country is the economy.

The fact that youth unemployment is breaking historical records and precarious working conditions of youth creates anxiety for the future for young people. They state that they experience mental depression and anxiety because of the flexible, fragmented, and uncertain labor regime created by the neoliberal transformation. Due to the fact that the Turkish economy is based on the construction sector and the collapse experienced here, it is seen that civil engineering students have more future anxiety than other engineering department students. All the changes in the field of the economy directly affect the young people who are prepared to stand on their own feet.

These problems, which have been experienced for a long time, cause young people to look to the future with hopelessness. It is seen that the fact that the country of their citizenship does not promise them a future weakens their belonging to the country and therefore affects their motivation to organize. For example, 3rd-year civil engineering student Baver states that he has similar concerns with other youths about finding a job, that most of the companies have gone bankrupt due to the worsening of the economic situation, and he is constantly talking to his friends about how to find a job. He complains that their only concern is to earn money and that they have to struggle for it continually:

My mental depressions are mostly from anxiety. Can I find a job? What kind of job will it be, and will it be financially satisfying? What kind of life will I have? Most companies go bankrupt. We have friends who graduated, and half of them could not find a job. Generally, in terms of our department, everyone else carries this anxiety. How do I find a job, and what will I do? Due to the economic conditions, our priority is to find a job. Ongoing study, constant struggle to find a job, to earn money. Our only problem is that they pushed us to it, and we are constantly trying to find our way in depression.¹⁵

As mentioned, METU still remains one of the most prestigious schools in Turkey. It is a school where graduates can find jobs more easily and earn higher salaries than other university graduates. However, it can be seen that, even at METU, students' future anxiety is quite high. For example, Anil states that the current economic crisis affected the young people the most and will continue to affect them because the crisis affected them for ten years, and this includes the years that their peers cling to life, so they are very worried.

This situation in the country affects people like us very negatively, who are currently studying and close to starting business life. It is also among my closes. Anxiety happens to everyone. Even if the country is very good, it is unclear what we will do because we are the last class, but it would be a concern. I think the anxiety is high right now. After all, if there is a mistake, it will of course, affect young people the most. I mean, because it's a forward-looking mistake, none of which is a one- or two-year mistake. If there is a crisis, it affects ten years, and these ten years are the years that we will hold on to life, our youth years, so it pushes us under this problem and this anxiety. We have already witnessed cases

¹⁵ Ruhsal bunalımlarım kaynağı çoğunlukla kaygıdan. İş bulabilir miyim? Nasıl bir iş olacak işte maddi olarak tatmin eder mi? nasıl bir hayatım olacak? Çoğu şirket batıyor. Mezun olan arkadaşlarımız var yarısı iş bulamadı. Genelde bizim bölüm açısından onun şeyi var herkesin üstünde. Nasıl iş bulurum ne yaparım ne ederim? İçinde bulunduğumuz ekonomik koşullardan ötürü daha çok önceliğimiz iş bulmak, işe girebilme. Sürekli çalışma, sürekli mücadele etme bir iş bulabilmek için para kazanabilmek için. Tek derdimiz o gibi şu an bizi ona itmişler o bunalımın içinde sürekli yolumuzu bulmaya çalışıyoruz

of suicide often, conversations about violence, and so on, so I think it affects us the most...¹⁶

In parallel with Anıl, Berna also has similar anxiety about finding a job. Even if she goes to a good university, she is not sure that her salary will satisfy after she graduates and finds a job. She complains that her peers abroad earn much better money with much less effort and that they cannot do this themselves.

I'm not happy that we studied for four years and couldn't find a job. We are studying at an excellent school, I chose my department as it will be a job opportunity, but I wonder if my salary will satisfy me even when I graduate. I may not be unemployed, but I don't know if it will satisfy me. For example, my cousin studied abroad for two years as a salesperson and earns very good money. We graduate here after four years and cannot find a job. Our money has no value. We cannot go abroad. Of course, I've always talked about the economy, but right now, it's the thing that hurts the most.¹⁷

The fact that the political power spends on their supporters and themselves instead of the people and the elimination of merit system in the country is another issue that young people see as a problem for the country.

Elif and Dilek say that they are uncomfortable with the state making religious or unnecessary investments instead of investments in education and sports. They argue that the state should allocate a budget to the people. Dilek stated her inconvenience as such:

I played rugby for three years, and then I founded the flag football team, and I played there. They decided not to do American football or rugby tournaments at one point. The reason was that the budget was taken from the Ministry of Sports and given to other places. We don't need this, can I tell you, you need to support

¹⁶ Ülkenin bu durumu özellikle bizim gibi şu anda okuyup aynı zamanda iş hayatına atılmaya çok yakın insanları çok olumsuz etkiliyor bence. Yakın çevremde öyle. Bir kaygı herkeste olur. Ülke çok iyi olsa bile son sınıf olduğumuz için ne yapacağımız belli değil bir kaygı olur ama. Şu an kaygı hat safhada bence. Sonuçta bir yanlış varsa ortada bu en çok gençleri etkileyecek tabi ki. Yani çünkü ileriye dönük bir yanlış hiçbirini bir iki senelik yanlış değil. Bir kriz olursa 10 sene etkiliyor ki bu 10 sene de bizim hayata tutunacağımız yıllar gençlik yıllarımız o yüzden bizi bu sorunun altına bu kaygının altına itiyor. Zaten sık sık da şahit olduk intihar vakaları, şiddet muhabbetleri falan o yüzden en çok bizi etkilediğini düşünüyorum

¹⁷ 4 sene boyunca okuyup da iş bulamamamızdan memnun değilim. Çok iyi bir okulda okuyoruz bölümümü de iş olacak diye seçtim ama ben bile çıktığımda beni tatmin edecek mi maaşım diye düşünüyorum. İşsiz kalmam belki ama tatmin eder mi bilmiyorum. Yurtdışında mesela kuzenim 2 sene Almanya'da satış görevlisi gibi bir şey okumuş çok iyi paralar kazanıyor. Biz burada 4 yıllık mezun oluyoruz iş bulamıyoruz. Paramızın hiçbir değeri yok. Yurtdışına çıkıp gezemiyoruz. Ben tabi hep ekonomiye şey yaptım ama şuan can yakan şey o zaten en çok.

sports, you need to support education, support religious things, but here, for example, there is a mosque two streets away, there is no need for it. The money you will give it, the investment you will make in it, you should give to education.¹⁸

In addition to unequal allocation of resources, most students point out the influential contact as a separate problem point. They say that even though they put a lot of effort, undeserving people are being hired, which causes them to feel future anxiety. Elif expresses this situation with these words:

The next day when we go to Bahçeli etc., there will be many people waving rosaries, graduating from some universities and saying that I am a mechanical engineer or something, and wandering around the market. All of them will enter ASELSAN one day or ROKETSAN, which we could not enter after a lot of effort.¹⁹

While expressing what they think about working life, most stated that AKP members fill the public sector. They feel that if they work in the public sector, they will work with the people of the AKP, not be able to express their opinions freely and be forced to sign whatever comes to them. They say that they will feed the boss in the private sector, but they do not know whose pocket they are making money for in the state. Bilal expresses his opinion about this issue as; I don't want to deal with many AKP guys, that's all. There is also the private sector, but I think it is less, although I do not know why.²⁰ Hasret also stated that most civil servants I've seen so far are very incompetent and do their job poorly. Maybe I've always seen people placed with supporters; I don't know.²¹

¹⁸ Ben 3 yıl rugby oynadım sonra da bayrak futbolu takımını kurdum falan onda oynuyordum. Bir ara Amerikan futbolu rugby falan turnuva yapmamaya karar verdiler. Nedeni de spor bakanlığından bütçe alınıp diğer yerlere verilmişti. Buna ihtiyacımız yok hani anlatabiliyor muyum spora da destek vermen gerekiyor, eğitime de destek vermen gerekiyor dini şeylere de destek ver ama benim burada mesela 2 sokak ötemde bir cami var 2 sokak beride cami var buna ihtiyaç yok. Ona vereceğin parayı, ona yapacağın yatırımı eğitime verirsin.

¹⁹ Yarın bahçeliye vs. gittiğimizde işte tespih sallayıp bazı üniversitelerden mezun olup işte ben makine mühendisiyim falan deyip piyasada gezen bir sürü insan var. Onların hepsi yarın bir gün bizim çok emek harcayıp giremediğimiz ROKETSAN'a ASELSAN'a girecekler, giriyorlar.

²⁰ Bir sürü Ak Partili adamla da uğraşmak istemiyorum o kadar ayrıca. Özel sektörde de vardır ama daha az olduğunu düşünüyorum sebebini tam bilmemekle beraber.”

²¹ “Benim şuana kadar gördüğüm devlet memurlarının çoğu çok beceriksiz ve işlerini kötü yapıyorlar belki hep torpille yerleştirilmiş insanları görmüşümdür bilmiyorum. “

Baver states that although the most prominent topic among the country's problems has been the economy recently (quoted from him above), he felt under pressure and could not feel free, felt trapped even when the economy was relatively good. This is one of the most important topics determining the desire to go abroad.

The current popular topic is economics, but when the economy was relatively good, I felt overwhelmed and cornered as a political person. Even though the rhetoric they came out with at first was libertarian, I think they were relatively oppressed, cornered, and restricted from everywhere due to the current political power policies.²²

In the process that developed in the 1980s, while neoliberalism devalued the political field and its content, on the other hand, the pressure, torture, arrest, etc. applied to ensure the depoliticization of the society. This has led to the perception of the political space as dangerous. Today, the increasing authoritarianism of the AKP government and increasing oppression have caused young people to match the political arena with fear more and more. Today, the political sphere is perceived as a place to be feared and avoided. All the unorganized students think that something will happen to them if they get organized and get involved in the political arena. For example, Fatih believes that Turkey is becoming more and more authoritarian and that the political Islamic hegemony is being established more and more each day, as a result of which the economy deteriorates. He states that he lives under pressure that will cause him to think twice even while tweeting.

We are becoming more and more authoritarian. Political Islam is establishing its hegemony day by day. The economy is getting worse as a result. Freedom of expression is also getting worse. I am not directly involved in a political movement, so I am not in danger of being detained, but it makes me think twice about the tweet I will post on Twitter.²³

Muhammed thinks that Turkish society has become incredibly polarized after the AKP regime. He states that people and the system have become even more corrupt under

²² Şu an popüler olan konu ekonomik ama ebetteki ekonomi görece iyi olduğu zamanda da bir siyasi olarak kendimi bunalmış, köşeye sıkışmış hissediyordum. İlk başta çıktıkları söylemler özgürlükçü olsa da görece daha çok kendimi şu an ki siyasi iktidarın şeyinde politikalarının sonucunda her konuda baskılanmış, köşeye sıkışmış, her yerden kısıtlanmış hissediyorum

²³ Gittikçe otoriterleşiyoruz. Siyasal İslam hegemonyasını kuruyor gün geçtikçe. Bunun sonuçları olarak ekonomi de daha kötüye gidiyor. Düşünce özgürlüğü de daha kötüye gidiyor. Ben kişisel olarak bir siyasi hareketin de doğrudan içinde vs. olmadığım için gözaltına tehlikesi yaşamıyorum ama twitter'a atacağım twitte iki kere düşünmeme neden oluyor.

this regime, they are trying to create a society of fear under an authoritarian state, and they are trying to live in a system where people cannot foresee the consequences of their actions. Like many students, he does not trust justice and does not believe that if he criticizes the president, he will be prosecuted under the law.

I don't feel free. The reason is this: it seems that an attempt is made to create a society of fear. I think about the consequences of my actions. But I do not think that the result of an action I took today can be applied. To criticize someone, to say something negative, I don't know, even if I think that my actions don't harm anyone, to make a point and bring them to a judgmental position frightens me. You live with the law, and as a result of the law, you need to know what you're getting in return.²⁴

Hasret has no confidence in the justice system in Turkey. She states that she does not feel safe on the street as a woman, and that she does not believe that if anything happens to her, the man will be judged. She finds the functioning of the justice system wrong. She states that only political criminals are imprisoned in Turkey, and everyone else roams freely. Similarly, this situation causes young people to perceive the political field and the political power that represents it as something to be feared and avoided.

I never feel safe, or I don't think any person I know can be safe. It can be the expression of political thoughts; anything can happen. I know that if a man kills you in the street, nothing will happen. There is a reason, maybe even the man cannot be found. I don't think these are important factors at all. For a person to stay in prison, he only needs to be a political criminal. Other than that, it seems impossible.²⁵

As a general tendency, young people attribute the cause of Turkey's problems to the political power (AKP) and its wrong policies in the political and economic fields. While the political power should support education and science, supporting its supporters, destroying their merit, and devaluing their own efforts. The wrong economic policies they follow are among the issues young people see as a problem.

²⁴ Kendimi özgür hissetmiyorum. Sebebi şu: korku toplumu yaratılmaya çalışılıyor gibi geliyor bana. Yaptığım eylemlerin sonucunu düşünüyorum. Ama bugün yaptığım bir eylemin sonucunun uygulanabileceğini düşünmüyorum. Birini eleştirmek, olumsuz bir şey söylemek ne bileyim yaptığım eylemlerde kimseye zarar vermediğini düşünsem bile bir anlam çıkarılıp yargılanır bir konuma getirmek bunlar beni korkutuyor açıkçası. Yasalarla birlikte yaşıyorsun ve yasaların sonucu olarak aslında karşılığında ne alacağını bilmen gerekiyor

²⁵ Ya da ben kendimi asla güvende hissedemiyorum ya da tanıdığım herhangi bir insanın güvende olabileceğini düşünmüyorum. Politik düşüncelerin dışı vurumu da olabilir, her şey olabilir. Ne biliyim sokakta bir adam sizi öldürürse bir şey olmaz. Bir gerekçe bulunur, belki adam bulunamaz bile. Bunlar hiç önemli faktörler değil bence. Bir insanın cezaevinde kalabilmesi için sadece politik bir suçlu olması gerekiyor onun dışında imkânsız gibi geliyor

Situations such as youth unemployment breaking historical records and the flexible, fragmented, uncertain, and insecure labor regime created by the neoliberal are far from repaying their efforts are issues that they define as problems. It is possible to say that the neoliberal transformation has changed the young people who struggled to make Turkey a better place by organizing around the problems experienced, not holding themselves responsible for the solution of the problems experienced today. With the effect of the transformation experienced, they do not feel like they belong to the country. The problems encountered distract them from establishing a relationship with the political sphere, contrary to the past. In addition, the authoritarianism of Turkey by the political power and the increasing oppression cause young people to define the political area as a place to be feared.

It is possible to say that the political agendas of young people in Turkey are similar to those that cause conventional forms of political participation. Even though the economy, the threat of unemployment, concern for the future, and precarious working conditions develop under different conditions, they still constitute the youth's agenda. Also, the agendas described as conventional still exist, along with the agendas considered as the new agendas of the youth, which will be discussed in the next section.

Since they have not seen another political power for 20 years, how they perceive the political area is closely related to how they see the AKP and relate to it.

3.2. Youth's Perception of the Ruling Parties

In the study, it is seen that the only representative of the political field today is the AKP government in the perception of the youth. Although all of the interviewed youth votes for parties other than AKP, they do not see them as effective political actors in the political field. While the reasons for this will be examined under the title of young people's perception of opposition parties, it is evident that young people's perception of the AKP regime determines their view of the political field in general.

All of the interviewees do not see a government other than the AKP government. They have been living in a country where AKP has been in power since birth. All of the interviewees interviewed within the scope of the study stated that they were not satisfied with the AKP government. Since the AKP forms a large part of their

perception of politics, the AKP's way of doing politics is directly related to how young people define politics and how they perceive it. Parties are considered to be one of the traditional ways of doing politics, and as is revealed in the case of AKP, neither politics nor parties, nor the work done by them, is trusted. The perception that politics is a business of deceiving people has emerged as a general trend in the study.

In the interviews, how they see and evaluate the AKP and how they manage to stay in power were two separate questions. Most of these questions explained how they could remain in power by describing the people who voted for the AKP rather than their views on the AKP. A great majority of young people think that the AKP government stole the votes in their favor. This is one of the reasons why they have the low belief that voting as a form of political participation can change things.

How youth perceive politics and political power can be understood by looking at their evaluation of the AKP. They say that all the problems in the country are the fault of the AKP government. They thought that they couldn't manage the economy, abolish the merit system, and bring the presidential system, and thus, everything got worse because of the AKP. All of this leads to thinking that politics is made for personal or small group interests, reinforcing the perception that politics is a corrupt field. They also say that opposition parties have the same characteristics. However, it was more frequently emphasized that the ruling party abolished merit, and they only dragged the country into a bad situation for their own interests. Bilge also thinks that the AKP is doing politics for his supporters. Still, other political parties are doing the same, so she also feels that politics is something people do for their benefit. She answers the question of what kind of power AKP is as follows;

After a certain point, I think every government will do the same thing.. Even if it is not the AKP, I think the other parties will all say, "I have the power," and begin to manage their own practices after a certain point. I don't think it's that different either.²⁶

Baver states that the AKP was able to come to power initially thanks to its economic promises, but after a while, they managed to stay in power by sharing the resources with those around them.

²⁶ Bence her iktidar gibi bir yerden sonra civıtan ya da en başından beri... AKP de olmasa başka bir iktidar da gelse bence hepsi bir yerden sonra güç bende diyip kendine dair uygulamaları çok yönetmeye başlayacak kendine çıkar sağlayacak. Onun da çok farklı olduğunu düşünmüyorum.

AKP was a populist party at the beginning. After a while, they created their own dynamics in their own country. They created their own rich partisans. They made an ideological discourse. At first, they did not have a clear ideological discourse. It was a populist party. After a while, it started to appeal to people in a certain environment. They fed many people, so many people ate bread, so they did. In fact, what did 38 percent get in the last election? It went all the way down, the economy went bad. This will decrease after a while.²⁷

In addition to the perception that politics is made for the sake of financial interests, the perception that politics is manipulation and deception is a widespread view among young people.

They think that politics is a business of persuading people, albeit by lying, rather than telling the truth. Therefore, their trust in politics decreases, which poses a serious obstacle to their participation in politics. For example, Anıl states that the AKP convinced its own people so well that they would die for what they said;

We need to appreciate it; it really explains something about this subject very well. In our opinion, they have the characteristics of passing something wrong to the other side. The masses they pass through are not people who question a lot, but maybe people who question. But they express themselves well and gather good support for their own segments. The support they collect is not a support for a year or two, you know, they give their lives for that way. They do not think of other options in life; they are uncomfortable even being talked about. That's why people who think about something different from them attribute bad adjectives.²⁸

Doğa, on the other hand, similarly states that the people who voted for the AKP have already written what needs to be done by the ruling party in the AKP's treasury, they do not question what has happened, and the illiterate consciousness has increased, and this has nothing to do with the university.

I don't think people make decisions by thinking; they're a bit motmots. Well he did that then good, he gave us that ah then very very good. I also think about things: things are mixed up with extra things to do. They vote for everything that needs to be done as extra things, and I don't think they question it. Uneducation

²⁷ AKP popülist bir parti başlangıç itibarıyla. Bir yerden sonra kendi ülke içinde dinamiklerini oluşturdular. Kendi zenginlerini, partizanlarını oluşturdular. İdeolojik bir söylem çıkardılar. İlk başta net bir ideolojik söylemleri yoktu. Popülist bir partiydi. Bir yerden sonra insanlara hitap etmeye başladı belli bir çevreye. Çok kişiyi besliyorlar çok kişi ekme yedi, yedirdiler yani. Aslında en son seçimde yüzde 38 mi ne aldı. Oraya kadar düştü, ekonomi kötüye gitti. Bu bir yerden sonra azalacak.

²⁸ Gerçekten takdir etmek lazım bu konuda bir şeyleri çok iyi anlatıyor gerçekten. Hükümet olarak. Bize göre yanlış bir şeyi karşı tarafa geçirme özellikleri var. Geçirdikleri kitleler çok sorgulayan insanlar değil belki sorgulayan insanlar. Ama kendilerini iyi ifade ediyorlar kendi kesimleri için iyi destek topluyorlar. Topladıkları destek de bir iki senelik bir destek değil hani canlarını veriyorlar o yola. Hayatta başka seçenek düşünmüyorlar, konuşulmasında dahi rahatsız oluyorlar. O yüzden onların dışında bir şey düşünen insanlar kötü sıfatlar yakıştırıyorlar zaten. Bunu iyi empoze ediyorlar. Bu en iyi özellikleri belki de zaten. Bu konuda gerçekten takdire şayan.

has also increased a lot in Turkey. The ignorant consciousness has become too much. It's something people still have, even after going through university. I think people need to improve a little bit.²⁹

Tuğba describes people who voted for AKP as idiots and think that AKP can deceive very well.

So firstly, the economy collapsed once. I am unemployed. Lots of people likewise. Cut this place, chop this place; he didn't leave any trees in the country. I am furious about this. For example, my relatives are old; they are all AKP, then the people I follow on my Facebook are all idiots. And the guys deceive so well that they know where to hit. They're deceiving people, they're clever, but they're wicked.³⁰

Barış state that the expectation from the general politics of the society is very much the same as what the AKP offers them, which is why the AKP can stay in power. He thinks that what he expects from politics is not bullshit but that people are convinced of this by being "ignorant." They have the perception that there is a difference between what is said and what is done in politics, that politics is about saying something, not doing something.

I think it has to do with what our society expects from politicians. I said that the majority of our society, in my opinion, politics shouldn't be done like this, it shouldn't be done with common words; I think the majority of our society wants it like this. Somehow, they continue to be convinced, and I don't know if ignorance, in particular, is the right word, but that type of policy may also be in place. I think the situation of the media is terrible. Everyone does not use such social media. Or the media is multilateral. People don't get any news; maybe they don't even realize it...³¹

²⁹ İnsanların düşünerek irdeleyerek karar verdiklerini düşünmüyorum biraz motomotlar. İyi bunu yaptı o zaman iyi, bize şunu sağladı aa o zaman çok çok iyi. Bir de şeyler diye düşünüyorum: yapılması gerekenlerle ekstra yapılacaklar karıştırılıyor. Yapılması gerekenlerin hepsini ekstra yapılan şeyler gibi düşünüp oy verdiklerini düşünüyorum ve sorgulamıyorlar bence. Eğitimsizlik de çok arttı Türkiye'de. Cahil bilinç çok fazlaştı. Bu üniversiteyi okuduktan sonra bile hala insanlarda olan bir şey. Biraz insanların kendini geliştirmesi gerekiyor bence.

³⁰ Yani ekonomi battı bir kere. Ben işsiz kaldım. Bir sürü insan aynı şekilde. Orayı doğra burayı doğra memlekette ağaç bırakmadı. Çok sinirliyim bu konuda. Benim mesela akrabalarım yaşlı olanlar hepsi AKP'li sonra facebook'umda takip ettiğim insanlar hepsi salaklar. Ve adamlar çok güzel kandırıyor nereden vuracaklarını biliyorlar. İnsanları kandırıyorlar zekice ama kötü kalpliler.

³¹ Bence toplumumuzun siyasilerden beklediği şeyle alakalı. Toplumumuzun büyük bir çoğunluğu dedim ya bana göre siyaset böyle yapılmamalıydı beylik laflarla yapılmamalıydı falan diye sanırım toplumumuzun büyük bir çoğunluğu böyle istiyor. Bir şekilde de ikna olmaya devam ediyorlar ve işte belki de özel olarak cahilleştirme doğru kelime mi bilmiyorum ama o tip bir politika da uygulanıyor olabilir. Medyanın durumu da çok kötü bence. Yani sosyal medya herkes tarafından kullanılmıyor. Ya medya da çok taraflı. İnsanlar haber alamıyor belki de hiç farkında değiller onun dışında...

Another remarkable point is the change in the youth's relationship, who took the leadership of the entire social struggle and the responsibility of the whole society before 1980, with the society today. Students think that the AKP voters are completely different from themselves as a general trend in the study. They say that they are ignorant, do not question and are deceived. This reveals a significant difference between the youth movements of the past and today's youth. Until the 1980s, the relationship between youth and society was mentioned above. Acting with the responsibility of being a minority group that can achieve education compared to the rest of the society, the youth organized the social struggle with all the constituents of the society and tried to use the education they received for the benefit of the public. However, today public is seen as ignorant, causing a gap between the youth and the rest of the society. In this period, the youth has moved from a position that transforms the society and develops with the society, to a position that blames the society and avoids establishing relations with it. This change, which appears as a result of the individual society structure created by neoliberalism, is one of the main reasons for the distance that youth has taken from the organization compared to the past.

Another tendency that emerges in the perception of the government is related to the political Islamist and religious character of the AKP. Again, this is directly related to the perception that politics is the business of deceiving people. It has been frequently stated that the AKP uses religion as a tool to deceive people. Many interviewees think that the AKP politicized Islam, made politics using religion, and was able to stay in power because the general character of the society was prone to this type of politics. The attitude of accusing society is also seen here.

While Bilal expresses that they hate the AKP, they say that the "eastern" peoples, including Turkey, like authoritarian figures. They think that politics in Turkey is not done within the constitutional order and that politics can be so convincing that people harm each other.

As far as I understand from Turkish politics, I think you can observe this in Russia, a Turkey coming from the past, or there is something in the eastern peoples. However, it harms my freedoms; people seem to want authoritarian figures. You expect them to rebel very easily after seeing the things done in Russia, Turkey, and China. But as far as I can tell, they put up with this a little more, and Erdogan's show in foreign policy makes them incredibly satisfied and happy. And if we go back to Turkey, I think that Turkish politics, in general, revolves around two axes. Two economics, secularism, and an Islamist or

political Islam. Although it revolves around these two circles, I am living in the thing we call secularism and Islamism, especially as I understand from my elders; on the contrary, since there is no certain state or a constitutional order has never existed, both sides are trying incredibly hard to destroy each other. And it does incredible damage during that time. That's why it prevents them from making emotional decisions, casting votes, or keeping different issues on the agenda. That's why it seems to me that it is difficult to get out of this axis. I think this is the reason why they voted.³²

Efe defines himself as a Muslim bisexual and thinks that the Turkish society is a Muslim society, but they do not know about Islam, so the AKP remains in power.

I think that I am a different person in this regard. Let me count my features: I am both a religious person and bisexual. I now have a boyfriend. I am different. We stay in a specific place socially, minority plus minority, I am Circassian, for example. When I look back, I think this is why I opened the topic of religion. They use a lot of religion. It is a great taboo for us in the country. I define myself as a Muslim; for example, I did not read the Qur'an, I read some parts of it, but I did not read it all. We get into ridiculous discussions without reading the Qur'an. In high school, my friends were more on the believing side. I think it seems that we cannot get rid of this power without realizing that our people are an element on which every sheep is hanged by their legs.³³

Another trend in the answers to the question of how the AKP was successful and able to stay in power was the emphasis on the importance of working from below. Young people think that the bottom-up organization model will bring success in politics. For

³² Türkiye siyasetinden anladığım kadarıyla burada bence geçmişten gelen bir Türkiye'de bunu Rusya'da da gözlemleyebilirsiniz veya doğu halklarında şey var. ne kadar benim bireysel kişisel özgürlüklerimi zedelese de otoriter figürler istiyor gibi gelmekte bana halklar. Rusya'da Türkiye'de Çin'de yapılan şeyleri gördükten sonra isyan etmelerini beklersin çok rahat. Ama biraz daha bunu sineye çekip Erdoğan'ın dış politikada şov yapması onları inanılmaz tatmin ediyor mutlu kılıyor anladığım kadarıyla. Bir de Türkiye özeline dönersek; bence genelde Türkiye siyaseti iki eksende dönüyor. Bir laiklik ve İslamcı veya siyasal İslam diye adlandırılan iki de ekonomi. Bu iki çeperde dönmesine rağmen laiklik ve İslamcılık dediğimiz şeyde özellikle büyüklerimden duyduğum anladığım kadarıyla şuan kendim de yaşıyorum tam tersi bir şekilde belli bir devlet olmadığı için veya anayasal bir düzen hiçbir zaman var olmadığı için iki tarafta birbirini yok etmek için inanılmaz çabalıyor. Ve bu sürede inanılmaz zararlar veriyor. O yüzden duygusal karar vermelerini de oy atarken veya farklı konuların gündemde olmasını da engelliyor asla siz Türkiye'deki bir seçimde dış politika konuşulduğunu görmezsiniz sürekli bu eksende döner tartışmalar bana kalırsa. O yüzden de bu eksen de dışarı çıkmak zor gibi geliyor bana. Oy vermelerinin sebebi de bu eksen bence

³³ Ben değişik bir insan olduğumu düşünüyorum bu konuda. Sayıyım özelliklerimi: hem dini bütün bir insanım hem de biseksüelim şuan erkek arkadaşım var. Değişik biriyim. Sosyal olarak spesifik bir yerde kalıyoruz azınlık plus azınlık, çerkezim falan yani. Dönüp baktığımda şunu düşünüyorum din konusunu bu yüzden açtım. Çok fazla dini kullanıyorlar. Ülkede inanılmaz bir tabu bizim için. Ben kendimi Müslüman olarak tanımlıyorum mesela kuranı okumadım bazı yerlerini okudum ama tamamını okumadım. Kuranı okumadan etmeden çok saçma tartışmalara giriyoruz. Lisede arkadaşlarım daha inanan taraftaydı. Bence bizim halkın her koyunun kendi bacağından asıldığı bir unsur olduğunu anlamadan bizim bu iktidardan kurtulamayız gibi geliyor.

example; Berna thinks that the AKP is organized from below, that they have been doing this from the very beginning, and that is why they are in power.

They did it by working with Fethullah Gülen. That is, by spreading to the bottom. They can spread well onto the bottom. These are the things I heard from my aunt. The areas also appeal to the upper segment of the CHP. In HDP, going out to the fields constantly is spreading to the bottom. There are workshops. Tell it to spread out. AKP was doing it from the beginning; I think they existed even in education.³⁴

Similarly, Fatih states that the AKP, is organized from the grassroots, with which the left used in the past. Thus it comes to power.

How did they come to power? On September 12, the masses who had just migrated from the village to the city, where the left used to be able to communicate more, were largely left in the hands of religious sects. For example, my mother goes to women's meetings of Naqshbandi, etc. religious reactionism over it...³⁵

Unlike the general opinion, there are also students who think that AKP was relatively better at first but then very bad. For example, Deniz thinks that AKP has had this share of votes thanks to its use of religion, but also thinks that solving some of the problems that people had in the past (such as the health system) had an impact:

There is also something like this. Before 2000, more precisely, people who are old experienced very difficult times in coalition governments. For example, our health system was much worse. I know from my family, from my grandfather or something. It's better now. Health is something that affects those age groups a lot. For example, when my grandfather was 40 years old, he couldn't have some things, but now everything is covered by the hospital, and why shouldn't my grandfather give it to the AKP? Many people vote like this. Many people vote for religion.³⁶

³⁴ Fetullah gülenle alttan alta işleyerek yaptılar. Yani tabana doğru yayılarak. Tabana iyi yayılabiliyorlar. Bunlar da teyzemden duyduğum şeyler de. Alanlar da CHP daha üst kesime hitap ediyor. HDP' de sürekli alanlara çıkmak tabana yayılmak. Çalıştaylar falan oluyor. Şuraya söyle yayılalım diye. AKP onu baştan beri yapıyordu bence eğitimde bile varlardı.

³⁵ Nasıl iktidar olmayı başardılar? Bence 12 Eylül'le beraber eskiden solun daha çok iletişime geçebildiği köyden kente yeni göç etmiş kitleler büyük oranda dinci tarikatların eline bırakılmış oldular. Annem de mesela Nakşibendi'nin kadın toplantılarına gidiyor vs. onun üzerinden dinci gericiilik...

³⁶ Şöyle bir şey de var 2000 öncesinde daha doğrusu koalisyon hükümetlerinde çok sıkıntılı zamanlar yaşadı şu an yaşlı olan insanlar. Ya mesela sağlık sistemimiz çok daha kötüydü ailemden biliyorum dedemden falan. Şu an daha iyi. Sağlık o yaş gruplarını çok etkileyen bir şey. 40 yaşındayken dedem mesela bazı şeylere sahip olamıyordu ama şu an bütün hastane her şeyi karşılıyor ve dedem neden vermesin Ak partiyeye. Böyle veren çok insan var. Din konusunda veren çok insan var.

Muhammed, which came from a AKP supporter family, also states that the AKP was more positive in its early days, and their views turned to negative when they realized that a political Islamist democrat rhetoric was not possible.

In the beginning, it was actually during the establishment period, when my father and my family were young. I'm a little older because my mom and dad got married early. It was the time of youth. AKP was very good in its youth branches and establishment. Since I was a bit conservative during the establishment period of AKP, I had a positive view, and I liked their ideology, and I defended it. But if we need to draw a certain limit, there are certain divergences, or there may be a Gezi process. Before the Gezi process, I had a little research on these processes that changed my view during the 2007 process. That conservative democrat or political Islam in its foundation... When I realized that these were not implemented gradually, and were not on a suitable ground to be applied. At first, I was positive, but now it is negative.³⁷

Up to this point, the evaluations made by students about Turkey and the political party that rules it make it difficult to evaluate the youth in Turkey as apolitical. It can be said that young people follow the changes taking place in the political field and form their views on Turkey's problems. As can be seen, all of the young people interviewed within the scope of this field research are uncomfortable with the AKP and its politics. All of them state that they vote for opposition parties in the parliament while voting, but none of them are members of any of these parties or participate in their work. It is important to understand what kind of politics they want for the change they want to take place in the country and know where they see the solution to their problems. In this sense, it is necessary to look at how these young people who voted for opposition parties perceive the opposition parties and their politics in the parliament.

3.3. Youth's Perception of the Opposition Parties in the Parliament

How the interviewees view and evaluate the opposition parties in the parliament is another topic directly related to their perception of politics. In the Turkish parliament, apart from AKP and MHP, there are CHP, HDP, TİP, Saadet, and İYİP. Most of the

³⁷ AKP gençlik kollarında ve kuruluşunda falan baya iyiydi. AKP'nin kuruluş döneminde biraz da muhafazakâr olmam sebebiyle olumlu bakıyordum, ideolojilerini beğeniyordum, savunuyordum. Ama işte belli bir sınır çekmek gerekirse belli ayrışmalar var ya işte gezi süreci olabilir. Gezi sürecinden de önce 2007 sürecinde benim görüşümü değiştiren biraz bu süreçleri incelemem oldu. Kuruluşundaki o muhafazakâr demokrat veya siyasal İslam... Bunların yavaş yavaş uygulanamadığını, olmadığını ve uygulanmaya müsait bir zeminde olmadığını fark edince. İlk başlarda olumlu bakıyordum ama şu an olumsuz kesinlikle.

interviewees vote for CHP, some for HDP, and some state that it changes according to the situation.

Although all students vote for opposition parties, none of them belong to a party is an important point in understanding how the youth perceive the organization. This is why it becomes remarkable how they evaluate the opposition parties in their perceptions of politics. It has been stated above that the evaluations they made on the political field over the AKP also included their views on the opposition parties. The main motivation for voting for opposition parties is their opposition to the AKP, and they frequently express this. When we closely examine the evaluations of the opposition parties in the parliament, we see that the perception that politics is a job done for profit, financial gain, and rent also applies to the opposition parties.

Like most of the students, Mehmet states that he does not trust any political party, and also CHP members do politics for profit, which is very similar to AKP. He does not think the CHP can lead the country to a better place. He attributes why he is voting for the CHP because he has some family background and that there is no other alternative.

This includes the CHP but also all other parties. I do not think that any political party, or politician, thinks and will think about the welfare of the society, the welfare of the people, and the welfare of the country. Someone who is a politician enters there ultimately to gain power, money, and position. As far as I can see, I have never met a politician who denied my opinion or acted oppositely.³⁸

Elif also states that she does not find the parties and politicians sincere, and they all engage in politics for the sake of profit:

I don't think there is much sincerity. In Turkey, people in politics seem to join parties to make money with self-interest, so I feel a little close and then turn cold.³⁹

³⁸ Bu söyleyeceğim CHP'yi kapsamakla beraber diğer tüm partileri de kapsıyor. Ben hiçbir siyasi partinin siyasetçinin toplumun halkın iyiliğini ülkenin refahını düşündüğünü ve düşüneceğini sanmıyorum. Siyasetçi olan biri tamamen oraya güçtür, paradır, mevkidir bunları kazanmak için giriyor. Benim bu düşüncemi de kendi gördüğüm kadarıyla yalanlayan veya aksi şekilde davranan bir siyasetçiyle de karşılaşmadım.

³⁹ Samimilik aslında bence pek yok. (...)Türkiye'deki siyasetteki insanlar bir çıkarıcılık para kazanmak için partilere giriyor gibi geliyor o yüzden biraz yakın hissediyorum sonra geri soğuyorum.

Similarly, Efe thinks that politics is a career business, based on a familiar relationship, regardless of opposition or ruling parties. He describes the functioning of politics as follows;

When I was little, I always thought things, my mouth makes good words, but you lie well, everyone used to say to me that you should either be a lawyer or a politician. But then I realized that in our country, the political work is something, you have an acquaintance, your uncle's son somewhere, and he imposes a certain party idea on you. You're going to that party; it's obvious whatever steps are being taken, I don't know much anymore, you go up those steps in a party. I'm not just speaking for the MHP and AKP. I think it is more or less the same in CHP.⁴⁰

Hasret's criticism of CHP and CHP supporters is similar to her criticism of AKP. She thinks that everyone joins the CHP for their own benefit, and they do politics to fill their pockets.

In the CHP, things go a long way, and everyone wants to be a CHP member as much as they can. Okay, why do people go to the AKP? Because he buys something for his own benefit, the AKP gives him something; people approach the CHP in the same way. All the CHP people I know are there to get help from the CHP. Because it is the main opposition party. I get jobs from municipalities. Let me be a deputy; I have parliamentary immunity and a salary. My pocket will be complete when I retire. For this reason, people are becoming CHP members. Otherwise, none of the CHP deputies have such a view of the world; I do not want to be a CHP member.⁴¹

It is seen that the fact that politics is based on the relationship of interest affects the young people's view of politics negatively. While evaluating the opposition parties, many interviewees think that the parties should persistently and decisively defend the ideas they believe. One of the biggest criticisms leveled at the opposition party CHP is that they gave up their own ideology to win votes and tried to emulate the AKP. They think that politics should be done not for the sake of profit but to defend the right

⁴⁰ Ben küçükken hep şey düşünürdüm benim ağzım iyi laf yapar iyi de yalan söylerin herkes bana sen ya avukat ya politikacı ol derdi. Ama sonra fark ettim ki ülkemizde politikacılık tamamen şey olarak işliyor senin bir tanıdığın var amcanın oğlu bir yerlerde o sana belli bir parti fikrini empoze ediyor. Sen o partiye gidiyorsun işte belli her ne basamaklar çıkılıyorsa artık çok bir bilgim yok bir partinin içerisinde o basamakları çıkıyorsun. Sadece MHP ve AKP için konuşuyorum. CHP'de de üç aşağı beş yukarı böyle bence.

⁴¹ CHP'de de de aslında şey çok yürüyor herkes kullanabildiği kadar CHP'li olmak istiyor. Tamam AK Partiye insanlar neden gidiyor? Çünkü kendi faydasına bir şeyler alıyor yani ak parti ona bir şey veriyor insanlar CHP'ye de öyle yaşıyor. Benim tanıdığım bütün CHP'liler herkes CHP'den nema almak için orada. Çünkü ana muhalefet partisi, CHP'li belediyelerden iş alırım. Milletvekili olayım dokunulmazlığım olsun maaşım olsun. Emekli olduğumda cebim dolsun. Bunun için insanlar CHP'li oluyor. Yoksa CHP'li milletvekillerinden hiç biri bu benim dünya görüşüm var ben bunun için savaşağım tarzında insan sayısı çok az var ben bu yüzden de CHP'li de olmak istemiyorum.

ideas. However, the fact that none of the existing parties is like this is another reason that keeps them away from politics.

Many evaluations were made about the CHP's policy making. The recent change in the CHP's policies (such as highlighting more right-wing candidates, the predominance of right-wing discourse, etc.) has been criticized by many interviewees. They state that parties should have certain ideological orientations and that they should not stop saying what they believe to be true just to gain votes. They say that the CHP adopts the right-wing rhetoric at the expense of its own base and that it disturbs them.

Bilal says that his views are opposite of his father, that his father is from the AKP, that he was from the CHP even when he prayed five times a day, and that he currently votes for the HDP. He states that the CHP has recently tried to adopt the AKP's strategy, which is the right attitude if they want to be in power, but if they want to change something in the country, it is wrong. He answers the question of how he evaluates the CHP;

I think what they are doing now, especially in the last municipal elections, is a bit of what they did, and they are trying to adopt the strategy of the AKP in 2012, and the CHP is taking an expansive stance. If they want to be in power, this is right, but if they want to change Turkey, it is wrong because it is wrong if the CHP's aim is a more secular Turkey or wrong if it is a free Turkey. Politics is not about winning; it's about changing it, in my opinion. If he wants to change, he has to abandon them. (...) I think the progressiveness of the CHP remains on a micro-scale. (For example) Even if the woman prefers to nominate the local authority candidate, it does not do this when there is a chance to change the things that depend on her hands in these high positions.⁴²

As I mentioned above, Elif does not trust any political party. The CHP's recent deviation from its own ideology proves this distrust for her. When I ask to which party, she feels close, she answers:

CHP looks better. But I don't think it's nice that the CHP's recent attitude is a little out of their ideology to get votes so that we can come to power. It is wrong for him to go to the opposite ideology because we are obviously conservative, and there is no vote without being conservative. My mother is also wearing a

⁴² Bence şuan yaptıkları şey özellikle son belediye seçimlerinde yaptıkları biraz da onlar da Ak partinin 2012'deki stratejisini benimsemeye çalışıyor CHP'nin genişletici bir tutum takınıyor. Eğer iktidar olmak istiyorlarsa bu yaptıkları doğru ama Türkiye'yi değiştirmek istiyorlarsa kesinlikle yanlış çünkü kendi şuan CHP'nin amacı daha laik bir Türkiye'ye de yanlış veya daha özgür bir Türkiye'ye de yanlış. Siyaset kazanmak değildir değiştirmektir de aynı zamanda bana kalırsa. Değiştirmek istiyorsa bunları terk etmek zorunda.(...) Mikro ölçüde kalıyor bence CHP'nin ilericaliği. (Mesela)Muhtar adayı gösterirken kadın tercih etse bile bu yüksek makamlarda eline bağlı şeyleri değiştirmek varken bunu yapmıyor.

headscarf, but they always put head scarfed people on their advertising banners, etc. That's not sincere either.⁴³

Baver also thinks that the CHP is trying to follow AKP politics. The party he voted for is HDP. However, he thinks that politics should be based on class contradictions and criticizes HDP for making identity politics.

And I think that the struggle should be a class struggle. The Kurdish movement is not only about the Kurds, I think. There is a class problem, not just racial. But I had something like that because the HDP sometimes carried out a policy on Kurdishness rather than class struggle so I couldn't get warm enough. In my mind, I did not feel one hundred percent belonging. There were many people at the party, such as deputies or something. In other words, we have seen the discourses that we criticize the other side, too. Racism would be a little strange, but mostly because of nationalist rhetoric.⁴⁴

Muhammed considers it unnecessary for the CHP to use names like Mansur and İmamoğlu to impress the conservative audience. He thinks that a party (AKP) that best represents this mass already exists and that they cannot gain anything in this way. He does not believe that the CHP is progressive. He thinks that the CHP is also conservative, has a rigid structure, and does not have a structure that can be entered into and actively fought.

I do not think that the ideology of the CHP is particularly different. I don't see anything in general; I don't see it as a party that separates from central politics from this ideology; I don't know, I don't see it as a progressive and progressive point, whether it is conservatism, the progressiveness within itself, the current view of the world within itself. I don't think the CHP appeals to the conservative audience enough.

The existence of figures such as İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, in fact, is not directly beneficial when we look at it. Because although İmamoğlu tries to impress the conservative wing with his actions, there is more of this already in the AKP. I think there should be figures like Ahmet Davutoğlu. Actually, figures like Ali Babacan. It also existed in the first establishment period of the AKP. I will not support them directly but at least represent the conservative segment.⁴⁵

⁴³ Bakıldığında CHP daha iyi geliyor. Ama CHP'nin son zamanlardaki tavrı sırf iktidara gelelim diye oy toplayalım diye ideolojilerinden biraz çıkmaları hoş değil bence. Sırf belli ki biz muhafazakârız muhafazakâr olmadan oy gelmiyor diye ters ideolojiye gitmesi yanlış. Benim annem de başörtülü ama reklam pankartlarına sürekli kapalı insanları koymaları vs. bu da samimi değil.

⁴⁴ Ya ben mücadelenin biraz daha şeydense sınıfsal olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Kürt hareketi mevzu sadece Kürtler değil bence. Sınıfsal bir problem var sadece ırksal değil. Ama HDP'nin sınıfsal mücadeleden kürtlük üzerinden bir politika zaman zaman yürüttüğünden dolayı öyle bir şeyim olmuştu tam ısınmadım yani. Kafa olarak yüzde yüz ait hissedemedim. Parti içinde de çok şey insanlar vardı mesela milletvekilleri falan. Daha yani karşı tarafta eleştirdiğimiz söylemleri onlarda da gördük. İrkçılık biraz garip olur da daha çok milliyetçi söylemlerden ötürü.

⁴⁵ CHP'nin ideolojisinin özellikle farklı olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Genelde şey görmüyorum merkez siyasetten bu ideolojiden ayrışan bir parti olarak görmüyorum ne bileyim muhafazakârlık olsun ,kendi

Another reason why young people are not involved in politics despite being oppositional and wanting many things to change is that they cannot see a party that can actively oppose the political power they want to change, that they can see as an alternative, and that they can make Turkey the country they want it to be.

Most of the interviewees do not think there is an effective opposition in Turkey. They state that the opposition only criticizes but that no concrete response has been found. Some think that there has been a change in this attitude after the CHP won the municipalities, as well as those who believe that it continues in the same way and that an effective opposition cannot be carried out in the Corona case either.

Bilge thinks that the opposition in Turkey (albeit from different ideologies) remains only at the level of criticism, that they express the government's mistakes well. Still, they do not put forward anything alternative.

I think the government did something. It's good that the opposition party has against this wrong and says this. But no opposition party or anyone with any ideology in Turkey talks about anything other than I am a member of this or that. There are several concepts in the language they are spoken, but I think the process of generating ideas does not work anywhere. He says it's wrong, okay, but no one has an idea what will be the truth this.⁴⁶

Similarly, Defne thinks that the CHP has no interest in changing anything and that they are only producing an antithesis to the AKP's theses. He believes that HDP has the potential to change something, unlike CHP.

For example, AKP put forward a thesis. CHP says it the antithesis. But I mean like that, they don't actually say anything that can actually work. In general, I do not think that they have a discourse that appeals to their own voters. It's a little bit like we know the opinions of the people we represent for years, it seemed like they were making a very passive policy by saying that if we talk like that, we

içindeki progresiflik olsun, kendi içindeki dünyaya şu anki bakış olsun yeteri kadar progresif ve ilerlemeci bir noktada görmüyorum. Ben CHP'nin yeterince muhafazakâr kitleye hitap ettiğini düşünmüyorum.

İmamoğlu gibi, Mansur yavaş gibi figürlerin var oluyor olması aslında baktığımızda doğrudan faydalı şeyler de değil. Çünkü her ne kadar İmamoğlu muhafazakâr kanadı yaptığı eylemlerle etkilemeye çalışsa da bunun daha fazlası zaten AKP'de var... Ahmet Davutoğlu gibi figürler olmalı diye düşünüyorum. Ali babacan gibi figürler aslında. AKP'nin ilk kuruluş döneminde de var. Doğrudan bunları desteklemeyeceğim ama en azından muhafazakâr kesimi temsil eden...

⁴⁶ Bana kalırsa atıyorum iktidar bir şey yaptı. Yanlış bir şey yaptı muhalefet partisi çıkıp bunu söylüyor güzel. Ama hiçbir muhalefet partisi ya da Türkiye'deki herhangi bir ideolojiye sahip hiçbir insan yerden sonra şunun mensubuyum bunun mensubuyum dışında bir şey konuşmuyor. Dilde birkaç kavram var onlarla konuşuluyor ama fikir üretmek işlemi hiçbir yerde işlemiyor bence. Yanlış diyor tamam ama bunun doğrusu ne olacak bunun için hiçbir insanda bir fikir yok.

already get their vote somehow. When I compared it to HDP, I thought that they could really change something, that they defined freedom differently. That's why I felt close.⁴⁷

When I asked Bilal, how he evaluated what the opposition did during the pandemic, he said that the CHP remained an ineffective party and that there was a big gap in Turkey as an opposition.

Some mayors said the number of patients in their own provinces and deaths started to increase a little after that. One of them was the voice of dissent. There is nothing other than that; I do not know whether to go and talk to the doctors, report to the workers, or increase a voice; the CHP remains an ineffective party. They also achieve some things. There is a product of their propaganda in raising the minimum wage, and they could have done it. There is a big gap both as a political agenda and a big gap as an opposition. I feel sorry. (Pandemic process) It is poorly managed.⁴⁸

Deniz also states that they voted for the CHP because they believe that they will be more unrestricted under the CHP government in terms of religious pressure, but adds that they are no different from other parties in economic terms:

I vote CHP. And I think it could be more libertarian because religion also comes into play and the current government is very oppressive. I don't think the others will be like this, so I'm voting for it. But as I said, I don't think they will be very successful in other areas of economic matters.⁴⁹

Similar to Anıl, interviewee Berna is among those who think that the CHP is opposing to opposing. She states that he is close to socialist thought. He believes that the HDP

⁴⁷ Mesela AKP bir tez öne sürüyor. CHP buna antitez söylüyor. Ama böyle diyorum ki gerçekten işleyebilecek bir şey söylemiyorlar aslında. Kendi seçmenine hitap eden bir söylemleri olduğunu düşünmüyorum genel olarak. Birazcık şey gibi biz yıllardır temsil ettiğimiz insanların görüşünü az buçuk biliyoruz böyle böyle konuşursak zaten onların bir şekilde oyunu alıyoruz deyip çok pasif bir siyaset yapıyorlar gibi gelmişti bir dönem. HDP'yle karşılaştırdığım zaman onların gerçekten bir şeyi değiştirebileceklerini düşünmüştüm o yüzden kendimi yakın hissetmişim.

⁴⁸ Bazı belediye başkanlarının kendi illerindeki hasta sayısını ölü sayısını söylediler ondan sonra zaten biraz artmaya başladı. Bir onlar vardı muhalif olarak çıkan ses. Onun dışında hiçbir şey yok ne biliyim gidip doktorlarla konuşmak olsun gidip işçileri haber yapmak olsun ses çıkarmak olsun bilmiyorum CHP inefektif bir parti olarak kalıyor. Bazı şeyleri de başarıyor asgari ücretin yükselmesinde onların propagandasının ürünü var bunu da yapabilirlerdi. O yüzden hem siyasi gündem olarak büyük bir boşluk var hem muhalefet olarak büyük bir boşluk var. Ben üzülüyorum. (Pandemi süreci) Kötü yönetiliyor.

⁴⁹ CHP'ye oy veriyorum. Ve daha özgürlükçü olabileceğini düşünüyorum çünkü işin içine din konusu da giriyor ve şu anki hükümet bu konuda çok baskıcı. Diğerlerinin bu kadar olacağını düşünmüyorum ve o yüzden veriyorum aslında. Ama dediğim gibi ekonomik konularda diğer konularda onların da çok başarılı olacaklarını düşünmüyorum.

only cares about the Kurds, that other people also have problems, and ignore them. She states that he made the party election by evaluating all the options.

I am much more moderate to CHP. As I said, it seems closer to me about freedom. Let me not say religion; it is not clear what they will do, but we understand more or less, and I think that there could be a free country in this regard if the CHP were in power. That's why I'm one click closer to the CHP.⁵⁰

Some interviewees find the current policies of the CHP correct. For example, Anıl, like other interviewees, thinks that they used to oppose to be the opposition, but now that the municipalities have also been won, they have done concrete work and are getting better. He states that the work done by CHP municipalities is good during the pandemic period.

I think the CHP is a party trying to instil rational speech into itself lately gradually. Previously it was opposition only to be opposition. But recently, I feel as if they have started to produce a little more idea, as if to put their weight on it, at least by speaking out instead of just opposing, to be a little more dominant, not only to say that this is wrong but also to say that this is not wrong, let's do it like this, this is the right thing to do. They changed their minds a bit. They changed the method. (During the pandemic period) I think everyone would support the work done by a few municipalities based on the CHP, especially in Ankara, whether they support it or not. Most of Mansur Yavaş's activities were successful. He was pretty good at helping people with dwindling incomes and helping those in need.⁵¹

In general, it could be said that the opposition parties are not seen as an alternative to Turkey's change among the youth. The fact that none of the representatives in the political field creates hope for change for the youth causes the youth to stay away from the political area, to see it as ineffective, inefficient, and worthless. It is seen that all of the interviewed young people voted because they wanted to express their opposition to the AKP.

⁵⁰ CHP'ye çok daha ılımlıyım. Dediğim gibi özgürlük konusunda daha yakın geliyor bana. Din demeyeyim onların da ne yapacağı belli değil ama az çok anlıyoruz ve bu konuda daha özgür bir ülke olabileceğini düşünüyorum CHP eğer iktidar olsaydı. O yüzden bir tık daha yakınım CHP'ye.

⁵¹ CHP son zamanlarda mantıklı konuşmayı yavaş yavaş kendine aşlamaya çalışan bir parti diye düşünüyorum . Önceden sadece muhalefet olmak için muhalefetti. Ama son zamanlarda sanki ağırlıklarını koymak için biraz daha baskın olmak için en azından sadece muhalefet etmek yerine altını dolu konuşarak, sadece bu yanlıştır demek değil de bu yanlış böyle olmaz şöyle yapalım bunun doğrusu budur diye biraz daha fikir üretmeye başladıklarını hissediyorum. Biraz da fikir değiştirdiler. Yöntem değiştirdiler. (Pandemi döneminde) ...CHP bazında birkaç belediyenin yaptığı çalışmalar özellikle Ankara'da desteklesin desteklemesin herkes savunur herhalde. Mansur Yavaş'ın yaptığı çoğu etkinlik çoğu başarılıydı. İnsanlara yardım etme konusunda ihtiyacı olanlara gelir kaynağı azalanlarla yardım etme konusunda baya başarılıydı.

For example, Mehmet states that;

There is a standard nonsensical political thought that we will not vote to the CHP but to whom we will give it, so no matter how much I try to oppose it, there is this. I do not trust any political party. Many of the people around me, including my family and friends, are people who don't really want to vote. They've been voting to let these guys go in the last few elections. That's why I vote also. Wrong, very wrong, but I think this wrong is more social than the individual. No group or party promises me something genuine that I believe can take me to a better place.⁵²

Similarly, Fatih says he voted for HDP to send a message about his opposition to AKP.

At the moment, I think the party that we can define as the main opposition is HDP. CHP is far from being the main opposition, and the vote for HDP is the most significant message in opposition to AKP. Since I said that change cannot be achieved through elections, but it can give a message, I think that the most meaningful vote given to HDP is at least in the parliament etc.⁵³

Continuing the meeting, he says that the CHP did not point out where Turkey wants to change. While expressing his criticisms about the CHP, he explains what kind of politics he wants;

The CHP is trying to beat the AKP by engaging in religious populism to a certain extent. This is not where I want Turkey to change. It's just by putting different values against it. I would like to, after standing side by side with the HDP, which frequently puts the minimum wage, the main agenda item on the agenda, to a certain extent, it should be a party that does not say yes to the bill just because it fears the reaction of the average person, can defend its principles and enter into a discussion on these values. (...) He needs to be more courageous both for his success and this is what I want.⁵⁴

⁵² CHP'ye vermeyeceğiz de kime vericez tarzı bir düşünce standart saçma bir siyasi düşünce var yani her ne kadar buna karşı çıkmaya çalışsam da bu var. Hiçbir siyasi partiye güvenmiyorum. Birçok çevremdeki insan da öyle ailemden tutun arkadaşlarım da gerçekten oy vermek istemeyen insanlar. Son birkaç seçimde şu adamlar gitsin diye oy veriyorlar. Ben de öyle veriyorum. Yanlış, çok yanlış ama bu yanlışlığın bireyselden çok toplumsal olduğunu düşünüyorum. Bana gerçekten gerçek bir şey vadeden umut vadeden beni daha iyi bir yere çıkarabileceğine inandığım bir grup ya da parti yok.

⁵³ Ana muhalefet olarak tanımlayabileceğimiz partinin HDP olduğunu düşünüyorum şuanda. CHP ana muhalefet olmaktan uzak ve HDP'ye verilen oy bence AKP karşıtlığında en büyük mesaj. Seçimlerle değişim sağlanmaz ama mesaj verebilir dediğim için o yüzden bence HDP'ye verilen en anlamlı oy oluyor en azından parlamentoda vs.

⁵⁴ CHP dinci popülizme belli oranda angaje olarak AKP'yi yenmeye çalışıyor. Türkiye'nin değişmesini istediğim yer de burası değil. Karşısına farklı değerler koyarak işte... Ana gündem maddesi patatesin pahalılığı olan asgari ücreti sık sık gündem haline getiren HDP'yle belli oranda yan yana durduktan sonra sırf ortalama insanın tepkisinden korktuğu için tezkereye evet demeyen daha çok ilkelerini savunabilen ve bu değerler üzerinden tartışmaya girebilen bir parti olsun isterdim. (...) Daha cesur olması lazım hem kendi başarısı için hem de istediğim şey bu.

While evaluating the opposition parties, the interviewees talked about the policies they followed and their candidates. A few interviewees commented on party structures and leaders. Most of the interviewees do not know much about the structure or functioning of the parties, and they also state that they do not understand how they work.

Ayşe criticizes Kılıçdaroğlu, who is the general president of CHP, for being inadequate as a leader. She states that Kılıçdaroğlu could not defend even what he knew, but Tayyip defended it, albeit by blaming others. She expresses that she cannot believe Kılıçdaroğlu because of his style, no matter how much she wants to believe.

I don't know if a political party leader is like this. Is Tayyip a better political leader or Kılıçdaroğlu? Of course, Tayyip. Because Kılıçdaroğlu cannot defend what he knows, I mean, Tayyip is blaming at least. I sometimes say to my friends that if Tayyip is right, but we don't understand, we're doing great on A news TV or something (laugh). For example, when he turns on the ATV, someone who wants to believe him can believe it; sometimes, even I can't believe it, it's that good. They say that I want to think in Turkey but Kılıçdaroğlu so much that it doesn't happen again, I can't stand it so much...⁵⁵

While Muhammed stated that he did not like the current situation of the CHP and that it should change, when asked why he did not work in it, he replied as follows:

(...) today, when I joined the CHP, certain mechanisms will prevent me from actively fighting within the CHP. Conservatism in itself. Or joining an IYIP requires me to work with people with whom I directly clash ideologically, or we can count different parties.⁵⁶

The perception of young people that politics consists of interests and political field is a corrupt area is also valid for opposition parties. They think that the opposition parties are also concerned about interests, positions, and financial gain, so politics is defined in this way for them. They believe that politics should defend values that are considered correct, that principles should not be compromised, that there should be a concrete equivalent, and that it should not consist of mere rhetoric and promises.

⁵⁵ Ya bilmiyorum bir siyasi parti liderinin böyle olması... Tayyip mi daha iyi bir siyasi lider mi yoksa Kılıçdaroğlu mu? Tabi ki Tayyip. Çünkü Kılıçdaroğlu bildiğini de savunamıyor. Yani gerçekten Tayyip en azından suçluyor... bazen diyorum arkadaşlarıma acaba Tayyip çok haklı da biz mi anlamıyoruz diye A haber TV'de falan harika gidiyoruz ya (gülüşme) mesela ATV'yi açtığında yani ona inanmak isteyen biri inanabilir bazen benim bile inanasım geliyor o kadar güzel anlatıyorlar ki Türkiye'yi ama Kılıçdaroğlu'na o kadar inanmak istiyorum yine olmuyor o kadar tahammül edemiyorum ki...

⁵⁶ (...)bugün ben aslında CHP'ye girdiğimde CHP içinde aktif mücadele edebilmemi engelleyecek belli mekanizmalar da var aslında. Kendi içindeki muhafazakârlık. Veya iyi partiye girmek doğrudan ideolojik olarak çatıştığım insanlarla bir arada çalışmamı gerektiriyor veya farklı partileri de sayabiliriz.

However, they do not think that any of the representatives of the political sphere currently in the parliament have these principles. They believe that the parliament has become a dysfunctional place and does not work for the welfare of the people and society. This, in turn, reduces the willingness of young people to participate in politics for Turkey to change and become the country they want, and it keeps them away from politics. It is possible to see a similar trend in the youth movements that developed between 1950 and 1980. The distant attitude of the youth of that period to political parties was mentioned in chapter 2. However, young people created organizations outside the parliament in this period and struggled through them. The perception of politics and the political field consisting of representatives operating in the parliament in Turkey dates back to the years after 1980. With the transformation experienced here, the difference between the past and the present is that today young people do not create their organizations by taking responsibility to establish the alternative they want. The reasons why young people who are not satisfied with the representatives of the existing political field, do not trust them and do not believe that they can make Turkey the country they want, do not establish their organizations, as in the past, will be analyzed in chapter 4, in the perception of the organization.

As mentioned in the Turkey chapter, although the political field was tried to be limited to the political parties in the parliament after 1980, extra-parliamentary organizations and social opposition movements continue to exist even though they have been rendered ineffective compared to the past. It is thought that how the youth, who are not satisfied with the representatives of the political field in the parliament, evaluate the alternatives outside the parliament, is another point to be considered in this sense. Because of these reasons, this thesis also examined how young people evaluate how they see non-parliamentary left communities and parties.

3.4. Youth's Perception of Non-Parliamentary Opposition

As mentioned in chapter 2, the social opposition that emerged before 1980 was predominantly left-wing. With the 1980 coup, neoliberal discourse attacked values and concepts such as collectivity, socialism, etc. A negative perception has been created about it. According to the hegemonic discourse of this period, the left is a thing of the past, utopian and radical, and cannot be realized in daily life. The political Islamist authoritarianism that developed with the AKP government led to further suppression

of the left and the destruction of left values. It was tried to be coded as left equals terrorism.

Thus, after the 1980s, the activities of the left in universities were restricted, students were exposed to investigations, posters could not be hung, leaflets could not be distributed, and activities were made impossible. METU continued to host oppositional dynamics compared to other universities across Turkey. Even though the oppression on the students increased, they managed to stand together against the events in Turkey and the attacks against the school. For this reason, METU is a university where students have the opportunity to meet more leftists than at other universities. The oppression on political communities is less than in other universities so they can organize more events, protest, put up posters or distribute leaflets. Despite this, the general tendency among the interviewees is that although they are more intertwined with leftist groups, their definition of political space is limited to the parties operating in the parliament. They do not see the left/socialist organizations and communities existing in METU as of the actors in the political field. Their knowledge of the left/socialist parties outside the parliament is very little, and they express this themselves. They think this is because these parties or communities have little influence and follow a passive policy.

For example, Ayşe states that she does not know much about the left, but she thinks that this is due to the fact that the left is passive and ineffective.

So, they have a passive role. I say passive because even I didn't notice that much, as I spend most of my day reading the news or something on social media. He was talking more in our WhatsApp groups during the prep school; I don't remember later.⁵⁷

One of her close relatives of Berna is the co-chairman of SYKP. Despite this, she states that she does not know much about the left. She has a more positive view of the left other than the parties in the parliament.

I don't know what exactly left-right means; there is something in my head, but I don't know the exact limit. (...) I don't know about my aunt's lifestyle; there was a disabled woman in the village who tried to teach her how to write. She does not live in luxury. She tries not to make the kids in his organization pay anything. It does not discriminate

⁵⁷ Yani pasif bir rolleri var. Pasif diyorum çünkü benim bile bu kadar dikkatimi çekmediyse ki günümün birçoğunu sosyal medyada geçiriyorum haberleri okuyorum falan hiç dikkatimi çekmedi. Dediğim gibi bizim whatsapp gruplarımızda hazırlık zamanında daha çok konuşuyordu son zamanlarda hiç hatırlamıyorum mesela.

among people. (...) My aunt is trying to change things, even if I don't support her party, I can't say to my aunt, but you are like that. If I go to my aunt's house, everywhere is a book. So is his partner. Someone who has read this much does not have the money to pocket the money anyway. I can't say that you are doing this wrong; I am not that knowledgeable anyway.⁵⁸

Despite the negative perception of the left, it is possible to argue that the students have a more positive view of the left parties and organizations outside the parliament than the opposition parties. They think that they are more genuine and sacrifice their lives (as a positive thing) than the political parties in the parliament. They do not think they do politics for profit, but they criticize them for being ineffective. They say that the left is considered irreligious(atheistic) and terrorist among the people, and they need to break this perception. Similar to the criticism they have levelled at the opposition parties, the left also remains to object to the fact that they do not say what to do as an alternative and remain at the level of opposition.

Elif also thinks that the left is more sincere and that leftists are better people. She looks more favorable to the left. She believes that the left cannot speak the language of the people and that it should be able to explain itself to people whom it calls "illiterate."

TKP, for example. So, they have sincerity. Who was Tunceli mayor? For example, the man is amiable. It's very nice but is there anything that the man is missing, and his own team is missing? It is debatable. I didn't research much; maybe if I didn't study engineering, I could have studied social sciences. I don't think much about them. Something is missing. Are they close to the public, or are they actually close or unable to market themselves? It's like something is missing. People have the perception that they are dividing the country or worse. And for someone to break that perception, they need to do serious research or see one of those people. I don't know a little bit there. Maybe it's what we call advertising. I don't know if they are losing because it comes from capitalism.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Tam sol sağ ne demek bilmiyorum kafamda bir şeyler var ama tam sınır nedir bilmiyorum. (...) Teyzem hayat tarzı olarak ne bileyim köyde engelli bir kadın vardı ona yazı yazmayı öğretmek için uğraşmıştı. Kendisi lüks yaşamaz. Örgütündeki çocuklara bir şey ödetmemeye çalışır falan. İnsanlarda ayırım gözetmiyor. (...) Teyzem gerçekten bir şeyleri değiştirmeye çalışıyor onun partisini desteklemesem bile teyzeme ama sen de şöylesin diyemem. Tezemin evine girsem böyle her yer kitap. Sevgilisi de öyle. Bu kadar okumuş biri parayı cebine etme şeyi zaten yok hani bir şeyleri ben ona şunu yanlış yapıyorsun diyemem ben zaten o kadar bilgili değilim.

⁵⁹ TKP mesela. Yani samimiyet var onlarda. Neydi Tunceli belediye başkanı. Mesela adam çok samimi. Çok güzel ama adamın eksik olduğu ve kendi ekibinin de eksik olduğu yanları var mı? Tartışılır. Ben çok araştırmadım belki mühendislikte okumasam daha sözel bölümlerde okusam belki araştırabilirdim. Çok düşünmüyorum da bunların üzerinde. Şey eksikleri var. Halka yakınlar mı aslında yakın mı olamıyorlar ya da kendini pazarlayamıyorlar mı? Sanki orada bir eksik var. Halk onları ülke bölücü işte veya daha kötü o şekilde algı var. Ve o algıyı birinin kırması için ciddi

Barış thinks that the left should also tell the opposition what they will do in concrete terms, similar to the opposition. He also feels that they should destroy the "non-religious" perception created in society by explaining that religion is not what matters.

For example, I don't think they can be efficient. Yes, they believe in good things; definitely, maybe they want the best things for humanity. (...) What if something is sitting on leftists because they are irreligious. It is necessary to tell that part of the people may be irreligious, but the important thing here is not that they are members of the religion. What are their plans to make a decision in terms of the country's economy? First, they need to be able to tell them; it doesn't *matter whether we are irreligious or not. They have to say this first.*⁶⁰

Bilge states that leftists are not very knowledgeable, self-educated people, and their ideas cannot go beyond formalism.

They has a lot of opinions that I agree with, but when I look at that audience on a human basis, for example, the man came while we were in prep school, he was saying there is something to go. I'm looking at the man now first. (...) During prep school, the man only wears his clothes, I say a leftist, he leaves a mustache on the right, for example, the leftist and the mustache are different. Trying to do something with the image. And I don't think they are filled that much (he thinks they are not very knowledgeable) the ones who hang out in an organized way in school.⁶¹

Contrary to the parties in the parliament, some think that they are more on the streets and are more involved in issues such as the environmental movement and the women's movement, which is a good thing. They state that they are trying to organize from the bottom up as their way of doing politics, which is a feature they see as positive in both ruling parties and opposition parties. Their lack of knowledge about the left causes them to make superficial comments. Although they do not have the knowledge, they

araştırması ya da o insanlardan birini görmesi lazım. Orada biraz bilmiyorum tam belki reklam dediğimiz şey. Kapitalizmden geldiği için mi kaybediyorlar bilmiyorum olabilir.

⁶⁰ Ben açıkçası mesela çok fazla pratik olabildiklerini düşünmüyorum evet güzel şeyler düşünüyorlar kesinlikle belki de insanlık için en iyi şeyleri istiyorlar. (...) Ya şöyle solcuların üzerinde oturmuş bir şey var dinsiz diye. O kesime de da şeyi anlatmak gerekir dinsiz olabilir ama burada önemli olan şey din mensubu olması olmaması değil. Ülkenin ekonomisi açısından nasıl bir karar verecek planları ne? Önce bunları anlatabilmeleri lazım, bizim dinsiz olup olmamamız önemli değil önce bu demeleri lazım.

⁶¹ Katıldığım çok fazla görüşü var ama insan bazında ve o kitleye baktığım zaman adam mesela hazırlıktayken geliyordu şöyle bir şey var gidelim diye konuşuluyor. Ben adama bakıyorum şimdi önce. (...) Hazırlık sürecinde adam sadece kıyafetiyle solcu atıyorum sağcıda bıyık bırakır solcunun da bıyığı da farklıdır mesela. Görselde bir şey yapılmaya çalışılıyor. Ve içinin o kadar doldurulduğunu düşünmüyorum (çok bilgili olmadıklarını düşünüyorum) ben okul içindeki genelde örgüt şekilde takılanların.

have a general opinion and judgment about the left. For example, in line with the public perception of the left, it was said by several interviewees that he was very segregated. There are those who say this as criticism and those who think it's a good thing.

Baver says leftists are very divided, but he thinks it's not bad. Being only is bad. When I ask the leftists to evaluate their politics, he conveys it as follows.

They're very dissociated (laughing). Being alone is terrible. From the point of view of those leftists, I observe that they do not pursue a policy to get more votes rather than a struggle for votes. They are more sensitive to social issues. I can get most of the news from left-wing sources. There are leftists in the women's struggle. There are also leftists in the LGBT struggle. There are leftists in the class who struggle again. More like I said, I think they are on the streets more than a vote politics at any moment. That's why I find it more valuable, how can I say, the politics they do from my point of view.⁶²

Hasret is one of those who criticize the separation of left parties. She thinks that leftists are good people. They can spend their lives for an opinion, spare time, and make sacrifices.

For example, there is a problem that they are too much. I don't like that they're separated too much. Some of my family and some of my cousins are members of the TKP. They took me to their meetings several times. People are not bad people, of course. But it wasn't an environment I wanted to be in. Because I don't adopt those views enough to spend my life for any opinion, I don't waste myself; I don't waste my life on it. They're doing it; they're making sacrifices.⁶³

Deniz is among those who criticize the division of the left into factions. He thinks that with unity, something can be achieved. He states that even though everyone advocates different things, it is necessary to be united to change something.

Rectorate is a festival etc. In such events, people who are generally leftist and generally political come together. It comes together when there is no difference

⁶² Çok ayrılmışlar (gülüşme). Tek olmak kötü bence. Daha çok bir oy mücadelesindense daha çok oy almak için bir siyaset gütmüyorlar benim gözlemim o solcular açısında. Toplumsal meselelere daha duyarlılar. Çoğu olayı haberi solcu kaynaklardan edinebiliyorum ben. Kadın mücadelesinde solcular var. Lgbt mücadelesinde de yine solcular var. Sınıf mücadelesinde yine solcular var. Daha çok dediğim gibi bir oy siyasetindense daha çok daha sokaktalar bence her an. O yüzden daha nasıl diyim daha değerli buluyorum ben kendi açımdan yaptıkları siyaseti.

⁶³ Çok fazla olmaları gibi bir problem var mesela. Çok fazla ayrılmış olmaları, bu benim hoşuma gitmiyor. Benim ailemin bir kısmı da kuzenlerimin bir kısmı TKP'li. Birkaç kere toplantılarına beni de götürmüşlerdi. İnsanlar iyiler kötü insanlar değiller tabi ki. Ama içinde bulunmak istediğim bir ortam değildi benim için. Çünkü ben kendime herhangi bir görüş için hayatımı harcayacak kadar o görüşleri benimsemiyorum gerçekten kendimi harcamam hayatımdan zaman harcamam bunun için. Onlar bunu yapıyorlar fedakârlık yapıyorlar.

of opinion, but when a formation is to be resisted, something is accomplished at that time. Like the example I just gave, the festival was not going to be held last year, but it was thanks to the union. That's why the cliché of fracturing on the left is true. And I don't think that should happen. At least it shouldn't happen when we want to change something. Everyone can advocate for different things.⁶⁴

For example, although Mehmet states that he does not have much knowledge, he makes a judgment that leftists are no different from rightists and that they are also bigots. According to him, leftists also do politics over a few memorized words (such as rent, we will not give them away), and they do not say anything concrete.

When our country says we are bigoted, we always think of right-wingers. I think the leftists in our country are a bit like that. I'm not in the extensive work. What I say may not reflect the truth. Leftists are also very intolerant. Here are a few memorized words; we will not give them away, etc. I don't see any other way out. Okay, we're not going to do this, but what will we do?⁶⁵

Unlike the other interviewees, Muhammed mentions that the left does not give enough importance to identity or gender movements. It is not progressive in itself, and it is collectivity as a bad thing. He states that he still questions whether the only question is economic/class distinctions or something else.

My opinion on the left at METU is this: I don't think it's progressive enough. When I look at it after the things I have seen, heard from my surroundings, and witnessed personally, it is not much different from communal life. It doesn't seem to be much different from collectivism. (Collectiveness) It prevents individual thinking and prevents progressiveness. I think the problem with the left and organized structures in METU is that they are far from current life practices. For example, the approach to women's movements does not seem like any leftist organization could be the best and the most progressive. In identity movements or gender movements, the left doesn't seem to care enough about this. I think it seems too far from the day and age requirements. I don't know the only problem

⁶⁴ Rektörlüktür şenliktir vs. onlarda genelde yine politik olan genel olarak solcu olan insanlar bir araya geliyor böyle olaylarda. Fikir ayrılığı değil de bir oluşuma karşı durulacağı zaman bir araya geliyor ve o zamanlarda bir şeyler başarıyor. Az önce verdiğim örnek gibi şenlik geçen sene yapılmayacaktı yapıldı ve birlik sayesinde. O yüzden solun da fraksiyonlara ayrılma klişesi gerçek. Ve bunun olmaması gerekiyor bence. Hiç değilse bir şeyleri değiştirmek istediğimiz zaman olmaması gerekiyor farklı şeyleri savunabilir herkes.

⁶⁵ Ülkemizde solcuların da sonuçta hep biz yobaz deyince sağcıları düşünüyoruz dini kullanan geçen yine bunu tartışıyorduk yobazın kelime anlamı bir şeye körü körüne bağlı olup başka düşünceleri göz ardı etme duymama. Bence ülkemizdeki solcular da biraz böyle. Çok müthiş için içinde değilim. Söylediklerim gerçeği yansıtmıyor olabilir. Solcular da çok yobaz. İşte ezberlenmiş birkaç kelime rant işte peşkeş çektirmeyeceğiz vs. bunlar dışında başka bir çıkış yolu da göremiyorum ben. Tamam, bunları yapmayacağız da ne yapacağız?

is economic class distinctions or economic class distinctions, which pushes me to question or something.⁶⁶

While Defne says that she does not know much about the left, her cousins are member of Left Party, formerly ÖDP. Commenting on this she states that they are radical, that they live in utopia, that's why she feels distant. She does not believe that their promises can be realized and sustained.

I don't remember the year, but I remember thinking this, I think that it made very utopian statements. It seems like we need to be a little bit realistic, especially about politics. If you are making a policy to influence people, when those who will vote make very utopian statements to you, they drive me away. That's why I never felt close. I knew, yes, it had statements that sounded right. By the way, I'm not against it, but it's a little like that.⁶⁷

In parallel with Defne, Efe also states that he does not know much about the left. He says that he does not read the leaflets distributed at the school, and even get angry at the leaflet distribution because it is harmful to the environment. He also thinks that they want something very radical and unlikely to happen, such as bringing Marxism to Turkey. He states that ideas such as socialism and communism are a thing of the past and that these ideas had no validity in 2020.

I do not receive any leaflets, and I get outraged when the brochure is distributed because I think it is very harmful to the environment. I usually say thank you to people and extend my hand. Other than that, I have never been go to political societies. And the political communities will obviously be very assertive, but I think it is empty maybe you can say who you are. They are advocating a very radical idea. I feel like there is not much possibility of Marxism coming to Turkey

⁶⁶ ODTÜ'deki sola dair düşüncem şu: bence yeterince progresif değil. Kendi gördüğüm, çevremden duyduğum, birebir şahit olduğum şeylerden sonra bakınca aslında çok farkı yok komün yaşamdan. Kolektiflikten çok bir farkı yok gibi geliyor. (Kolektiflik) Bireysel düşünmenin önüne geçiyor, progresifliğin önüne geçiyor. Şuanda özellikle ODTÜ'deki solun ve örgütlü yapılanmaların sorunu güncel hayatın pratiklerinden uzak oluyor oluşu bence. Mesela kadın hareketlerine yaklaşımı herhangi bir sol örgütün şey olabilir gibi gelmiyor bana en iyisi ve en progresifi olabilirmiş gibi gelmiyor bana. Kimlik hareketlerinde veya cinsiyet hareketlerinde falan sol yeteri kadar bunu gözetiyor gibi gelmiyor. Bence günün ve çağın gereksinimlerinden çok uzak geliyor. Ne bileyim gerçekten hala tek sorun ekonomik sınıfsal ayrımlar mı ekonomik sınıfsal ayrımlar mı bu sorgulamalara falan itiyor beni.

⁶⁷ Yıl kaçtı hatırlamıyorum ama şunu düşündüğümü hatırlıyorum çok ütöpik söylemlerde bulunduğunu düşünüyorum. Birazcık da gerçekçi olmak lazım gibi geliyor özellikle siyaset konusunda. Eğer bir politika yapıyorsanız insanları da etkileyebilmek için yani sonuçta oy verecek o insanlar size çok ütöpik söylemlerde bulununca beni uzaklaştırıyor kendisinden. O yüzden kendimi hiç yakın hissetmedim. Biliyordum evet evet doğru gelen söylemleri de vardı bu arada çok da karşı da değilim de birazcık böyle eğer o sol bir parti diyorsak ona onun söylemleri de bana gerçeklikten uzak geliyor ve gerçekleştirilebilir sürdürülebilir olduğunu düşünüyorum.

in the upcoming period (he says with a laugh). I think he would say, let go of Marxism, even if it was Marx, and see your way.⁶⁸

As a general tendency among the youth, it is seen that the information about the left-wing groups and organizations outside the parliament is quite insufficient. Compared to the parties and politicians in the parliament, young people have a more positive view of the left and left-wing politicians. However, they do not think they can be an alternative because they are politically ineffective and powerless.

3.5. Youth's Understanding of Politics and Political Field

The change in the content of political agendas in the period that evaluated and continued after the 1980s was mentioned in detail in chapter 2. The replacement of class-based politics with identity-based politics has also affected the content of young people's political agendas. Struggle areas such as environmental rights, human rights, and minority rights have become the new agendas of politics. Struggle areas such as the environmental movement and the women's movement, which are shaped around these agendas, have started to become forms in which young people are more involved. However, a remarkable point here is that young people do not define agendas other than those called traditional politics as politics. As an effect of the devaluation of politics and the political field, these fields are not perceived by young people as the agenda of the political field. The negative view of the political field causes young people not to see the issues they are interested in as politics.

An important distinction is made between what is accepted as the subject of politics by young people and those who are not. The reality that emerges here is that politics covers issues related to parties, such as being a member of a party, being a member of parliament, and that all these issues are perceived as "things that can lead to problems" in Turkey, which has an authoritarian regime. Although fear is an important factor in

⁶⁸ Ben hiç bildiri almam bildiri dağıtılınca da çok sinirlenirim çünkü çevreye çok zararlı olduğunu düşünüyorum. Genelde insanlara teşekkür ederim deyip elimi uzatıyorum falan. Onun haricinde siyasi topluluklara hiç gitmedim. Ve siyasi toplulukların açıkçası çok iddialı olacak belki ama sen kimsin diyebilirsin çok boş olduğunu düşünüyorum. Çok radikal bir fikri savunuyorlar. Türkiye'ye Marksizm'in gelme ihtimali şuan önümüzdeki dönemde çok yok gibi hissediyorum (gülerek anlatıyor) Marx olsa bile Marksizm'i salın yolunuza bakın derdi bence.

the participation of young people in politics, what they define as doing politics is also not considered legitimate.

Contrary to the general belief that young people are not political, they are interested in political issues that are important to them in new political areas. Still, they do not define it as doing politics. They think that what they describe as their own area of interest and struggle is not politics. Issues such as the struggle for women's rights, and the struggle for the environment, which can be considered the main issues of politics, are not seen as political activities - even if they are aware of their political content.

It is possible to say that the agendas of unconventional politics are also included in the political agendas of young people in Turkey. However, there is a general trend that arose from the field study, which is very striking. A distinction is made between the political issues and the non-political issues as a trend among the interviewees. The struggle for women's rights and the struggle for the environment are considered non-political, so they can be defended. In fact, all of the interviewees state that they are aware that these issues are also political – they originate from the AKP. However, defending the political party, being a member of it, and acting together with it is seen as illegitimate and frightening due to the perception created by neoliberalism and the conditions under an authoritarian regime in Turkey. Because of this, it seems that they will have a side that they do not see as legitimate if something happens badly for them (like being arrested, investigated etc.) However, it is understood that no one can say anything about an environmental issue or react to femicide, and they see it as quite legitimate. For example, when I asked Elif, would you be afraid if you wanted to object to anything that you see as a problem, she said that it was « very correct » to react to femicide and to cut trees. Other than that, other things were a bit too political, so she hesitated to get involved. Elif explains whether she sees participation as legitimate or not as follows;

There was a harassment case of a girl in the Adana courthouse. A women's group was lifting a banner or something about it. I stumbled upon it at once. I've seen it on social media too. All of a sudden, I passed by and grabbed the banner. It's a situation where you can't be undecided. Party events are situations where we can be a little more indecisive. It's not that vital. Even if I support a group that criticizes AKP for an event, how much will it change? AKP already knows this. Somewhere you have to go after horrible things so people can see it's awful. That's why no one can say anything about femicides, cases of children, or something. I don't think even an Aselsan employee can say anything. S/he says,

yes, the girl defended the right thing. (...) (But) If we join organizations and participate in marches, our images will wander around the day after tomorrow.⁶⁹

Berna also states the same thing when he talks about the content of his tweets as;

My accounts are private. I'd probably be afraid if it was open. I don't do too much or too political things, but I don't remember what I said too much. But I share things like cutting trees, killing animals, etc.⁷⁰

On the other hand, Bilal determined a distinction in his mind about the subjects, such as the worth for making sacrifices and not worth to make. While capital, labor, and parties do not require sacrifices, issues such as freedom of expression, gender equality, and freedom are worth making sacrifices and struggling. (Concepts of lifestyle politics defined by Giddens and Becks). He explains these issues in that way;

I'm probably splitting the point in my head on the sacrifice-able-not-feasible part. I realized this after this question. Things like freedom of expression, gender equality, or not being afraid to express one's thoughts absolutely need to be done, even if the things I do are small. But when we go towards the essence of the ideology at the point of the thing, I am a little more withdrawn because the point of caring for labor rather than capital and defending the equality of people is not sacrificing.⁷¹

Deniz is in Quidditch, one of the school's sports clubs. A community that reacts to the events at the school and participates in the protests. But Deniz claims that this community does not participate in what is directly involved in politics and answers the question of what exactly politics as such is:

⁶⁹ Adana adliyesinde bir kız çocuğunun taciz davası vardı. Onunla ilgili bir kadın grubu pankart falan kaldırılıyordu. Bir anda denk geldim. Sosyal medyada da görmüştüm. Bir anda geçtim pankartı tuttum. Bir yerde kararsız kalamayacağın bir durum. Parti olayları biraz daha kararsız kalabileceğimiz durumlar. O kadar da hayati meseleler değil. Mesele ben bir olaya AKP'yi eleştiren bir gruba destek versem bile ne kadar değişecek ki? AKP bunu biliyor zaten. Bir yerde gerçekten kötü olayların üstüne gitmelisin ki insanlar kötü olduğunu görsün. O yüzden kadın cinayetleri çocuk vakaları falan kimse bir şey diyemez. Aselsan çalışanın bile ben bir şey diyebileceğini düşünmüyorum. Evet, kız doğru bir konuda savunmuş der. (...) (Ama) Örgütlere katılırsak yürüyüşlere katılırsak görüntülerimiz yarın öbür gün oralarda dolanır.

⁷⁰ Hesaplarım gizli. Herhalde korkardım açık olsaydı. Aşırı da çok siyasal şeyler de yapmıyorum ama aşırı da dediğim neler paylaştım hatırlamıyorum da ağaç kesilmesi, hayvanların öldürülmesi falan böyle şeyler paylaşıyorum

⁷¹ Şey noktası fedakârlık yapılabilir yapılamaz kısmında kendi kafamda ayırıyorum muhtemelen. Bu sorudan sonra fark ettim. İfade özgürlüğü, cinsiyet eşitliği veya düşüncelerini ifade etme korkmama gibi şeyler kesinlikle yapılması gereken benim de yaptığım şeyler küçük de olsa. Ama şey noktasında ideolojinin özüne doğru gittiğimizde sermayedense emeği önemsemek insanların eşitliğini savunma noktası fedakârlık yapılabilir gelmediği için ben biraz daha çekiliyorum.

That's exactly what happens. We also react to political events, albeit rarely, by collecting signatures and becoming a signatory when an event occurs. There are many apolitical people there, too, but since they are not opposing people, they are generally okay with this. (Meaning the subjects that concern the school) It is very political; that is, the community does not get involved in things that are directly involved in politics. There is no such thing as we are against the AKP, direct party events, or the AKP is doing it wrong. But something happens at school, TGB students are doing something, and this is something that affects all METU students. But as a community, we do not support this if it does not affect all of the METU students but only some of them.⁷²

Ayşe thinks that criticizing the government and talking about the economy is not talking about politics. Talking about politics is perceived as talking about what ideology is and how this ideology is.

That's why I don't talk to my friends about much politics. I'm talking about the government, but I think it's different from politics. It's about today's events, the economy, etc. (...) We talk about the government. But I mean, let's sit down and discuss what this ideology is and what is right with it, which is very less and I do not remember it.⁷³

Political communities at school are, for them, more like non-governmental organizations; getting involved with them is not a means of doing politics. They are more legitimate but less effective tools for doing politics. It is thought that politics should be done in large areas. For example, Mehmet said that;

I'm not so sure if political communities at school count as participating in politics, though. I can't do anything real. I don't mean to criticize them and say they can't. It really can't be done when you think about what can be done anyway. You are a student club at school. No matter how much you make your voice heard, and they do, this is a limited voice. It stays in one place. After all, it does not reach the general population. Okay, we have a lot of student groups here, and there are other universities. But the people on the street don't know what these communities are thinking, what they are doing or what they want to do. And I

⁷² Aynen tam olarak böyle oluyor. Birisi bir olay olduğu zaman siyasi olaylara da nadir de olsa biz de tepki gösteriyoruz imza toplanıyor imzacı oluyoruz falan. Orda da apolitik insanlar var bir sürü ama karşıt görüşlü insanlar olmadıkları için genelde okey oluyorlar buna. (Okulu ilgilendiren konuları kastediyor) Çok siyasi yani siyasetin direk içinde olan şeylere pek bulaşmıyor topluluk. Direk parti olayları ya işte AK parti yanlı yapıyor ak partinin karşısındayız gibi şeyler olmuyor. Ama okulda bir şey oluyor TGB'liler bir şeyler yapıyor ve bu ODTÜ öğrencilerinin hepsini etkileyen bir şey. Ama ODTÜ öğrencilerinin hepsini etkilemiyorsa bir bölümünü etkiliyorsa buna destek olmuyoruz topluluk olarak

⁷³ O yüzden arkadaşlarımla konuşmuyorum pek siyaset. Hükümet üzerine konuşuyorum ama o bence siyasetten farklı bir surum günümüzdeki olayları ekonomiyi falan konuşmak. (...) Hükümet hakkında konuşuruz. Ama yani oturup hadi bu ideoloji nedir bunun hakkın tartışalım falan yapmışızdır da o kadar sayılıdır ki hatırlamıyorum

believe that in order to be involved in politics, we need to reach out the society and hear and make everyone's voice heard.⁷⁴

When asked what he thinks about the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, Mehmet comments that he feels closest to him, trusts his sincerity, but is not sure whether it is right to engage in politics.

Yes, I am a student member. I signed up to take advantage of a course. I think they tried to do something about their work and failed. Honestly, I trust its sincerity. I feel like they are trying to do something. With the room of mechanical engineers, I know the most. They are really trying to do something for our profession; they are really trying to do something for the rights of mechanical engineers or about the general political opinion they have. In other words, I think it is wrong for them to have political thoughts; probably I will conflict myself: there is a profession there, mechanical engineering. It should be basic things to protect their rights. For example, I don't know to increase my knowledge about mechanical engineering. I think the focus that can be given to this issue by shifting to politics is a bit confusing. You know, but on the other hand, this is the part that I said to contradict. This is the right to a profession, and it is generally affected by politics. That's why I can't be sure.⁷⁵

Fatih has close friends who are involved in political communities. He knows political parties and left parties better; he has more ideas. Political communities at school do not consider it as a non-governmental organization.

Turkey is a country with a high voter turnout rate. In this sense, there are very few things like marches that we can call active participation or being a part of NGOs and associations; they are often criminalized, such as going out, etc. Therefore, I think that participation in politics in Turkey is insufficient.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Okuldaki politik topluluklar politikaya katılmak sayılıyor mu çok emin değilim ama. Gerçek bir şey yapılamıyor ya. Onları eleştirip yapamıyorlar demek istemiyorum. Gerçekten yapılamıyor. Zaten ne yapılabilir ki düşündüğün zaman. Okulda bir öğrenci topluluğusun. Sen ne kadar sesini duyursan da ki duyuruyorlar da ama bu limited bir ses duyurma. Bir yerde kalıyor. Sonuçta toplumun geneline ulaşmıyor. Tamam, bizim burda bir sürü öğrenci topluluğumuz var başka üniversitelerde var. Ama sokaktaki insanlar bu toplulukların ne düşündüklerini ve ne yaptığını veya ne yapmak istediğini bilmiyor ki. Ve biraz da hani politika siyasete dâhil olmak için biraz da aslında topluma ulaşmak herkesin sesini duymak ve duyurmak gerektiğine inanıyorum

⁷⁵ Evet, öğrenci üyeyim. Bir kurstan yararlanmak için üye oldum. Çalışmaları hakkında da bir şeyler yapmaya çalışıp başaramadıklarını düşünüyorum. Açıkçası samimiyetine güveniyorum aslında. Bir şeyler yapmaya çalıştıklarını hissediyorum. En bildiğim makine mühendisleri odasıyla. Gerçekten mesleğimiz için bir şeyler yapmaya çalışıyorlar, gerçekten makine mühendislerinin hakları için bir şey yapmaya çalışıyorlar veya genel sahip oldukları siyasi düşünce hakkında... Yani siyasi düşünceye sahip olmaları bence şöyle yanlış: gerçi kendimle de çelişicem birazdan muhtemelen ama sonuçta bir meslek var ortada makine mühendisliği. Bunun haklarını korumak temel şeyleri olmalı. Mesela ne bileyim makine mühendisliğiyle ilgili bilgi birikimini arttırmak gibi. Biraz bence siyasete kayarak bu konuya verilebilecek bir odak biraz şaşmış oluyor bence. Hani ama bir yandan da çelişicem dediğim kısım bu bir meslek hakkı da genelde siyasetten etkilenen bir şey. Bu yüzden de tam emin olamıyorum aslında.

⁷⁶ Seçime katılım oranında Türkiye yüksek bir ülke. Aktif katılım diyebileceğimiz yürüyüş ya da ne bileyim STK'ların derneklerin parçası olma gibi şeyler çok az bu anlamda baya yetersiz hatta çoğu

Muhammed is someone who has been in the religious community before and has experience in organized living. That's why he knows the difference between civil society and organization. He is aware that identity struggles are political, and he thinks that the left should pay more attention to them. He argues that TMMOB should have a political stance. "Because everybody is affected by politics at the end of the day."

I think the stance of the professional chamber should be in the conjuncture, at least in terms of showing its side or in terms of causing certain difficulties or preventing certain injustices. I think what the Turkish Medical Chamber does is reasonable at certain points. Also, I think normal life is not very separate from politics. Because everyone is affected by politics at the end of the day. For example, this institution was the most affected by the zoning law. I see no harm in their direct involvement in politics because it touches their lives.⁷⁷

Young people themselves define politics through the traditional way of doing politics. The areas defined by Giddens as lifestyle politics are not within the scope of politics for young people. But the content of lifestyle politics is also occupying the agenda of youth. (Furlong & Cartmel, 2007:134) For the interviewees, doing politics, being involved in politics means being a member of a political party, working in the parliament, defending an ideology, etc.

As discussed above, young people do not trust this type of politics and are afraid to enter certain political structures and engage in politics. Therefore, it is not considered legitimate for them to engage in politics. The fact that politics consists of only these areas causes young people not to see areas such as the women's movement and the environmental movement as doing politics. However, they are aware of its political content, and they have a more positive view of working in these areas.

3.6. Concluding Remarks

It is obvious that the neoliberal authoritarianism process has changed the youth's definitions and perceptions of the political sphere. The change in the relationship of

zaman kriminalize ediliyor bunlar sokağa çıkmak vs. gibi şeyler. O yüzden yetersiz bence Türkiye'de politikaya katılım.

⁷⁷ Meslek odasının duruşu şuan konjonktürde bence olmalı en azından tarafını belli etmek açısından veya belli zorluklar çıkarmak veya yapılan belli haksızlıkların önüne geçmek açısından bence olmalı. Hatta Türk tabipler odasının yaptığı da bence makul belli noktalarda. Bir de normal hayat bence siyasetten çok ayrı değil. Çünkü herkes günün sonunda siyasetten etkileniyor. Mesela imar yasasından sonra en çok etkilenen bu kurumdu aslında. O yüzden hayatlarına dokunduğu için doğrudan siyaset yapmalarında, müdahil olmalarında hiçbir sakınca görmüyorum ben.

young people with politics after 1980 has been evaluated as depoliticization in many studies. However, as the findings of the field research shows, although the youth maintain a distant relationship with the political sphere, they follow politics and form their own views on the representatives of the political field. This situation can be observed in many examples, such as the evaluation of AKP as a populist party, etc. It should be considered that the authoritarianism experienced under the AKP rule may be a factor in the youth's pursuit of politics. As young people become increasingly exposed to authoritarian policies in their daily lives, it may be causing them to follow the policies and politics that affect their lives. The fact that young people in Turkey have a higher voting level than in other countries appears to be a related point. In the interviews held within the scope of this thesis, all the young people stated that they voted. Another point that needs to be considered is that the opposition young people care about voting and that the most reliable way to express opposition to the AKP for them under an authoritarian rule is to vote.

Another result that emerged in this section is that the political agendas of young people in Turkey are formed by both conventional and nonconventional agendas. It is possible to say that their political agenda cannot be considered a generational shift, and the content of political agendas expands with the introduction of nonconventional content. In fact, it is possible to say that conventional agendas have gained weight in the political agendas of young people under the current economic, social and political crisis.

Politics and the political field for the youth are defined through the parliament and the political parties in the parliament. It is possible to say that the loss of trust in politics, the political field, and the representatives of the political field has emerged in this period as in the past. The distant attitude of the youth towards political parties in the past is still visible today. Youth today experience futility, unemployment, etc., and sees the ruling political party, the AKP, as responsible for the problems. However, the youth define and criticize the existing political parties as an area that runs on relations of interest, regardless of the ruling or opposition. The fact that all parties, which they see as the representatives of the political field, are doing politics for profit instead of defending the right ideas causes young people to be left without alternatives. They think that the opposition can win votes with their actions (like giving up their ideology,

etc.), but they cannot create a country they want to live in. It is seen that the opposition parties, which express that they are closer to their opinions, are far from being an alternative for young people. Young people's knowledge of the extra-parliamentary left is rather superficial and insufficient. They view left-wing politicians more positively than the parties in the parliament and politicians. Yet, they don't think they can be an alternative because they are politically ineffective. This situation causes young people to see the political field as ineffective and worthless while destroying the hope for change. Unlike in the past, it is possible to say that young people do not see themselves as the subject of the political field in this period. They are dissatisfied with the existing political parties and representatives of the political field. Still, they do not feel responsible for creating the alternative to establish the country they want.

In the period that was evaluated until the 1980s, the relationship of the youth with the society was mentioned in chapter 2. Another result of this study is that there is a negative change in this relationship. In this period, the youth took a very negative attitude towards other segments of society, especially those who did not think like themselves. The youth define an ignorant, unconscious, deceitful society, but they do not take responsibility for changing the existing situation. This situation is generally parallel to how the youth relate to the political sphere. Although how the youth relate to the political sphere is the subject of the next chapter, it is observed that their evaluation of the political field is realized from an observer position. Youth generally takes a critical position against the political field, its representatives, and subjects but evaluates the country's politics as an observer. They assigned responsibilities to other places besides themselves for all the questions asked about how to solve the problems they mentioned and did not hold themselves responsible for making the future a better place (such as improving the education system and the economy). In order to understand how the transition of young people from the observer position to the participatory position in the country's politics can be achieved, it is necessary to look closely at how they perceive the organization and how they evaluate it.

CHAPTER 4

YOUTH'S PERCEPTION TOWARDS ORGANISATION

In light of the theoretical and historical information given in the previous sections, this section aims to draw a general framework on the youth's perception of Turkey's political organization.

Discussions in the literature on the effects of the new social structure formed with the neoliberal transformation, which was conceptualized as a risk society on the character of the youth are already mentioned in the introduction part. It has been claimed that the character and values of young people born and growing up in a risk society are also affected by this transformation. Accordingly, it has been argued that old values such as belonging, trust, and commitment have been replaced by values such as individuality, no commitment, and constant change. This transformation impacts the youth's perception of the organization. In the context of these discussions, the effects of the accelerating neoliberal transformation on today's youth will be analyzed from the field research findings.

In this context, firstly, the effects of neoliberalism's ideology, which is based on individualization and depoliticization, on the sense of belonging, which is one of the important motivations for participation in politics, will be examined. In this context, in addition to neoliberalism, the effect of the authoritarian character of the AKP government on the youth's view of organization will be tried to be revealed through the experiences of the youth.

In the introduction, the effects of neoliberalism's "there is no other alternative" discourse on young people were mentioned. In this context, secondly, the effects of both neoliberalism and the fact that they have not seen any other power other than the AKP government on their change beliefs will be analyzed in relation to their perspective on the organization.

Finally, this section will try to determine the effect of the change and transformation experienced through the Turkey-specific consequences of the rise of authoritarianism along with neoliberalism on the possibilities of organizing and collective action of young people today.

4.1. “*I Feel Displaced in My Own Home*”: Sense of Belonging

It was mentioned in previous chapters that the neoliberal transformation changed the values of the previous period and replaced them with new ones. The sense of belonging is also one of the values that have changed with the neoliberal transformation. Feeling belonging to a community, establishing an emotional bond with it, sharing the same fate and needs with others, and the sense of being a partner is among the main motivations behind political participation. It is necessary to evaluate the sense of belonging with values such as dedication, commitment, and responsibility. Belonging to a place requires taking responsibility, spending time and effort, thinking about the priorities of the place you belong to, and being dedicated. Neoliberalism has targeted exactly these values and has placed the principle of "no long term" in all areas of life and all relations (Sennett, 2002:21-22). The response of this principle in social relations has been to erode values such as dedication, attachment, and trust. Instead, values such as being flexible, not making sacrifices, not being attached to others, and not being responsible for others were exalted.

This transformation in the content of the concept of belonging has also transformed the relationships established by the youth. Its relationship with the political arena is also included in these relationships. As mentioned above, the change in the relationship established with the political field has also changed the forms of the newly emerged struggle of the youth, and it has transformed from the organizational forms of the past period, which brought commitment, belonging time, and responsibility, to a more flexible, fragmented, non-governmental and non-devotion-free organization.

It is possible to find the traces of this change in the interviews held within the scope of this study. As stated above, it is observed that while students participate in collective actions within the university, they do not participate in collective actions outside the university. When asked about the reasons for this, many students (with the exception of 1-2) stated that their sense of belonging to METU is much more than their sense of belonging to the country, so it is more meaningful for them to fight for METU. When

asked about the reasons for this, they said that they are more comfortable and happier in the university and that people respect each other, so they feel a part of this place. Bayer conveys his sense of belonging with these words;

Because I belong to METU more. According to Turkey. Because to increase one's belonging, one must feel safe and secure in a place. I feel free at school, comfortable, and happy, so I belong to more METU rather than the country. So what happens at school affects me more. And I want to fight it, so I want to react against an outside influence in something against the school.⁷⁸

The sense of belonging they feel about the university causes students to consider themselves responsible. This makes them feel like a subject that the university is a better place. This positively affects their participation in collective action tools at the university. Doğa answers the question of why it participates in activities at school and not outside of school as follows:

How can I say it's more? I mean, students live here, and students are affected. Knowing that if I didn't do this, I know that no one else would do it affected me. I'm responsible for this.⁷⁹

Bilal similarly states that METU is the only place he loves in Turkey, and therefore he thinks it is necessary to react against anything that will damage METU.

What do I know, there may be a lot of shaking in the next 70 years, 100 years, but I don't think that (the country) will go forward during this time. That's why I have less motivation to make an effort in this regard than other people. This might be called selfish. Those who say so are right. I can't criticize, but what do I know? When there is an action in METU, I usually go because now I live in a place like METU. I really love this place. It's the only place I love in Turkey. But it is necessary that they try to harm this place, or that I see a force that can be set up against them here, or that we oppose the police in the LGBTI march with people or something.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Çünkü ODTÜ'ye aidiyetim daha fazla. Türkiye'ye göre. Çünkü insanın aidiyetinin artması için bir yere kendini huzurda güvende hissetmesi lazım. Ben okulda kendimi özgür hissediyorum rahat hissediyorum mutlu hissediyorum o yüzden de aidiyetim daha fazla okula ülkedense. O yüzden okula olan şey beni daha fazla etkiliyor. Ve bunla mücadele etmek istiyorum yani okula karşı olan bir şeyde dışardan gelen bir etkiye karşı tepki göstermek istiyorum.

⁷⁹ Orası daha fazla daha nasıl diyim yani burada öğrenciler yaşıyor, öğrenciler etkileniyor. Hani bunu ben yapmasam başka kimsenin yapmayacağını biliyor olmam da biraz etkiliyor buranın sorumlusu benim.

⁸⁰ ben ne biliyim önümüzdeki 70 yılda 100 yılda çok sallama da olabilir tabi ama bu süre içinde (ülkenin) ileriye gideceğini düşünmüyorum. O yüzden bu konuda çaba harcama motivasyonum diğer insanlara nazaran daha az. Buna biraz bencillik denebilir. Haklı da bunu söyleyenler. Eleştiremem ama ne biliyim ODTÜ'de bir eylem olduğunda genelde giderim çünkü artık iş ODTÜ gibi bir yerde yaşıyorum gerçekten burayı çok seviyorum Türkiye'de sevdiğim tek yer. Ama buraya zarar vermeye

In addition, Bilal offers METU students not to live in this country and for all of them to go abroad as a solution.

(...) Since this is an individual view, I did not sit down and base it so much theoretically, but I think it would be beneficial for people to go abroad as much as possible. Instead of closing it and leaving, 15 thousand people studying here go. Personally, I think the first aim should be for people who study in Turkey or are expected to have a promising career.⁸¹

The effects of these reasons mentioned by the students themselves on the fact that they say that they belong to METU are obvious. However, factors such as the fact that the university is a freer and safer place compared to the rest of the country behind the sense of belonging to METU should also be taken into consideration. At the same time, it should be taken into account that the various struggle practices developed within METU are not free from the change in the above-mentioned organizational form. They have a flexible, non-committal, reactive form that gathers and disperses upon the event. Bilal's solution proposal for the country's problems, the fact that all 15 thousand students at METU went abroad, is a good summary sentence describing the difference between the youth movements and organizations of the new era and the past.

The authoritarian neo-liberalization process that Turkey went through with the AKP government also has its own specific consequences. Along with neoliberal authoritarianism, the AKP government, which put into practice all existing ideological and oppressive power devices in order to suppress the voices that opposed it, caused the youth to perceive organizing as a dangerous thing. The fact that young people are not able to predict the consequences of their actions due to the system created by the AKP, and that they feel the situations such as being detained, labeled, and arrested all the time has had a very negative impact on the young people's view of the organization. However, this situation cannot be explained only by the authoritarianism of the AKP government. The transformation of neoliberalism in the ideological and political arena

çalışmaları ve ya burada onlara karşı kurulabilecek bir gücü görmem veya insanlarla beraber LGBTİ yürüyüşünde polise karşı çıkmamız falan bunlar gerekli şeyler.

⁸¹ (...)Bu bireysel bir görüş olduğu için oturup bu kadar teorik temellendirmedim ama mümkün olduğunca insanların yurtdışına gitmesi bence faydalı olur. Kapatıp gitmektense burada okuyan 15 bin insanın gitmesi. İlk amacının bence Türkiye'de okuyan veya kariyeri iyi olması beklenen insanların bu olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum şahsen.

is another important factor in changing the reaction of young people to oppression and threats. While young people chose to resist the increasing oppression and violent environment by organizing more before September 12, today, this environment of oppression and violence has caused young people to move away from organizing and become afraid. In the emergence of this result, the effect of the destruction of the grounds for the collectivity of young people with the policies implemented since 1980, the attacking of values such as collectivity and solidarity that ensured the unity of this period, and the replacement of these values with individuality should not be ignored. As a result of all these, the reaction to the order of oppression and violence has changed, and individual solutions such as going abroad have begun to be found in ways to get out of this order.

Although none of the students I interviewed had acted with or been a member of any organization before, all of them stated that they were afraid of organizing and therefore stayed away. Although it was stated to the interviewees that their identities would remain completely confidential during the field research, there were some who did not accept the interview and were afraid to express their opinions during the interview. In the interviews, I sought an answer to a question such as whether they are not organizing because they are afraid in general. Many mentioned that they were afraid without asking directly. There seem to be two different reasons for being afraid of organizing. First of all, there is a fear of being jailed, being arrested, having something to do with it, and being tagged by the government, and because of this, they are afraid of being unemployed and not being accepted. In Turkey, where the AKP and recruitment have already abolished the merit system based on proximity to the AKP, young people are very afraid of being mentioned with an anti-AKP organization, being a member of, acting with them, or being seen in an anti-AKP protest. This causes them to stay away from organizing.

For example, Defne thinks that she is being governed by a dictatorship and states that her future will be threatened if she takes office in an opposition party to the AKP. He says that the events in the country also prove this concern;

I think that we are currently governed by a regime such as the AKP government and a dictatorship, but I think that if I take part in a party, for example, it will cause great problems for me in the future. You know, yes, I am unhappy with the country's situation in general, but if I take an active role, it seems like I will endanger my own individual future. I avoid such a thing in life because I think I

have to protect myself first. For example, if I participate in a party, they will find me anyway, for instance, peace academicians and KHK people. Seeing such examples also distances me from being involved in such a thing.⁸²

Similarly, Muhammed states that the uncertainty of the outcome of his actions frightens him, and that's why he stays away from organizing.

I don't feel free. The reason is this: it seems that an attempt is made to create a society of fear. I think about the consequences of my actions. But I do not think that the result of an action I took today can be applied. To criticize someone, to say something negative, I don't know, even if I think that my actions don't harm anyone, to make a point and bring them to a judgmental position frightens me.⁸³

Although I stated that he would remain completely confidential, Umut also hesitated to express his thoughts during the interview.

No, it's different from saying fearlessly. We cannot speak our minds without fear in every field. Well, they will come and arrest me in the evening. I also have very good ideas, but not everyone in Turkey should know.⁸⁴

The change experienced in the relationship of the youth with the society with neo-liberalization was mentioned in the previous chapter. As a general tendency, students think that most of the society is ignorant, uneducated, and open to being deceived, and they distinguish between themselves and others. As a result of this perception, opponent youth think that when they express their thoughts in a public place, society will react to them and harm them. Hasret states that some segments of society today can kill others without thinking for their own thoughts and that these segments are also addressed by the AKP and says:

⁸² *Şuan AKP hükümet ve diktatörlük gibi bir rejimle yönetildiğimizi düşünüyorum ben açıkçası ama ben mesela bir partide görev alsam sonra ilerde bunun başıma çok büyük sıkıntılar doğurabileceğini düşünüyorum. Hani evet mutsuzum mesela ülkenin durumundan genel olarak ama aktif olarak görev alırsam kendi bireysel geleceğimi tehlikeye atarım gibi geliyor. Önce kendimi korumam gerektiğini düşündüğüm için hayatta öyle bir şeyden kaçınıyorum. Mesela bir partide görev alsam beni zaten bulurlar atıyorum barış akademisyenleri, KHK'lılar. Böyle örnekleri görünce de beni biraz uzaklaştırıyor böyle bir şeyin içinde olmaktan.*

⁸³ Kendimi özgür hissetmiyorum. Sebebi şu: korku toplumu yaratılmaya çalışılıyor gibi geliyor bana. Yaptığım eylemlerin sonucunu düşünüyorum. Ama bugün yaptığım bir eylemin sonucunun uygulanabileceğini düşünmüyorum. Birini eleştirmek, olumsuz bir şey söylemek ne bileyim yaptığım eylemlerde kimseye zarar vermediğini düşünsem bile bir anlam çıkarılıp yargılanır bir konuma getirmek bunlar beni korkutuyor açıkçası.

⁸⁴ Yok, korkusuzca söylemek daha farklı. Her alanda her fikrimizi korkusuzca söyleyemeyiz. Valla gelir beni akşama da alırlar. Benim de çok güzel fikirlerim var ama herkesin bilmemesi gerekiyor Türkiye'de.

This country is a Muslim country. I don't think we'll ever be able to change this. Here's what people say, in the past, Turkey wasn't like that before the AKP. Nobody cared about religion; everyone drank alcohol, etc. I do not believe that. So maybe people lived like that at that time, but when it comes to religion, they did the same thing. People can kill people from another nationality, sect, or thought in this country without blinking an eye. The AKP appeals to this audience.⁸⁵

This situation is also revealed when the reasons why young people do not participate in protests outside the university, even though they participate in the protests inside the university, are asked in the field research. Apart from the AKP, the youth are also afraid of the AKP members. This situation, which we can see unique to Turkey, has a very negative effect on young people's perceptions of the organization. This situation, of which we will discuss different aspects under the title of belonging, revealed that young people use the means of participation in the organization in areas where they feel safe. Still, they refrain from using the means of participation in the organization outside the university due to the fear of the people we face due to Turkey being removed from being a society under a neoliberal and authoritarian regime. When they express themselves outside of the university, they state that they have a life safety concern.

Regarding this situation, Ayşe says that she feels away when outside of university;

Also, something happens in one's mind, and something happens, my mother calls and says to be careful. You want to go, you want to show a reaction to something, but you are arrested in this country. There were many incidents even in LGBTI. I think the family has an influence too. Both my mother and father are constantly on, my daughter, be careful, be careful, they are in this mind. That's why doing it inside ODTU makes you feel like you're doing it at home, not away.⁸⁶

Elif, Mehmet, Mine, and Defne express similar concerns with different words. They think that someone from the people who do not think like them can attack them and

⁸⁵ Bu ülke Müslüman bir ülke. Bu asla değiştiremeyeceğiz bence. İşte insanlar diyor ya eskiden Türkiye böyle değildi hiç kimse dini umursamazdı ak partiden önce kimse namazında niyazında değildi herkes içki içerdi falan ben bunların gerçek olduğuna inanmıyorum. Yani belki insanlar o dönem öyle yaşamışlardır ama söz konusu dine gelince yine aynı şeyi yapmışlardır. Bu ülkede insanlar başka bir milliyetten ya da mezhepten ya da düşünmeden insanları gözünü kırpmadan öldürebiliyor. Ak partinin bu kitleye hitap ettiği açık.

⁸⁶ Bir de insanın kafasında şey oluyor bir olay oluyor annem arıyor dikkat et diyor. Gitmek istiyorsun, bir şeye bir tepkini göstermek istiyorsun ama tutuklanıyorsun bu ülkede. LGBTİ de bile bir sürü olay çıktı. Bence ailenin etkisi de var. Annem de babam da durmadan kızım dikkat et aman dikkat et bu kafadalar. O yüzden ODTÜ'nün içinde yapmak yani evinde yapıyorsun deplasmanda değilsin öyle hissettiriyor.

that people can now kill people with different opinions very easily. They describe the university as a place where people who think like them are in the majority, so they say that they see it as a safe zone. Defne explains the reason why they did not participate in an action that took place in the country while participating on the campus as follows;

Because I feel safer here, this place is a bit like a safe zone. And I think I'm surrounded by people who think like me, feel closer to, or think we would be respectful of each other even if we didn't feel the same way. But this is a small core. As soon as I leave here, I think I am in Turkey, and I do not feel safe in Turkey at all.⁸⁷

Mine conveys her fear ranking and puts the society first;

At least I'm afraid of being labeled. I am terrified of harming people from the public, police violence, and a bomb exploding.⁸⁸

There is also the non-organizational fear that especially female students talk about as life safety. They stated that they did not feel safe, that something very possible could happen to them, and that they were afraid because the person who did this would get away with it easily. Tuğba says she does not feel safe as a woman and adds:

For example, yesterday, I had a ridiculous harassment incident. I went to the police, and the guy already has a criminal record, attacking with a knife, drug addiction, etc. But the man is walking around the park freely. So my biggest annoyance for me is this in the country since I've recently experienced not feeling safe.⁸⁹

Similarly, Hasret expresses the reasons why she does not feel safe, especially as a woman, as follows.

Nobody is safe. There is no such thing as a justice system. That's why people don't hesitate when they hurt other people. Or I never feel safe, or I don't think any person I know can be safe. It can be the expression of political thoughts; anything can happen. I know that if a man kills you in the street, nothing will happen. There is a reason, maybe even the man cannot be found. I don't think

⁸⁷ Çünkü burada kendimi daha güvende hissediyorum. Burası biraz safezone gibi. Ve etrafımda benim gibi düşündüğümü düşündüğüm ya da kendimi daha yakın hissettiğim ya da aynı düşünmesek hissetmesek bile birbirimize karşı saygılı olacağımızı düşündüğüm insanlarla çevrili olduğumu düşünmüyorum. Ama burası küçük bir çekirdek. Buranın dışına çıktığım anda bence Türkiye'deyim ve Türkiye'de kendimi hiç güvende hissetmiyorum.

⁸⁸ *En az fişlenmekten korkuyorum. Halktan birilerinin zarar vermesinden, polis şiddetinden son olarak bir bombanın patlamasından çok korkuyorum.*

⁸⁹ Dün mesela saçma sapan bir taciz olayı yaşadım. Polise gittim ve adamın zaten sabıkası varmış bıçak çekmeden, madde bağımlılığı bir şeyler. Ama adam elini kolunu sallaya sallaya parkta geziyor. Yani güvende hissetmeme yakın zamanda yaşadığım için en büyük benim sıkıntı benim için ülkedeki bu.

these are important factors at all. For a person to stay in prison, he only needs to be a political criminal; other than that, it seems impossible.⁹⁰

A situation similar to the collective action regarding the use of Twitter, which is one of the examples of the debate that young people's participation in politics is based on new tools, emerges in the case of Turkey. A great majority of the young people I interviewed stated that they do not use Twitter actively; they generally use it to follow the news or have fun. They said that they think it is effective as a political tool but that they and many young people are hesitant to post political tweets on Twitter. Most of them use their accounts anonymously. They do not think that anyone who is an opponent in this country can express their political views without fear in their mind. The fear factor also appears to have a negative impact on the new means of participation in politics. Berna answers the question of how the use of Twitter is as follows:

My accounts are private. I'd probably be afraid if it was open. I don't do too much or too political things, but I don't remember what I said too much; but I share things like cutting trees, killing animals, etc.⁹¹

Similarly, Fatih states that he thought twice about his tweet:

I am personally not also directly involved in a political movement etc. I am not in danger of being detained, but it makes me think twice about the tweet I will post on Twitter. I haven't tweeted for a long time. This is one of the reasons; I guess I don't know.⁹²

Fear appears to be a severe obstacle for young people to use both traditional and new means of participation in politics. The effects of the fear society that AKP is trying to create are felt in the youth. Fear of the future and fear of life safety are keeping young

⁹⁰ Hiç kimsenin canın güvenliği yok. Adalet sistemi diye bir şey yok. O yüzden insanlar başka insanlara zarar verirken çekinmiyorlar. Ya da ben kendimi asla güvende hissedemiyorum ya da tanıdığım herhangi bir insanın güvende olabileceğini düşünmüyorum. Politik düşüncelerin dışı vurumu da olabilir, her şey olabilir. Ne biliyim sokakta bir adam sizi öldürürse bir şey olmaz. Bir gerekçe bulunur, belki adam bulunamaz bile. Bunlar hiç önemli faktörler değil bence. Bir insanın cezaevinde kalabilmesi için sadece politik bir suçlu olması gerekiyor onun dışında imkânsız gibi geliyor.

⁹¹ Hesaplarım gizli. Herhalde korkardım açık olsaydı. Aşırı da çok siyasal şeyler de yapmıyorum ama aşırı da dediğim neler paylaştım hatırlamıyorum da ağaç kesilmesi, hayvanların öldürülmesi falan böyle şeyler paylaşıyorum.

⁹² Ben kişisel olarak bir siyasi hareketin de doğrudan içinde vs. olmadığım için gözaltına tehlikesi yaşamıyorum ama twitter'a atacağım twitte iki kere düşünmeme neden oluyor. Uzun zamandır twit atmıyorum. Bunun sebeplerinden biri de budur herhâlde bilmiyorum.

people from putting forward a common will to change what they think is going wrong in the country. This fear society, riveted by neoliberalism, isolates young people and reduces their possibility of organizing.

4.2. Belief in Change and Hope

In the past, it was mentioned that the youth felt responsible for the future of the country, and in this sense, their belonging to the country was quite high. During this period, young people were organized with the awareness of the solution to the problems in the country, and they struggled to solve the problems. It seems that one of the biggest motivations behind this struggle was the belief that the youth could change in this period. Both the gains during the struggle and the effect of the struggles in the political field strengthened the belief of the youth in change.

Unfortunately, both in the surveys and studies, it is revealed that the young people living in Turkey today do not have any hope that the future will be better. They are not hopeful for their own future or for the future of the country. In the field research conducted within the scope of this study, it was seen that young people were not hopeful for the future, similar to the results of these studies.

One point that should be emphasized here is the fact that none of the interviewed youth saw a political power other than the AKP. The fact that the political power is in one party during their lifetime damages their belief in change. While all the interviewees expressed that they want to change the issues they see as a problem in the country, they also stated that they do not believe that there will be any change in the country in the near future, even if the political power changes. They describe themselves as a lost generation. Bayer puts it this way:

I think that a solution should be produced in the long term, not in the short term; in other words, I think that the current generation has been lost.⁹³

As mentioned above, one of the important motivations for participation in politics is the belief and hope that it can change. While explaining the reasons why young people participate in the protests at METU, he states that they have the power to change.

⁹³ *Ya kısa vadede değil de uzun vadede bir çözüm üretilmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum ben yani şu an ki neslin kaybedilmiş olduğunu düşünüyorum.*

For example, Muhammed expresses it like this:

I do not think I will get such active results when I do this in a place other than METU. I think that there are not many people who think like me; they cannot make their voices heard and cannot reach the authorities. I think that my action is meaningless when I can't reach the authorities. For example, we can reach the authority during the festival, and our direct addressee is clear. I believe that something can change if I at least show an active struggle in the act of poplar. I do not believe that things can change in Turkey. However, there has to be an event like a Gezi, which I don't think can happen after this time, but at least when we struggle for it in METU, we gain certain gains. Even that motivates people when they see that they are won.⁹⁴

It should be taken into consideration that avoiding taking responsibility for the country may also be a factor in why students at METU experience that the way to reach the authorities and be heard is to struggle is the reason they do not struggle about the country in general.

Although they think that the change in the political power will not lead to a change in the country, many interviewees stated that the victory of most of the municipalities in the last local elections by the opposition party gave them hope and showed that change might(!) be possible. In fact, the slightest possibility of change in the future of the country can rekindle the hopes of young people. For example, Anıl says that he remembers that everything comes to an end with these elections and adds:

No, it's not insecure; it's like a rebellion; it's like the victory of perseverance. It means that there is a power in one's hands; there is no such thing as it will always be victorious; it is doomed to collapse. Like everything else in life. An end to everything. Here he expresses, perhaps reflects, that this end is approaching gradually. That's why there is at least such confidence now. Compared to the past, when I first entered six years ago, a little more confidence increased.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ ben bunu ODTÜ dışında bir yerde yaptığımda bir bu kadar aktif sonuç alabileceğimi düşünmüyorum. Benim gibi düşünen insanların çok fazla olmadığını, sesini duyuramadığını, mercilere ulaşamadığını düşünüyorum. Mercilere ulaşamayınca yaptığım eylemin bir anlamı olmadığını düşünüyorum. Mesela şenlik eyleminde merciye ulaşabiliyoruz ve doğrudan muhatabımız belli. Kavaklık eyleminde en azından aktif mücadele gösterirsem bir şeyin değişebileceğine inanıyorum. Türkiye'de bir şeylerin değişebileceğine inanmıyorum. Anca gezi gibi bir olayın olması gerekiyor ki artık bu saatten sonra olabileceğini düşünmüyorum ama en azından ODTÜ'de bunun mücadelesi verilince belli kazanımlar elde ediyoruz. Bundan bile motive oluyor insan kazanıldığını görünce.

⁹⁵ Ya yok bu güvensiz değil de bir başkaldırı gibi bir şey işte azmin zaferi gibi bir şey. Demek ki bir güç var birinin elinde sürekli bu galip gelecek diye bir şey yok illaki yıkılmaya mahkûm. Her şey gibi hayatta. Her şeyin bir sonu. İşte yavaş yavaş bu sonun yaklaştığını ifade ediyor, yansıtıyor belki. Bu

Fatih, similar to Anıl, states that the elections created a renewed hope in him in the first days (even though it disappeared later on).

At least, it caused a change in the sense that it renewed the masses' hopes. There are also small gains, such as the Istanbul municipality was giving money to Ensar, not anymore, less to religious groups. There was a real renewal of hope on the first day of the elections. We even hung the BirGün newspaper's map of Turkey at home. But then, that hope was largely destroyed by the actions of the municipalities, with the actions of Imamoglu, etc.⁹⁶

We can see the greatest effect of the decrease in the sense of belonging, belief in change, and hope for the future in the increase in the desire of young people to go abroad. They say that they think that the kind of change they want is not possible in the country prevents them from making efforts for this country.

With the increasing authoritarianism of the political power and the political sphere and neoliberalism, the young people's sense of belonging to the country decreases, causing them to want to go to other countries where they think they have better social state opportunities and can "live like human beings". It is possible to say that this situation, which was discussed in the introduction as individualized risk-taking, is also effective on Turkey's youth. In the past, it was mentioned that the youth felt responsible for the future of the country, and in this sense, their belonging to the country was quite high. During this period, young people were organized with the awareness that the solution to the problems in the country was theirs, and they struggled for the solution of the problems. However, it is possible to say that this sense of belonging and responsibility has decreased in the picture that emerged today. Although the youth is aware of the problems and the source of the problems, they do not feel any responsibility for the solution of the problems; they do not believe that they can change them. As a result, they think of living abroad instead of organizing and struggling as a solution.

yüzden böyle bir güven şu an var en azından. Eskiye göre 6 sene önceye göre ilk girdiğim, biraz daha güven arttı tabiki.

⁹⁶ En azından kitlelerin umutlarını tazelemesi anlamında bir değişime neden oldu. Bir de direk İstanbul belediyesi Ensar'a para veriyordu artık vermiyor daha az dinci gruplara para veriyor gibi küçük kazanımlar var. Seçimlerin ilk gününde cidden umut tazelenmesi oldu. Hatta BirGün gazetesinin Türkiye haritasını astık eve. Ama sonra işte belediyelerin icraatlarıyla o umut büyük oranda yok oldu. İmamoğlu'nun icraatlarıyla vs.

Fatih, when he talked about the reasons why he wants to go abroad, stated that the possibility of not being able to find a job, a much lower standard of living compared to a job abroad even if one can find a job, economic factors, feeling comfortable walking on the street, not being crammed in the Metrobus every morning, being in the same environment with people whom he thinks to hate him because of my religious disbelief or political opinion.

Other than that, I think things like feeling comfortable walking on the street, not being crammed in the Metrobus every morning, or not being in the same environment with people I think hate me attracts me. It's like a conversation in the country of those who want to kill us, not ours. Of course, there is such a situation, even if I do not think so radically, but not so pessimistically. Seeing people who hate me because of my religious disbelief or political views or something makes me want to go abroad.⁹⁷

Hasret states that she might even consider seeking asylum rather than living in Turkey.

I really don't want to live in this society. The last thing I dream of is living here. I'm okay with even defecting. I don't think it's possible to live here.⁹⁸

Many interviewees also want to go for educational purposes. They think that education in Turkey has deteriorated considerably, and scientific knowledge has not been produced. They express that they want to do something useful so that the effort they spend to graduate from the university is not wasted. Yet, they say that if they stay in Turkey, they will have studied for nothing, and if they work here, it will be like renting out their brains. This reduces the young people's desire to contribute to the country and their willingness to struggle here. For example, Anıl expresses it as follows:

... I want to do something; we did not study in vain because I want to achieve something in this school, I want to be a part of something, but I do not want to disappear into nothingness.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Onun dışında sokakta yürürken rahat hissetme, her sabah metrobüste tıkiş tıkiş gitmeme, ya da benden nefret ettiğini düşündüğüm insanlarla aynı ortamda bulunmama gibi şeyler çekiyor beni sanırım. Ya burası bizim değil bizi öldürmek isteyenlerin ülkesindeki muhabbet gibi. O kadar radikal bir şekilde düşünmesem de bu kadar kötümser olmasam da böyle bir durum var tabi. Dini inançsızlığım sebebiyle nefret edenleri görüyor olmam, ya da siyasi görüş sebebiyle falan yurtdışına gitmek istememe sebep oluyor.

⁹⁸ Ben bu toplumda yaşamayı düşünmüyorum gerçekten. En son hayal edeceğim şey burada yaşamak. İltica etmeye bile okeyim ben. Olası bir şey olduğunu düşünmüyorum yani burada yaşamamanın

⁹⁹ ... Bir şeyler yapmak istiyorum boşuna okumadık çünkü bu okulu bir şeyleri başarmak istiyorum bir şeylerin parçası olmak istiyorum ama hiçlikte yitip gitmek istemiyorum.

Ayşe states that no solution is possible for this place, so she gave up her country with the following words:

But I think the only thing to do for the country is to go abroad. I've given up on things now, it's obvious that this country can't get better, like femicide. In other words, I read the news the other day that a woman was harassed, and she said I wore trousers as a statement. So, we shouldn't try to explain this to people anymore. In other words, since I am not a very nationalist person, I am giving up my country; there is no solution for this place.¹⁰⁰

As it is mentioned above, interviews were held with METU engineering faculty students. METU continues to be one of the best universities in Turkey. Studying at the most prestigious faculty of the best university in Turkey makes the interviewed young people see the option of going abroad as more likely. This allows them to look at their own future with more hope than the rest of Turkey, even if they are worried about the future. Thinking that a collective solution is not possible for the country causes them to turn to individual solutions.

The loss of hope and belief in the future for the collective struggle with the authoritarianism of neoliberalism causes young people to feel that they are alone in the face of their problems and thus to produce individual solutions to the problems.

4.3. Collective Action Possibilities

Although young people do not think that there will be a change in Turkey, all of them stated that they want Turkey to change. Looking at the evaluations of how this change can take place is thought to be important in terms of understanding the dynamics underlying the distant attitude of youth towards the organization.

It is possible to find the effects of the transformation created by neoliberal authoritarianism in the perception of organization of the youth in the evaluations of the youth regarding the way of change. It will be tried to be examined through the solution proposals they offer around the question.

¹⁰⁰ Ama ülke için yapılacak tek şey yurtdışına gitmek bence. Ben artık şeyden vazgeçtim bu ülkenin düzelemeyeceği belli ne kadın cinayetidir... Yani geçen bir gün haber okudum bir kadını tacize uğramış açıklama olarak pantolon da giymiştim oysaki diyor. Yani bizim bunları insanlara anlatmaya çalışmamalıyız artık. Yani çok milliyetçi bir insan da olmadığım için artık vazgeçiyorum ülkemden burası için bir çözüm yok.

In the picture that emerged during the field research, it is possible to talk about two different tendencies of thought in general. In the first trend, we can say that young people care about change in individual ways against the problems they experience. It seems that the logic of "if everyone swept in front of their door" dominates this way of thinking. It is thought that everyone is responsible for himself in line with the neoliberal subject created, and the path to change is through the individual change of individuals. The second trend is made up of young people who think that change is possible through collective and joint struggle but that they could not (cannot) be a part of it for many reasons. In both ways of thinking, a logic of justification comes into play when explaining why young people are far from organizing. Although these two ideas, which are common among students, seem to contradict each other, the influence of the individual world order created by neoliberalism is common in the shaping of both ideas.

Their first tendency is to think that Turkey can change not through collective struggle but through the change of individuals. As mentioned above, it is possible to find the subject created by neoliberalism at the source of this thought. The youth, who think that they are the only ones responsible for the problems they live and experience, think that the way of change passes through individuals. This situation causes young people to see the structural problems stemming from the political, economic, and social structure as the problems experienced by everyone due to their individual mistakes. While this way of thinking makes it difficult to establish a collective identity, it causes the understanding that everyone should save themselves. They think that the structural problems cannot be changed by themselves, so they think that the only way to change is for everyone to develop themselves personally. With this way of thinking, young people try to justify their thoughts that individual development can lead to change instead of collective struggle.

For example, when Tuğba states that she wants the country to change, when I ask how it will change, she responds as follows:

Of course, I want it to change. To change also, yesterday, for example, I made a complaint so that maybe I can prevent it from harming someone else. I can take such small steps, but what can I do about the economy? I don't see myself as that capable. But for example, I am going to do a master's degree in water resources, and I will start next month. I'm just for example, out there, I would like to reduce water consumption in the future, to have such a profession, or to continue in the

academy and increase this awareness; my aim is in this work anyway. Other than that, I don't know if I will have much of an impact on anything else.¹⁰¹

Efe, similar to Tuğba, states that everyone should improve themselves for the problems that the whole country is experiencing so that the problems can be solved;

In fact, it's something that cuts your motivation a lot when you think you're on your own. For example, if you are studying politics, you will go through the same career process, you will change the people, and they will become municipal or deputy. I have a friend who graduated as a dentist. He's going to a hospital or a dentist's university hospital to train interns there, etc. You're not alone. (...) That's why I think that if everyone changes their own environment, this is the logic of this thing if everyone cleans in front of their own door, the street will be clean. That's why I probably can't save the country by myself, but there is no reason why there are many people like me; the country will actually be saved.¹⁰²

Similarly, Bilge states that she started by changing herself in order to change the things she saw wrong in the country:

Right now, I'm trying to do the part where I started from myself, but I'm trying to do small things in my own way about the injustices I see or this kind of nepotism. But I am not under the responsibility of joining a large-scale organization so that we can do something. It seems really unreasonable to me to enter into the formation of a union right now. (...) I think being in something after a certain point only helps with the peace of mind, and I think it prevents a person from developing individually.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Değişmesini istiyorum tabi ki. Değiştirmeyi de dün atıyorum mesela şikâyetçi oldum belki başkasına zarar vermesini engellerim diye. Böyle küçük adımlar atabilirim ama ekonomiyle ilgili ne yapabilirim? Kendimi o kadar capable görmüyorum. Ama mesela su kaynaklarından yüksek lisans yapıcım önümüzdeki ay başlayacağım. Orada sadece atıyorum Ankara genelinde daha ilerde su tüketimini azaltmayı böyle bir mesleğimin olmasını ya da akademide devam edip bu farkındalığı arttırmayı falan isterim zaten amacım da bu çalışmaktaki. Onun dışında çok bir etkim olur mu bilmiyorum başka bir şeye.

¹⁰² Aslında tek başınaymışsın gibi düşündüğünde motivasyonunu çok kesen bir şey. Şöyle düşünüyorum Sen mesela siyaset okuyorsun sen de atıyorum aynı kariyer sürecinden geçeceksin geleceksin siyaset bilimi bölümünün şeyi olacaksın sen oradaki insanları değiştireceksin onlar gidecekler belediye başkanı olacak milletvekilleri olacaklar ya da işte benim liseden çok yakın bir arkadaşım var diş hekimliği mezunu. O atıyorum gidecek bir hastaneye ya da bir diş hekimi üniversite hastanesine oradaki intörnleri yetiştirecek falan filan. Tek başına olmuyorsun aslında. (...)O yüzden bence herkes kendi çevresinde bir değişiklik yapsak bu şey mantığı işte herkes kendi kapısının önünü temizlese sokak temiz olur. O yüzden aslında tek başıma muhtemelen ülkeyi kurtaramam ama benim gibi bir sürü insan olsa olmaması için de hiçbir sebep yok aslında kurtulur ülke.

¹⁰³ Şuan kendimden başladığım kısımda yapmaya çalışıyorum ama gördüğüm haksızlıklara ya da bu tarz adam kayırmalı şeylerde falan kendimce ufak ufak bir şeyler yapmaya çalışıyorum. Ama büyük çaplı bir oluşuma katılayım da bir şeyler yapalım gibi bir taşın altına girmiyorum. Şuan bir birliğin oluşumun içine girmek bana gerçekten çok mantıksız geliyor. (...)Bir yerden sonra bir şeyin içinde olmak sadece bence vicdan rahatlığına giriyor bence insanın bireysel olarak geliştirmesinin önüne geçiyor.

Deniz thinks that she will become an engineer when she graduates from university and that she can contribute to the change of the country in this way:

There are things that can be solved with organization, but I am an engineer. I am an electrical and electronics engineer. That's why I think there are more useful things I can do in my field. I am interested in renewable energy. I do more work there; it seems to be useful.¹⁰⁴

Mine also thinks that if she makes an effort to change something in Turkey, she will be labeled, that this is intimidating, so she must first come to a point:

The first seems very radical to me, and it scares me. What the people around me, my elders, also tell me is not to drown in the small sea. First of all, they say that it might make more sense to come to a place and change something where I come from. If I put on a register while doing something right now, it'll probably be more challenging for me to get to that place.¹⁰⁵

Another trend of thinking that we encountered was the students who stated that it is necessary to struggle collectively and together for change. The path of change passes through here, but they could not join the organizations for various reasons. The fact that organizing brings dedication and sacrifice for a greater good - outside of oneself - is directly related to taking responsibility. This prevents them from being involved in an organization and making efforts, even if they are aware of the problems in the country which affect them directly. In the interviews, those who think that organization is necessary for something to change define what they do as laziness or conformism. They do not see themselves as the people who should take the main responsibility for the change in the country. They don't feel as the subject of this process.

For example, Deniz describes himself as a freshwater leftist. He states that there is no organization on his priority list and that he wants to complete his academic career, but he thinks this is a bad thing and that the collective life is important. He also states that the problems must be solved collectively and cannot be solved in any other way.

¹⁰⁴ Örgütle çözülebilecek şeyler var ama ben mühendisim. Elektrik elektronik mühendisiyim. O yüzden kendi alanımda daha yapabileceğim daha yararlı şeyler olduğunu düşünüyorum. Yenilenebilir enerjiyle ilgileniyorum ben bölümde. Ben orada daha çok iş yaparım, işe yararım gibi geliyor.

¹⁰⁵ Birincisi bana çok radikal geliyor ve bu gözümü çok korkutuyor. Etrafımdaki insanların yani büyüklerimin de bana söylediği şey küçük denizde boğulmamak. Öncelikle bir yere gelip o geldiğim yerde bir şeyleri değiştirmenin daha mantıklı olabileceğini söylüyorlar. Eğer şu anda bir şeyleri yaparken fişlenirsem o yerlere gelmem daha zor olur muhtemelen.

I have very close friends who identify with political communities. I have a friend who studies politics; he is involved in such a thing, doing things that are beneficial to him and supporting his own opinion, learning something and supporting it; I think it makes sense. (...) But as I said, my priorities are different. I feel better if I continue like this. It's called freshwater leftism, but now I am.¹⁰⁶

Elif also explains that the organization imposes duties and therefore stays away from it as follows:

No, actually, it's purely a duty issue. In other words, if you are affiliated with a group, that group will have a task for you. Even in our simplest communities, there is the task of hanging posters. A task is given, and that task is doing something somewhere. I already have a lot of homework and especially engineering. It really does something like that. I have a lot of tasks. I'm depressed. I don't have time to get underwear, and I can't deal with that.¹⁰⁷

Berna, like Deniz and Elif, thinks that organizing is necessary for things to change, but she states that there is no guarantee of life, she has to save her own life first:

The issue is the same at METU now. Continuous action and such. I have nothing to do with it. If I join a group and get caught up in it, I will fall behind in my classes. I would like to do something, but I have to earn my own life and my economic thing. Both cannot work for me at the same time.¹⁰⁸

Hasret, on the other hand, thinks that organizing is important, that the people who organize are dedicated, and that it is a good thing, but she expresses that she cannot spend her life on it:

(...) Because I don't adopt those views enough to spend my life on any opinion, I really don't waste myself; I don't waste my time on this. They're doing it; they're making sacrifices.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Kendini siyasi topluluklarla tanımlayan çok yakın arkadaşlarım var. Bence yapmalılar çünkü yani. Siyaset okuyan arkadaşım var o böyle bir şeyin içinde olarak hem kendisine yararlı şeyler yapıyor hem de kendi görüşünü destekleyebiliyor hem bir şeyler öğreniyor hem destekliyor bence mantıklı. (...) Ama dediğim gibi benim önceliklerim farklı. Böyle devam etsem bana daha iyi geliyor. Tatlı su solculuğu deniyor ama şu an öyleyim.

¹⁰⁷ Yok, aslında tamamen görev muhabbeti. Yani bir gruba bağlıysan o grubun sana bir görevi olacak. En basit bizim topluluklarda bile afiş asma görevi oluyor. Bir görev veriliyor ve o görev bir yerde şey yapıyor insanı. Ya benim zaten çok ödevim var ve özellikle mühendislik. Böyle gerçekten şey yapıyor. Bir sürü görevim var. Bunalımdayım ben. Altıma don alacak bir vaktim yok ben bir de bununla uğraşamam.

¹⁰⁸ Mesele şu an ODTÜ'de de öyle. Sürekli eylem eylem falan. Hani benim onu yapacak şeyim yok. Bir gruba girsem kendimi ona kaptırsam ben derslerimden geri kalırım. Bir şeyler yapmak isterim ama kendi hayatımı ekonomik şeyimi de kazanmam lazım ikisi aynı anda yürümez benim için .

¹⁰⁹ (...) Çünkü ben kendime herhangi bir görüş için hayatımı harcayacak kadar o görüşleri benimsemiyorum gerçekten kendimi harcamam hayatımdan zaman harcamam bunun için. Onlar bunu yapıyorlar fedakârlık yapıyorlar.

Defne also draws attention to the subjective situation Turkey is in and states that she stays away from politics in order not to endanger her individual future. Again, she defines what she sees as a problem in Turkey in an individual way. There is a solution proposal, such as a leader's self-sacrifice:

For example, I think that we are governed by a regime such as the AKP government and a dictatorship, but I think that if I take part in a party, for example, it will cause great problems for me in the future. You know, yes, I am unhappy with the situation of the country in general, but if I take an active role, it seems like I will endanger my own individual future. I avoid such a thing in life because I think I have to protect myself first.

(...) In other words, there seems to be a certain kind of organization, maybe this is also a selfish thing, but there are people who already exist and strive for it. And in fact, I think those people are also people who don't get a return for their hard work. Maybe one person sacrifices himself. They put forward a leader like the main opposition party somehow influences people.¹¹⁰

The above picture seems to be one of the reasons for the distant attitude of youth towards the organization. Thinking that the way of change is through individual liberation or that the collective is thought to be important, but not including himself in that collective weakens the collective action possibilities of the youth. However, it cannot be said that this process of change and transformation completely eliminates the possibility of collective action. The fact that the subject of the movements that were evaluated after 2010 is again the youth and that the youth continue to be able to collectively respond to the agenda of the social struggle at METU, where this field research was carried out, is proof of this by the Gezi Park protests.

The students who were interviewed within the scope of the field research stated that they took part in the collective action practices carried out at METU. When there is a problem with METU, they believe that the solution is to come together. However, as mentioned, the issues of this collective action cannot be considered as political by

¹¹⁰ Ya şöyle mesela atıyorum şuan AKP hükümet ve diktatörlük gibi bir rejimle yönetildiğimizi düşünüyorum ben açıkçası ama ben mesela bir partide görev alsam sonra ilerde bunun başıma çok büyük sıkıntılar doğurabileceğini düşünüyorum. Hani evet mutsuzum mesela ülkenin durumundan genel olarak ama aktif olarak görev alırsam kendi bireysel geleceğimi tehlikeye atarım gibi geliyor. Önce kendimi korumam gerektiğini düşündüğüm için hayatta öyle bir şeyden kaçınıyorum.

(...) Yani zaten aslında belli bir yapılanma örgütlenme var gibi ya belki bu da bencilce bir şey ama zaten olan ve bunun için çabalayan insanlar var. Ve aslında o insanlar da emeğinin karşılığını alamayan insanlar diye düşünüyorum. Belki onların bir kişi kendini feda eder. Şey gibi bir lider öne sürerler ana muhalefet partisi bir şekilde insanları etkisi altına alır(...)

them. In this way, they think that they can achieve success and change. The first solution that comes to mind for the problems of the school is always collective. However, it is important to consider the unique conditions of METU, which are mentioned in detail in chapter 2. It should also be kept in mind that the organizations in this period were not organizations as we know them. It can be said that the flexible, non-responsible, short-term, event-oriented, network-based organization style that does not require commitment also characterizes the movement in METU. Contrary to the long-term, centralized organization model of the old period, in which values such as belonging and loyalty are indispensable, it emerges as a decentralized organization model consisting of flexible relationships, where one can enter and exit whenever he wants, and where the person takes responsibility as much as he wants.

For example, Bilal and Muhammed are two students who were part of the religious community during their secondary and high school years and later left. As a result of their religious community experience, they state that they hate collectivity and the integrity that religion brings. They think that people are used in collective structures and that being an individual is trivialized. They say that the important thing is to be an individual, that everyone should think about their own life, and that they should save themselves individually. But both of them think contradictory when it comes to university and METU since both emphasize the importance of collective action as a solution to the problems experienced at METU.

Bilal defines himself as a liberal, defends Keynesian economics, and says that he is one or two clicks away from neoliberalism but that he will never be able to express himself as a social democrat. He states that it is wrong to defend cumulative interests instead of individual interests. He states that individuality is very important and that even the relationship he establishes with his friends does not continue without reciprocity. After saying all this, he says that he participated in the protests at METU and that such actions are necessary.

I started to hate the totality that religion brought; I started to hate religion itself. ...You can call it your interest; you can call it your benefit instead of moving on a cumulative path.

...I do not think in the next 70 years, 100 years it(Turkey) will go forward this time. That's why I have less motivation to make an effort in this regard than other people. This might be called selfish. Those who say so are right. I can't criticize, but what do I know, when there is an action in METU, I usually go because I live

in a place like METU; I really love it here; it's the only place I like in Turkey. But if they try to harm this place, or if I see a force that can be set up against them here, or if we oppose the police in the LGBTI march with people, these are necessary things. (...) I think that I have to go here, even if I get hurt, rather than benefit as a stance.¹¹¹

4.4. Concluding Remarks

In this section, the effect of the neoliberal authoritarianism process on the youth's perspective on organization has been tried to be examined. It was tried to reveal how the youth living in Turkey perceive organization today and the dynamics underlying their distant relationship with the political sphere.

The values of the society, shaped according to the principles of the new economic order created by neoliberalism, create the perception that it is a bad thing for young people to stick to something for a long time, to show loyalty, to take responsibility for something other than themselves, to dedicate oneself to change things. This perception has affected the feeling of belonging to a community, establishing emotional bonds with it, sharing the same fate and needs with others, and being a partner, which is the main motivation behind political participation. This transformation in the sense of belonging has also affected the youth and their relationship with the political sphere. Today's youth do not feel that they belong to their hometown, and as a result, they do not see any responsibility in making the country a better place. It is seen that fear, which is a unique result of Turkey being ruled by an authoritarian regime, reduces the belonging of the youth to the country and causes them to take a distant attitude towards the organization. Here, the relationship between the individual social order created by neoliberalism and the fact that fear leads to an individual reaction (going abroad) or unresponsiveness, unlike the youth movements of the past, is also important. The

¹¹¹ dinin getirdiği bütünsellikten iyice nefret etmeye başladım, dinin kendisinden iyice nefret etmeye başladım. ...Kendi bireysel çıkarın diyebilirsin faydan diyebilirsiniz bunun yerine kümülatif bir yolda ilerlemekten.

...Ben (Türkiye'nin) önümüzdeki 70 yılda 100 yılda çok sallama da olabilir tabi ama bu süre içinde ileriye gideceğini düşünmüyorum. O yüzden bu konuda çaba harcama motivasyonum diğer insanlara nazaran daha az. Buna biraz bencillik denebilir. Haklı da bunu söyleyenler. Eleştiremem ama ne biliyim ODTÜ'de bir eylem olduğunda genelde giderim çünkü ODTÜ gibi bir yerde yaşıyorum gerçekten burayı çok seviyorum Türkiye'de sevdiğim tek yer. Ama buraya zarar vermeye çalışmaları veya burada onlara karşı kurulabilecek bir gücü görmem veya insanlarla beraber LGBTİ yürüyüşünde polise karşı çıkmamız falan bunlar gerekli şeyler. (...) Duruş olarak da faydadan da ziyade gitmem gerekiyor buraya zarar görsem bile diye düşünüyorum.

youth could not turn to collective resistance methods against oppression and force in the created individual order, and their fear and future anxiety in the face of oppression and force kept them away from establishing a relationship with the political arena.

When we look at the youth movements before 1980, it is seen that the young people believed in their power to change at the end of the struggles, and they had a hope that "tomorrow will be a revolution." It is seen that the neoliberal authoritarian transformation of Turkey under the AKP, which has been in power for 20 years, has had a negative impact on the youth's hopes for the future and their beliefs for change. The fact that there is no other government other than the AKP, combined with the "there is no alternative" discourse of neoliberalism, damaged the youth's belief in change and their sense of hope. This situation is directly related to the distanced attitude towards the organization.

It is a fact that in the new social order where collective structures and collective identities are destroyed by neoliberalism, the methods of coping with the problems faced by young people are highly individual. Although they stated that they wanted Turkey to change, it is possible to say that they did not make themselves a subject in this change. While some think that individual solutions are more important, they internalize the logic of everyone sweeping their own door. In contrast, others do not position themselves as a part of this struggle, even if they think that the collective struggle is necessary for change.

However, as a point to be emphasized, the fact that the subject of the rising social struggle against the AKP is the youth. As mentioned in detail in Chapter 2, the Gezi Resistance, the biggest rebellion against the AKP, has expressed opposition to the AKP government while creating an alternative based on solidarity, which is the exact opposite of the values of the new era. Although they have unique conditions, as can be seen from the METU example, contrary to what is claimed, young people can change their perspectives on organization and collective action practices in areas where they can see hope for change, feel responsible, and feel belonging. Although we do not talk about an organization as we know it here, it is possible to say that young people keep their collective action capacity hidden. The social change capacity of this new situation is beyond the scope of this study, but it is an important situation that needs to be examined. While the importance given to individuality by the youth causes them to

oppose the AKP regime to be the author of their own life, it also causes them to avoid taking responsibility and making an effort for the collective necessary to defeat this government. Necmi Erdoğan has revealed that the contradiction that emerges here constitutes a serious obstacle for the youth to move from "force to action"(Aksu et al., 2021).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis has been an attempt to analyze the characteristics of the relationship between university youth and politics in Turkey from the perspective of METU students themselves.

The change in the political, economic, and political structures that started with the transition to neoliberalism in Turkey in 1980 and accelerated with the AKP government in the last 20 years has been a breaking point in terms of the relationship between the whole society and politics. Thus, it is possible to state that, today, the main factor that determines the character of the relationship between METU students and politics is the ideological, political, and cultural climate shaped by neoliberal authoritarianism.

Even though neoliberal authoritarian transformation has changed the character of the relationship established between youth and politics, the first conclusion that emerged in this thesis is that the youth of METU cannot be described as apolitical today. In most of the interviews, we see that the youth follow politics, are aware of the developments in the political scene, and form their own views on the representatives of the political field.

Bilal's assessment that Turkey's politics revolve around the axis of secularism and political Islam, Baver's evolution about AKP as a populist party based on the AKP's ideological rhetoric, or Elif's criticisms of CHP's articulation with the right-wing ideology... It can be seen from these statements of the interviewees that the youth of METU today have knowledge of the political field, follow it and interpret it within the framework of their views. However, it should be considered that the authoritarianism experienced under the AKP rule may be a factor in the youth's pursuit of politics. As

young people become increasingly exposed to authoritarian policies in their daily lives, it may be causing them to follow the policies and politics that affect their lives directly.

However, from the claim that today's youth is political, it should not be concluded that young people directly relate to the political field as a militant subject. The youth's relationship with the political sphere today is distant compared to the past. Even if all of the interviewees stated that they are against the AKP regime, they do not act together with those parties, organizations, or communities against the AKP regime. It has been revealed that they only establish a relationship with the political field through voting.

As mentioned, the youth of METU today, like the youth before the 1980s, are not satisfied with the course of the country and think that it is poorly managed. They hold the political parties in the parliament, especially the AKP, responsible for the problems they experience. As a general tendency emerged in the study, although they encounter different political organizations and communities in METU, their definition of political field is limited to the political parties in the parliament. In the creation of this perception, the effect of neoliberalism's narrowing of politics together with its depoliticization policies, as well as the effect of political youth organizations and communities not being widespread and compelling enough, although they are more common in METU than in other universities, should also be taken into consideration.

It can be said that the youth of METU do not trust the political parties, which are the representatives of the political field, in line with the general tendency in the world. In this study, the interviewees criticized the AKP for considering the interests of its supporters instead of considering the interests of the people and stated that the CHP is not different from the AKP. Therefore, regardless of power or opposition, the political arena is defined by METU youth as a corrupt field in which interest relations dominate and personal interests are taken into consideration instead of common interest. As mentioned, the youth's distrust in the political arena is a situation that has existed in the past. Even when the youth struggle was at its most massive period, they did not trust political parties and kept a distanced attitude toward them. However, this situation did not cause the youth to distance themselves from the political field; on the contrary, it enabled them to become the representatives of the political field through their

organizations. From this point of view, it would be incomplete to explain the distrust of the representatives of the political field as the only reason for the distant relationship of today's youth with politics.

It was revealed that METU youth perceive the political arena as a place to be feared and, therefore, to be avoided. The distant relationship of youth with politics today is an influential factor in the environment of fear and oppression created by the increasingly authoritarian AKP government. AKP government, which put into practice all existing ideology and oppressive power devices to suppress the voices that opposed it, caused the youth to perceive the political field as a dangerous sphere.

Many interviewees stated that they did not join an organization in line with their own views because of the fear that something would happen to them. This situation manifests itself not only in the traditional means of participation but also in the use of Twitter, which is considered among the new forms of youth participation in the political arena. While most of the interviewees stated that they use Twitter, they also indicated that their accounts are private and they think twice while tweeting about a political issue. The overwhelming majority of the interviewees stated that they were afraid that their involvement in an organization parallel to their views could lead to being detained or arrested, even if they had never been organized before and did not act with a political party or community. However, while young people, before the 1980s, chose to resist the increasing pressure and violent environment by organizing more, today, this environment of coercion and violence has caused young people to put a distance from organizing and become afraid. In this sense, it can be said that broader hegemonic processes are effective in the causes of change in youth's reaction against the climate of oppression and fear.

As revealed in this study, the fluid, fast, ever-changing, and transforming society structure shaped around the precarious, flexible, fragmented, and temporary labor regime created by neoliberalism has affected the youth, their character, and relationships. With the "no long term" principle of neoliberalism, the youth do not feel safe and secure in their future. In this study, sentences such as "I need to save myself first," "Firstly, I need to earn my own life and my economic power," which are frequently used by different interviewees in this study, indicate that even in a university

like METU, where job opportunities are quite high after graduation, students do not feel safe, secure and worry about the future.

The majority of the interviewees stated that they felt that they belonged to METU rather than the country. This situation, which is strikingly revealed in Ayşe's words, "I feel displaced (in the country) outside of METU," or Bilal's suggestion that all 15.000 METU students should go abroad, reveals the difference between youth before the 1980s who were involved in the political field with the responsibility of developing the country and today's youth. The current situation of the relationship between youth and politics is revealed with the sentences of Defne: "Yes, I am unhappy with the situation of the country in general, but if I take an active role, I feel like I would endanger my future. I avoid such a thing in life because I think I have to protect myself first". This situation, which other students expressed in different words, is a result of the new narrative of the neoliberal ideological discourse. These people take risks to become successful, constantly improve themselves, who are responsible for their success or failure, and therefore continuously have to compete with others. This situation cannot be considered independently from the neoliberal ideology's new character, which creates an individual, self-responsible self and erodes values such as loyalty, commitment, and dedication.

Considering that belonging is about taking responsibility, spending time and effort, considering the priorities of the place one belongs to before oneself, and being dedicated, the characteristics of METU belonging expressed by the interviewees are also questionable. Although it caused a collective reaction to the events that developed against METU, this situation did not cause the students to be included in the political communities and organizations within METU itself. Therefore, it can be said that the sense mentioned earlier of belonging does not occur in the forms such as taking responsibility, taking time, and devoting oneself to the defense of the university, but in a short-term, reactive manner that does not endanger one's own future. For example, in the interview, Elif said, "If you are affiliated with a group, that group will assign duties to you. Even in our clubs, there is the task of hanging the events' posters. I already have a lot of homework as an engineering student. I already feel depressed because of my own tasks. Even I don't have time to get underwear, and I can't deal with other tasks." As expressed in her sentences, it is seen that this situation arises not

only in establishing political belonging but also in being included in non-political school clubs.

It is possible to see a similar situation in the research that was conducted with the white-collar unemployed people, most of whom are educated university graduates.(Aksu et al., 2021) In this study, it has also been revealed that the young unemployed avoid belonging, commitment, and involvement in the political field by taking responsibility for the solution of the problems they experience. Also, it is possible to observe a similar situation in terms of youth who defines themselves with a political identity. Thus, it can be argued that an active militancy seen in university youth in the past does not exist in general today.

The fact that the youth, who were somehow associated and organized in the political field during their university years, established a more flexible relationship with their political affiliations after graduating from the university affects the difficulty of political parties in finding young cadres. This situation, which even causes the perception of "being communist till find money," should be evaluated together with the effect of the new character of the neoliberal labor regime on the youth and their political belongings. All of these show that the situation for METU students is not unique to them. Still, the ideological political-cultural climate shaped by neoliberal authoritarianism was influential in the emergence of the distant attitude towards the political field.

Another result of this study is that although METU students are not satisfied with the AKP and have demanded an alteration, they do not believe that this change can happen. Obviously, the "There is no alternative" discourse of neoliberalism and the authoritarian AKP regime, which has been in power for 20 years, negatively influenced the belief of change of the youth. Also, most of the interviewees stated that even if the government changes, the country will not become the country they would like to live in. As Castel states, "Struggle requires the existence of a collectivity and a future project" (Castel, 2003:390). The disbelief about change and the possibility of a different future causes young people to seek individual ways of emancipation. Ayşe's statement that "there is nothing to be done for this country to change, the only way is to go abroad," or Hasret's statement which is "I'm "okay" even to seek asylum instead

of living in this country," can be given as examples of young people looking for emancipation in individual ways when they do not have a belief in change.

It is possible to see another aspect of this situation in the answers given by interviewees to how change can be possible. Most of the students think that in parallel with the individualized risk-taking approach of neoliberalism, the country's problems can be solved by individuals' self-development. In this sense, it is possible to say that the logic of everyone sweeping in front of their own door finds its echo among young people. It is also important to note that the students, who stated that change could be achieved through a collective struggle, do not position themselves as a part of this struggle. Deniz, who thinks that a collective political struggle is needed for something to change, defines himself as a "freshwater" leftist and expresses that he supports the political organizations. Still, he won't be a part of this struggle because, as an engineer, he can be more useful if he deals with renewable energy.

Similarly, Tuğba thinks that a collective struggle is necessary. Still, she will not participate in it because she plans to contribute country by doing a master's degree in water resources. The paradoxical situation manifests itself in these statements also directly related to the character created by neoliberalism.

The fragmented, individualized, and casualized characteristics of the new labor regime and its erosion of the values such as commitment, dedication, and loyalty make it difficult for young people to think of themselves as a collective subject, to resort to collective ways for the problems they want to change, and to take responsibility for changing them. This situation has a negative effect on the transformation of political awareness of young people into political power. Necmi Erdoğan described this contradictory situation between wanting to change the situation they are not satisfied with and keeping their distance from the forms of politics and militancy required for this as an artificial balance (Erdoğan, 2017).

The rapidly increasing youth unemployment created by neoliberalism, insecure employment conditions, and the ever-increasing debts of the youth bring the feeling of anger among the youth. It is possible to say by looking at the movements that emerged after 2011 that the ways necessary for the combination of anger with hope are not completely blocked. Although we do not talk about militant youth that can

create a political movement that affects the whole society as we know it yet, it is possible to say that young people keep their collective action capacity hidden. However, considering the examples of the METU protests and the collective reaction that manifested in Gezi, it is not impossible for the youth to create a collective subject and disrupt the artificial balance for their benefit of themselves. The rapidly increasing youth unemployment created by neoliberalism, insecure employment conditions, and the ever-increasing debts of the youth bring the feeling of anger among them. It is possible to argue that the ways necessary for the combination of anger with hope are not entirely blocked by looking at the movements that emerged after 2011. Although we do not talk about militant youth that can create a political movement that affects the whole society yet, it is possible to argue that young people keep their collective action capacity hidden. The ways of turning this potential into action, there is a need for more comprehensive research and evaluation that addresses the status of existing political channels.

But there is the fact that there will be resistance wherever there is exploitation and domination.

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APPENDICES

A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER



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16 MART 2020

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu


Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu


Sayın Necmi ERDOĞAN

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız Pınar YÜKSEK'in "Gençliğin Politikaya ve Politik Katılıma Bakışı" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülmüş ve 143 ODTU 2020 protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla bilgilerinize sunarız.


Prof. Dr. Mine MISIRLI SOY


Başkan


Prof. Dr. Tolga CAN

Üye


Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ali Emre TURGUT


Üye


Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Müge GÜNDÜZ

Üye

Doç. Dr. Pınar KAYGAN

Üye


Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Şerife SEVİNÇ

Üye


Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Süreyya Özcan KABASAKAL

Üye

B. INFORMATION ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEES

NAME	Gender	YEAR OF STUDY	DEPARTMENT
Elif	Female	6	Mechanical Engineering
Mehmet	Male	6	Mechanical Engineering
Baver	Male	6	Civil Engineering
Anıl	Male	6	Civil Engineering
Bariş	Male	5	Metallurgical and Materials Engineering
Berna	Female	4	Computer Engineering
Hasret	Female	3	Civil Engineering
Fatih	Male	2	Industrial Engineering
Bilal	Male	2	Industrial Engineering
Muhammed	Male	2	Computer Engineering
Doğa	Female	4	Mechanical Engineering
Bilge	Female	4	Mechanical Engineering
Mine	Female	4	Electrical and Electronics Engineering
Deniz	Male	4	Electrical and Electronics Engineering
Defne	Female	4	Metallurgical and Materials Engineering
Umut	Male	5	Mechanical Engineering
Tuğba	Female	4	Civil Engineering
Dilek	Female	6	Civil Engineering
Efe	Male	4	Industrial Engineering
Ayşe	Female	4	Metallurgical and Materials Engineering

C. AN EXAMPLE OF INTERVIEWS

Merhaba Elif, kendini tanıtabilir misin? Nasıl birisin?

Adanalıyım. 01 ile başlayayım. Adana'dan geldim endüstri mühendisliğini kazandım ilk başta sonra makina mühendisliğine geçtim çünkü mühendislik istiyordum. Endüstrinin yanlış tercih olduğunu sonradan fark ettim, uyandım falan derken sonra geçiş yaptım. Aslında çok enerjik bir insanım. İnsanlar beni slov modda, üzgün modda zor, nadir görürler.

Adana'da devlet lisesinde mi okudun?

Evet ilkokul, lise hep devletti. Özel okulda okumadım hiç ama dershaneye gittim.

Nerede yaşıyorsun?

Şu an öğrenci evinde, normal 3+1 standart mutfağı olan bir ev.

İşleyişi nasıl peki evinizin?

İşleyişi çok sessiz ve çalışkan bir ev tam bir engineering evi.

Mesela evde yemek yapar mısınız?

Aslında ikimiz de makinacı olduğumuz için pek yapamıyoruz. Kahvaltı yapabiliyoruz sadece. Çok nadir 15 tatillerde, dönemin başı gibi ODTÜ'lünün rahat dönemlerinde. Memleketten gelen ganimetlerle beraber yemek yapıyoruz.

Ortak giderler oluyordur evde nasıl karşılıyorsunuz bunları herkes kendi aldığından mı mesul?

Her şeyi ikiye bölmüyoruz. Dengeli bir düzen var aslında. Buzdolabının üzerinde bir tane a4 var. İkiye ayrılmış durumda. Orada işte sadece çok temel giderler var faturalar ve eve sipariş edilen su yazar. Market giderlerini yazmayız çünkü dengeli bir şekilde yani biri cimri biri bonkör gibi bir durum olmadığı için. Bir ben alıyorum bir o alıyor. Artı eksi 5 okey yani işte biraz insanın samimiyetine kalmış bir şey.

Bölümden mi tanıştın ev arkadaşınla?

Hazırlıkta aslında sonra oradan devam ettik.

Ailenle ilişkin nasıl?

İki sene önce benim annemle babam boşandı. Biraz kavgalı bir boşanmaydı çünkü annemle babamın ikisi de ilkokul mezunu. Babam böyle işine ne gelirse o zaman çalışır, çok çalışmazdı. Annem genel anlamda hep çalışır. Baklava ustası. Havalı bir meslek olduğunu düşünüyorum. Öyle olduğu için geçinme, bir parasal sıkıntıdan dolayı evin içinde sürekli bir kavga verdi. 2 sene önce cort etti işte. O şekilde bir ayrılma söz konusu oldu. Ayrıldıklarında babamla aramız çok kötüydü. Bizi suçluyordu, tehditler savuruyordu. Ablam var benden 2 yaş falan büyük okulu uzatmadan bitirdiği için o şu an diş hekimi. Gölbaşı'nda devlette. İşin düşerse gidersin. Annemle aramız çok iyi. Annemle iyi olmamak imkânsız. Babamın tehditler savurduğu dönem babamla kötüydük şimdi konuşuyoruz işte vicdanen. Ama hani çok mükemmel miyiz? Değiliz. Tamamen babadır sonuçta falan diye konuşuyoruz. Normalde hak eder mi dersin tartışılır.

Gelir kaynağın ailen mi?

Hayır. Bursum var. Eczacıbaşı kız mühendis programından burs alıyorum. Ondan önce Sabancı bursu alıyordum. Sabancı bursunun süresi doldu. O bitince Eczacıbaşı başladı. Paslaşma oldu. Onun haricinde annem bazen verir. Pek almam. Onun haricinde özel ders veriyorum. Yabancı öğrencilerim var 2 tane. Onlardan biraz ganimetler alıyoruz.

Ailende herhangi bir siyasi geçmiş var? Ya da mesela evde siyaset konuşulur muydu?

Evde aslında hiç konuşulmazdı. Yani ben lisedeyken babam benim AKP'ye oy veriyormuş. Ben bunu bilmezdim. Ne futbol ne siyaset. İkisi pek konuşulmazdı evde. Evde ana tema hep geçim sıkıntısı para giderler vs. bundan başımızı kaldırıp siyasete pek gelinmezdi.

Mesela haber izlerken yorumlar yapılır falan...

Küçükken ben çok fark etmemişim. Ben lisedeyken fark ettim. Aa dedim babam AKP'ye oy veriyormuş. O zaman tabi hiç farkında değilim AKP iyi mi kötü mü bilmiyorum. Arkadaşlarıma bakıyorum. İşte arkadaşlarımla tepkilerine bakıyorum. Sonra biraz kendim araştırıyorum falan sonra dedim oo bu iyi bir şey değil. Biraz büyüdükçe konuşulmaya başlandı. Annem hiç takmaz. Annem esnaf olduğu için diyelim bir belediye başkanı esnafla görüşme yapıyor, geziyor. Annem bakar tamamen bireysel. Particiliği sıfır. Adamın konuşması falan hoşuna gittiyse adamlarda davarlık yoksa falan tamam diyor bu adam benim hoşuma gitti diyor. Bir iyi partili kadın vardı. Bir ara böyle ben dedi kadın diye buna vereceğim diyor. Bir iyi partiye atıyor, bir CHP'ye atıyor, bir MHP'ye atıyor. Bir siyasi görüşü falan olmayan bir insan. Bana göre annem olması gereken bir tip.

Bu şekilde mi olması gerektiğini düşünüyorsun?

Evet, yani benim için partililik kötü bir şey. Çünkü yanlış bir şey. Çünkü partilere insanların ideolojileri yüzünden girdiğini düşünmüyorum. Gösteriş oluyor. Bir yerde bireysel amaçlar bireysel düşünceler bunlar girdiği için işte adam diyelim ki FETÖ-bunu FETÖ bakış açısından diyorum.- 'ye giriyor. FETÖ'nün partisine giriyor. Bir yerde onların partisinde onların vizyonundaymış gibi gözüküyor. Sonra FETÖ düşünce işte benim işime gelmez diyor. Hemen başka bir partiye geçiyor. Bu tamamen bireyseldir. İdeoloji varsa insanların o zaman partiler arasında geçiş yapmaması gerekiyor. FTÖ battıysa sen de batacaksın. Eğer iyi zamanında destek olduysan kötü zamanında da destek olacaksın. Ben açıkçası bunun taraftarıyım. Particilik ve partiler bana hiçbir zaman samimi gelmez. Tamamen bireylere bakıyorum. Yaklaşımlarına yorumlarına onlara bakıyorum. Ben bunun doğru olduğunu düşünüyorum. İşte babam

büyüdükçe biraz şey demeye başladı. Hükümet iyi şöyle böyle. Ekonomimiz kötü değil AVM'ler dolu. Kötü olsaydı tüp sırası olurdu. Ama bir yerde emekli maaşı yetmiyor da diyor. Öyle öyle biraz mantıksız konuşuyor ama babam hep mantıksız konuştuğu için... Öyle bir beklentim yok babama karşı. Ben sadece bana acı vermemesi için o dediklerine he he baba haklısın diyorum insanı değiştiremezsin çünkü o insan gelmiş öyle gidecek. O yüzden zorlamıyoruz.

Peki, şu anki durumundan memnun musun Türkiye'nin?

Evet değilim ama bunun suçu ne partiler ne partilerin başındaki insanlar. Bunun suçu tamamen halkta. Aslında tamamen partiler ve siyaset halkın aynısı. Bir sıkıntı varsa demek ki halkta bir sıkıntı. Bir kişinin düşüncesi partideki diğer insanların ona destek vermesi gerekiyor. AKP'yi unutsak siyaseti unutsak sokağa çıksak insanlarla konuşsak aynı bağınazlığı sokakta görüyoruz. O insanların getirdiği insanlar işte, ben şaşırmiyorum. Yani daha da fazla şeyler de olabilir. Çok memnun değilim evet.

Peki, 15 sene öncesine göre ve şu an Türkiye'de bir fark var mı bağınazlık anlamında? Yaşadığımız süre içinde düşün en azından son 10 yılda bir değişiklik var mı?

Ya aslında bunu ben tamamen bilimsel ve matematiksel olarak olaya bakıyorum. İşte benim gibi ailesi bağınaz olup okuyup işte Güney Anadolu'dan gelip gözü açılan bir sürü insan var. Annesi babası aydın olup kendisi bağınaz olan pek yok onlar zaten aynı aydınlıkta devam ediyor. Ama bağınaz ailelerinin aydın çocukları bu ülkede giden bir süreç. Bunu sağlayan şey ne? Tabi ki de Atatürk ve ilkelerinin koyduğu eğitim sisteminden dolayı biz bu şekilde geliyoruz. Gördüğümüz eğitimler sayesinde. E şimdi teknoloji dünyası her şey açık. Önceki insanlar cahiller Amerika'daki veya Almanya'daki lüks hayatın farkında değil o yüzden biz çok iyiyiz diyor.

Şöyle bir şey desem. Hala yüzde 51 dediğimiz kısımda da genç var vs. hala oy veriyor.

Eğitim bozulmadan böyle giderse. Bu süreç çok uzun sürecek ama bütün insanların eğitilip aydınlanması başka bir şekilde bürünmesi çok uzun zaman alan bir şey. Ben bu durumun ilerde düzeleceğini düşünüyorum. Yüzde 51'e bakıyorum babam gibi saf insanlar var. Eğitimsiz. Buranın yüzde 35 desek kalan 15 de tamamen maddi çıkarlar,

şirket çıkarları, ihale çıkarları vs. diğer kısım köyden gelen saf eğitimsiz insanların olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ama diğer 15'lik kısmın tamamen maddi aydın bile olsa bunların yanlış gittiğini düşünse bile ülkenin bu şekilde kötü gittiğini düşünse bile şirketinin karı cebinin karı için ona oy verdiğini düşünüyorum. Bence bizim ülkenin yarısından biraz daha az kısmı belki yüzde 40'luk bir kesiminin eğitimi eksik, ileri görüşlü olmayan insanlar olduğunu düşünüyorum. O insanların bakıldığında zaten o malum partiye oy veren insanlara bakıldığında yaş ortalaması çok yüksek. Yaş ortalaması genç olan insanların benim gördüğüm mali çıkarlar. Yarın bahçeliye vs. gittiğimizde işte tespih sallayıp bazı üniversitelerden mezun olup işte ben makine mühendisiyim falan deyip piyasada gezen bir sürü insan var. Onların hepsi yarın bir gün bizim çok emek harcayıp giremediğimiz ROKETSAN'a ASELSAN'a girecekler, giriyorlar. İşte o partinin genç üyeleri bu insanlardan oluşuyor. Maddi çıkarlar için ona oy verenlerden oluşuyor. Bu insanlar dönek insanlar. Yarın öbürü cebini açsa cüzdanını açsa oraya giderler. Bu insanlar arada gezinen orta malı dediğimiz oylar bence. Ama işte o kemik tayfayı oluşturan yüzde 35 benim babam gibi saf eğitimsiz insanların olduğu yüzde 35 işte dinsel veya diğer kültürel duygularının emildiği yüzde 35 olduğunu düşünüyorum. Onlar eğitimle düzelmesi gerekiyor. 60 yaşındaki adamı eğitimle düzeltemezsin nolur çocuğunu belki eğitebilirsin. Çünkü onun ilerisi çocuğudur. Ben ve benim gibi Anadolu'dan gelip çabalayan işte bir ortamı analiz eden işte benim ailem niye böyle onların ki niye böyle ben niye eğlenemiyorum onlar niye eğleniyor. İşte diğer ülkelere baktığımda iki dünya gezdiğinde o farkı ayırt edebilen insanlar olabiliyorlar. Bu açıdan ben yurtdışına da çıktığımda şeyi gördüm temel olarak ülkenin temeli gerçekten iyi. Bazı temellerde çok eksikiz okey ben ona bir şey demiyorum. Ücretsiz verilen eğitimde daha iyiyiz. Ve biraz şirketlerimizin bazı destekleri oluyor. Şirketler işte biri de düşünmüyor bu ODTÜ'de niye bu kadar şirketler burs veriyor? Şirketler bu kadar paracıyken niye bedava para veriyor. Çünkü devletin işte şey destekleri var. İşte sen şu kadar öğrenciye burs verirsen ben senin verginden bu kadar düşücem. Şirketler diyor adam da diyor ki ulan devlete vergi vereceğime öğrenciye burs veririm. Biraz aslında devletin yönlendirmesiyle olan bir şey. Ama bu çok çok geçmişten gelen bir şey. Bizim ülkede öğrencilere verilen burslar okullarda verilen eğitimler özel okula gitmeyerek ileri derecede fizik matematik alabildim. Bu algoritma zekâsını emek vererek geliştirebildim. Ücretsiz eğitimlerle. Yani yaşamımın yarısı köyde yaylada geçti. Ben bunu şekilde gelebiliyorsam demek ki bizim eğitim sistemimiz o kadar kötü

değil. Bize verilen biraz daha sosyalist Amerika gibi Avrupa ülkeleri gibi kapitalist olduğumuzu düşünmüyorum. Çünkü gittiğimde oralardaki ücretsiz eğitimler pek eğitim değil. Para verince şeysin, tamamen kapitalist sistem.

Kendini yakın hissettiğin bir ideoloji var mı ya da parti?

Dediğim gibi partililik ve partilere yakın olamıyorum pek. Bir iki cümleleri oluyor yakıcı oluyor benim için. Bakıldığında CHP daha iyi geliyor. Ama CHP'nin son zamanlardaki tavrı sırf iktidara gelelim diye oy toplayalım diye ideolojilerinden biraz çıkmaları hoş değil bence. Sırf belli ki biz muhafazakârız muhafazakâr olmadan oy gelmiyor diye şeylerden çıkmaları bence yanlış. Önceden de yanlıştı. Zamanında muhafazakârları dışlamaları da yanlıştı. Benim annem de kapalı mesela. Hani kapalılığı ben bazen çekinmemem gerekiyor. Annem kapalı, başörtülü...

Çekindiğin zamanlar mı oldu?

Evet. O insanların baskın sivri dillerinin olduğu ortamlar. ODTÜ'de bunları bazen gördüm arkadaş grupları topluluklarda vs. oralarda insan rahatça söyleyemiyor. Bunlar da yanlış. Bu da CHP'nin yanışı. Zamanında geçmişteki. Bunu tam tersine çevirip ters ideolojiye gitmesi de yanlıştı. Reklam pankartlarına sürekli kapalı insanları koymaları vs. bu da samimi değil. Samimilik aslında bence pek yok. İyi parti biraz mantıklı gelmişti. Sonra onların da bilmiyorum ya bana şey geliyor Türkiye'deki siyasetteki insanlar bir çıkarıcılık para kazanmak için partilere giriyor gibi geliyor o yüzden biraz yakın hissediyorum sonra geri soğuyorum.

Peki, mesela solcular hakkında ne düşünüyorsun? Sol partiler? Onlarda da aynı şey var mı sence?

TKP mesela. Yani samimiyet var onlarda. Neydi Tunceli belediye başkanı. Mesela adam çok samimi. Çok güzel ama adamın eksik olduğu ve kendi ekibinin de eksik olduğu yanları var mı? Tartışılır. Ben çok araştırmadım belki mühendislikte okumasam daha sözel bölümlerde okusam belki araştırabilirdim. Çok düşünmüyorum da bunların üzerinde. Şey eksikleri var. Halka yakınlar mı aslında yakın mı olamıyorlar

ya da kendini pazarlayamıyorlar mı? Sanki orada bir eksik var. Halk onları ülke bölücü işte veya daha kötü o şekilde algı var. Ve o algıyı birinin kırması için ciddi araştırması ya da o insanlardan birini görmesi lazım. Ama o insanlardan birini görmeyen güzel araştıramayan veya araştırdığında güzel feedbackler bulamayan insanlar onlara yakın olamıyor ister istemez. Orada biraz bilmiyorum tam belki reklam dediğimiz şey. Kapitalizmden geldiği için mi kaybediyorlar bilmiyorum olabilir.

CHP'ye yakın hissediyorum dedin? Yakın hissettiğin bir ideoloji mi var? Dünya görüşün nedir?

Türkiye'de ben üretmeyen insanlara direk kötü bakıyorum. Belki bu bencillik mi şey mi bilmiyorum ama üretmeyen sadece böyle bir şeyler ortaya koymayan aralarda konuşan sadece birilerinin yanında olan ikili üçlü ilişkilerle bir şey kazanmaya çalışan insanlar bana hep itici geliyor. Çok varlar bunlardan. Şöyle araştırmalar yapıp bir şeyleri ortaya koyup insanlar bunu istiyor bunu yapmak yerine, hani ben buna yakın olayım buradan bu parayı alayım bu kazanır diyen insanlarla dolu olduğunu düşünüyorum siyasetin. Genel anlamda CHP'ye özgü değil ciddi samimiyetsizlik.

Bir şeyleri değiştirmek gerekiyor mu sence Türkiye'de? Ne yapmak lazım? Sen ne yapman gerektiğini düşünüyorsun?

Evet, kesinlikle değişmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Son zamanlarda etrafla çok şey görüyorum. İşte instagramdan hesap açalım yok anneyim hamileyim yok böyleyim vs. diye. Hiçbir şey üretmeden kendini pazarlayan Şeyma subaşı tarzı tipler çok görüyorum. İşte ben direk bu insanlardan nefret ediyorum. Üretmeyen kadınlardan nefret ediyorum. Üretmeyen erkeklerden zaten nefret ediyorum. Bıdı bıdı yani. Bir sürü insanlardan nefret ettiğim için üretmeyen ülkeye destek olmayan insanlardan sadece üretmeyenlerden değil bir insanın katkı da sağlamalı.

Bir şey yapmak gerekiyor mu sence? Sen napıcaksın senin benim ne yapmam gerekiyor?

İşte Şeyma subaşı gibi olan bir insan yığını var. Birilerinin onlara bunun yanlış olduğunu, ülkenin dünyanın kötü etkilendiğini, iklimin çok bozulduğunu, bu tüketim çılgınlığıyla dünyanın bu şekilde ilerlemeyeceğini söylemesi lazım... Tırnakları yapay yüzü yapay orası burası plastik insanlar gidiyor marketten organik yumurta arıyor. Abi bu şu an toplumun en büyük sıkıntısı. Sen ne kadar samimisin ki samimi bir şey istiyorsun olayı. İstekler kesinlikle samimiydi. Bir şeylerin değişmesi gerekiyor. Evet değişmesi gerekiyor. Her ülkede var bu sıkıntı ama bizim ülkede daha fazla var. İnsanlar eğitimsiz. Ya farkında değil ya da farkında da işine gelmiyor. Tembellik.

Sen de farkındasın? Sen bir şey yapıyor musun mesela?

İşte ben insanlara sadece diyorum ki çocuklarınızı okutun ürettirin bir şeyler yapın bu şekilde Şeyma Subaşı gibi olacak bir tip varsa onu engellemeye çalışıyorum kendi çapımda ama çok da etkili olduğunu sanmıyorum. Yine anne babaya bağlı. Mesela benim baba tarafında çok fazla kuzenim var artık onlarla çok zor bir araya geliyoruz. Ara sıra gidiyorum Adana'ya o sürede kimle görüşeyim sorusu. İşte onlarla düğünde bir şey de bir araya gelirsek işte hep böyle çocuklarını düzgün okutun saçma sapan bölümlere göndermeyin ülkeye katkı sağlayacak yerlere gönderin ODTÜ olması önemli değil diyorum. Öyle şeyler yapmaya çalışıyorum.

Kendini herhangi bir gruba ait hissediyor musun herhangi bir topluluk olabilir arkadaş grubu ya da öğrenci topluluğu? Bir şeye bağlı hissetmekten de hoşlanmıyorum diyor olabilirsin?

Hiç hissetmiyorum ya. Aslında doğru bir şeye bağlı hissetmemek bana daha doğru geliyor. Bağlı olunca dediğim gibi bir şeylerin pozitif de var negatif de var. Sadece eleştiri düzeyinde kalıyorum. Tam bağlanamıyorum. Ne kadar avantajlı biri yüzde 70'ken biri yüzde 60'sa yüzde 70'e yöneliyorum.

Kendini bağlı hissettiğin birileri var mı? Arkadaş, sevgili eşya hayvan herhangi bir şey olabilir?

Siyasi olarak düşünmüştüm ben. Siyasi bir grup olarak düşünmüştüm. Takım ruhu yok bende pek. Ama tabii kişiye bağlılık çok var. Biraz da bölümden kaynaklı olabilir bir şeylerden eksik kalmam. Çünkü bir insanın sınırlı sayıda zamanı var, her şeye ayıramıyorsun belki daha rahat bölümlerde olsam profesyonel bir spor topluluğuna gitsem o takıma belki çok bağlı olabilirim daha farklı işte THBT' ye gitsem oradaki insanlara daha bağlı olabilirim. Bölüm çok ağır çok ders çalışmamız gerekiyor. Bireysel olarak gerçekten oturup gömülmemiz gerekiyor. O şekilde olduğu için de bir şeylere bağlanamamış olabilirim. Düşünecek çok zamanım olmayabilir. Arkadaşlar arasında siyasi konu açıldığında bile 3 kişi olsun mesela bir süre sonra biri şey diyor arkadaşlar ders çalışmamız gerekiyor bak zaman geçiyor diyor mutlaka ve konu kapatılıyor. İnsanların biraz görev şeyiyle ilgili. İnsanların boş kalmaması tarafındayım. Ne kadar görev verirsen, üretime teşvik edersen insanlar o kadar boş şeylerle uğraşmaz.

Siyaset de boş bir iş o zaman?

Yani aslında biraz değil eleştirmek gerekiyor evet ama bizim Türkiye'de böyle bir şey oluşmuş. İşsiz, düzgün yeteneği olmayan insan, lise mezunu insan gidiyor ocağa falan oradan birilerini tanıyor siyasete atılıyor. Siyasete atılmasının nedeni siyaset mezunu falan değil alakası yok.

Mesela bir sıkıntı yaşadın. Bu herhangi bir sıkıntı olabilir ailenle ilgili olabilir okulla ilgili olabilir. Buna karşı çıkmak istiyorsun. Bir sorun yaşadığında nıyorsun?

Durumuna bağlı aslında. Yapabileceğim bir şeyse etrafımı çok darlamıyorum. Kendim yapıyorum. Mesela parasal konu. Parasal konu yapabileceğim bir şey mi? evet. Fedakârlık yapmalı mıyım, yapıyorum derslerimden zaman ayırıyorum, çocukların derslerine bakıyorsun o şekilde hani para kazanıyorsun ama bir şeylerden fedakârlık yapıyorsun. Ama benim değiştiremeyeceğim bir şeyse yani artık mesela dersle ilgili bir şey hocanın değiştirmesi lazım. Gidip hocayla konuşuyorum.

Diyeim bir hoca tarafından haksızlığa uğradın. Direk hocayla mı konuşursun?

Evet, o konuda özgüvenim olduğunu düşünüyorum. Asistanı falan araya sokmuyorum.

Sınıfça bir haksızlığa uğradıysanız mesela onda nasıl bir yöntem izleniyorum?

Bir örgütlenme varsa kesinlikle katılıyorum. Yapabileceğim bir şeye katılmaya çalışıyorum. Ama ülkenin şuandaki o bütün cahil toplumunu ben değiştiremem, ben sadece örnek olabilirim. Biraz daha pozitif çevirebilirim.

Nasıl değişecek peki?

Bir kişi çıkıp tümünden insanları uyandıramaz. Bir anda CHP'nin uyandıracağını düşünmüyorum. İktidara gelse de yapamaz. Bir nesil var eğitilmemiş nesil başka düşünceleri olan nesil. O nesil ölene kadar yapacağımız bir şey yok.

Yeni nesilin eski nesil tarafından etkilendiğini düşünmüyor musun?

Evet, etki ediyor ama işte bunu ne kadar etkilediği? Mesela çocuk doğuda ailesi geleneksel gidip de okula hocası ona çok zıt konuşursa, bu aslında tam bizim sol partilerinin sıkıntısı bir anda yüzüne söylüyorsun yüzüne çarpıyorsun. Çocuk bu sefer bir anda 'ne saçmalıyorsun sen' diyor. 'Öyle bir şey yok' falan diyor. Direkt perdeyi çekiyor sana bu yanlış at çöpe. Belki sol partilerin yaptığı bu. Çok cahil bir insana bir anda gerçeklerin söylenmemesi gerekiyor. Öğretmenin, 'senin annen baban yanlış yapıyor' diye direkt söylemesi yerine daha geçişsel nasıl desem orta yolu bularak, tatlı dille bir şekilde söylemesi gerekiyor. Doğaya zarar vermemenin, aslında sosyal dediğimiz bir devletin nasıl olması gerektiğini biraz yavaş yavaş onun dilinde konuşması gerekiyor. O yüzden ülkeyi değiştirecek insanlar o halkın o cahil dediğimiz insanların dilini bilmesi lazım. AKP'nin başarılı olmasının sebebi o geçişini sağlıyor. O halkın dilinde konuşabildiği için insanlar ona yakın hissettiriyor. AKP dese ki yenilebilir enerji çok iyi bir şey. Bütün ülke ona geçer. İnanırlar. Çünkü o insan geçiş insanı. Bunu ama bir TKP'nin bir HDP veya CHP bile söylese işe yaramaz. Eğitim sistemindeki insanların siyasetten uzak durması gerekiyor kesinlikle. Siyasi olarak bir grubu olan insanın ya da o gruba üye olduğunu bilirse öğretmenin söylediği şeyler o çocuğa ailesi şey der o insan işte TKP'li PKK'lı HDP'li ona inanma der. Çocuk ona

şartlanır. Öğretmen bu sefer ne derse mesele Atatürk ilkeleri falan çocuk der bu kötü. O yüzden o geçiş bu halkı şekillendirecek insanların ki bunlar öğretmenler eğitici insanlar oluyor kesinlikle siyasete değmemesi gerekiyor.

Az önce dedin ya bağlı hissetmekten hoşlanmıyorum diye. Özgürlük mü senin aradığın şey?

Yok, aslında tamamen görev muhabbeti. Yani bir gruba bağlıysan o grubun sana bir görevi olacak. En basit bizim topluluklarda bile afiş asma görevi oluyor. Bir görev veriliyor ve o görev bir yerde şey yapıyor insanı. Ya benim zaten çok ödevim var ve özellikle mühendislik. Böyle gerçekten şey yapıyor. Bir sürü görevim var. Bunalımdayım ben. Altıma don alacak bir vaktim yok ben bir de bununla uğraşamam. Zaten bakıldığı zaman topluluğa gitme zamanı hazırlık ve birinci sınıf. Birinci sınıfın ortasında genelde cayılır. İlk notlar gelir böyle insanlar topluluktan çıkar. 3. Sınıfta 4. Sınıfta insanların ben toplulukta olduğunu hiç görmedim. Aslında bu tamamen verilen görevlerin ağır olmasıyla ilgili belki bu bizim üniversitenin dezavantajı olabilir. Aslında biraz görevden kaçma olayı.

Politikaya katılım hakkında ne düşünüyorsun? Sence katılmak gerekli mi politikaya?

Aslında katılmak gerekiyor ama. Yeri gelecek meclise abi mühendis günü yapalım. O gün mecliste mühendisler konuşsun. Ülkenin geleceğiyle ilgili, teknolojiyle ilgili. Bir gün öğretmen günü yap o gün mecliste eğitim konuşulsun. Ben milletvekilliği muhabbetine tamamen karşı bir insanım. Bu bizim ülkede değil birçok ülkede böyle. Milletvekili bir eksiği görüyor ama ne kadar aktarabiliyor. Ya da aktarıyor diğerleri ne kadar duyuyor. Kadın diyor ki işte bakın güneş enerjisi rüzgârdan daha mantıklı biz güneş enerjisine yatırım yapalım diğeri anlamıyor yani farkını çok mu önemli değil ona göre adam maliyete bakıyor. Bu ilk satışta bu kadar diyor. Benim zaten görev sürem 5 sene. Bu bana yetişmez cefasını ben çekerim, sefasını süremem. Bizim ülkenin sıkıntısı. Altyapı kötü o kötü bu kötü. Niye herkesin görev süresi 5 sene ben bunun cefasını çekicem de ne olacak bir sonraki belediye başkanı sefasını sürecek. Bundan dolayı belki ülke bir yerlere gitmiyor. Siyasette temelde bir sıkıntı var. Siyaset

kavramından belki bir sıkıntı var. Siyaseti yapan insanlar biraz da siyasetçilerden ziyade halk olmalı diye düşünüyorum. Çünkü ben siyasetçilerin halkla devlet arasındaki köprüyü sağladığını düşünmüyorum. Çünkü yani bir öğretmen bir şey dese mesela işte çocukların şu bakış açısı daha iyi olmalı. Mesela ben öğretmenlik yapıyorum ama bir öğretmen kadar iyi yapabileceğimi düşünmüyorum çünkü çocukların psikolojik geçişlerini nasıl öğretilmesi gerektiğini hangisinin doğru olduğunu ben bilmiyorum ben bir mühendis bakış açısıyla çocuğa öğretiyorum. İşte bak buna çalışman lazım çünkü sınavda çıkacak. Bu doğru mu? Çok da doğru değil aslında. Ama neden o aile beni seçiyor? Çünkü İngilizce bilen az öğretmen var Türkiye’de. Sen daha iyi biliyorsun. Sana vereceğimiz ücret daha makul ve beni seçiyor. Belki siyasetteki sıkıntı bu. Biraz meslek gruplarının konuşabilmesi gerekiyor.

Son birkaç yılda çok fazla seçim yaşadık. Ne düşünüyorsun bu seçimler hakkında? Bir şeyler değişiyor mu ülkede?

Yani biraz israf olarak bakıyorum. Fiziksel israf olarak bakıyorum. Kesinlikle Değişmesi gereken bir durum. Ülkeyi geliştirecek veya dünyayı geliştirecek şeylere yatırım yapılmayıp sürekli idare yönetim kısmına yatırım yapılmasını ben doğru bulmuyorum. Biraz belki mühendis bakış açımdan geliyor olabilir. Yönetim muhabbetini çok gerekli görmüyoruz. Az kişi yönetsin ama bu kadar dışının dıdısı müdür yardımcı bilmem onun yardımcısı bu kadar süreç şey oluyor. Şuradaki halk burada belge verirken arada kayboluyor.

Bir gençlik var Türkiye’de. Sence nasıl bu gençlik. Gençliğin genel özelliklerini nasıl görüyorsun? Sence ne gibi özellikleri var? Eskisinden farkı var mı?

Gençlik nasıl diye düşündüğümde aslında bunu hiç düşünmemiştim. Kesim kesim fark ediyor. Bakıyorum çok boş insanlar var, sokakta geziyor, kitap okumuyor, ders çalışmıyor, film izlemiyor boş duruyor insanı kesiyor bir şeyler yapıyor. Boş insan her kesimde kötü gençte de kötü diğerlerinde de kötü. İşte biraz Türkiye eğitimsel olarak da eksik olduğu için gençleri düzgün yönlendiremiyorlar. Bu seçimlere yapılan yatırım yerine gençlik eğitimleri açılrsa, eğitim merkezleri açılrsa falan fistan o gençler yazın 3

ay boyunca evde sadece televizyon izlemek yerine eğlenceli bir şeylere yönlendirilse daha üretken daha aktif daha dinamik bir insan grubu olur. Gençliğin dinamiği hiçbir zaman bulunamaz. Yapılabilecek bir şey vardır onları sadece genç insanlar yapabilir. Diğerlerinin ya enerjisi yoktur ya düşüncesi yoktur ya da kuşağı yakalayamaz. Y kuşağı x kuşağı dediğimiz kuşaklar çok önemli. Bir yerde Türkiye'nin geleceğini konuşuyorsun teknolojiyi de bileceksin yeni nesili de bileceksin. Gençlere biraz destek verilmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Yanlış bir yere gidiyoruz birçok insan farkında değil. İlerde patlayacak bu.

Farkında olanlar da yapmıyor bir şey. Elle tutulur bir şey göremiyoruz.

Bu hep işte tam özgür olamıyoruz gençler maddi olarak aileye bağlıyız. Diyoruz ki ben bir çıkıntılık yapsam babam kızar evden kovar. Üniversitedeki çocuk diyor ki ben bir çıkıntılık yapsam üniversite beni dava eder. İşte başım belaya girer. Sicilime işler. Hep bir böyle tehditle karşı karşıyayız.

Sen de var mı bu kaygı? Bir şeye itiraz etmek istesen bu kaygıyı taşır mısın?

Bu kaygıyı bazen taşıyabilirim. Çok büyük bir şey olması lazım. Ciddi bir siyasi görüş karşıtı olması lazım. Mesela bizde yurt yapılacak ağaçlar kesilecek. Bu beni korkutmaz. Korkutamaz. Bu şey bir şey savunuyorsun çok doğru bir şey savunuyorsun.

Mesela ODTÜ'de değil de meclisin orada ağaçlar kesilse gider misin?

İşte orada biraz Türkiye gerçekleri ve can tehlikemden dolayı gitmeyebilirim.

ODTÜ'de bunu hissetmiyor musun?

Çok hissetmiyorum. En fazla cop yiyebilirim. Onun haricindeki oluşan Türkiye profili normal yürürken bile kadınlar öldürülüyor ki orada halkımdan korkuyorum polisten falan değil bir insan orada ters düşünce bir adam biranda çılgınlık yapıp bana fiziksel olarak bir şey yapabilir. ODTÜ'de halk açısından öğrenciler açısından bir tehlike görmüyorum. En büyük tehlike polis oluyor. Polisin seni öldürmesi artık çok şey bir şey bence fazla çıkıntılık yapmak değil de ben o seviyeye gelebileceğimi

düşünmüyorum. O kadar coşkulu bir insan değilim. Karşı çıktım kendimi gösterdim. Medya gördü. Tamam. Çünkü bireysel olarak ben oradaki polisle ne kadar kavga edebilirim ki. Amacım ne olabilir. Adam çünkü parayla tutulmuş bir şey yani. Adamın görevi belli. Benim üzerimde o korumalar yok o aletler yok. Polisle bire birçok sürtüşmek bana çok mantıklı gelmiyor. Direk böyle advertising olayı. Kendini ne kadar duyurdun. Nasıl duyurdun ne kadar gündem oldu. Çünkü ülkede gündem olmadığı zaman eziliyorsun. Gündem olmadığı zaman aradaki insan yığına takılıyorsun. Senin verdiği dilekçe ulaşamıyor istek ulaşamıyor ve ya önemi azalıyor.

Mesela sosyal medya üzerinden bu çok yapılıyor. Kadın cinayetleri vs. söz konusu olduğunda. Sen kullanıyor musun sosyal medyayı bu amaçla? Paylaşım yapar mısın?

Evet yaparım. Şule Çet davasında mesela elimden geldiği kadar sosyal medyadan destek vermeye çalıştım.

Sence bir anlamı oluyor mu peki?

Oluyor. Aslında kime ulaştığınla alakalı. Şimdi benim Facebook'ta ulaşabileceğim insan grubu arasında çok cahil insanlar var Adana'dan özellikle gelen. Biliyorum o insanlar duymuyor. Bizim ODTÜ'deki insanlara duyurmana gerek yok onlar zaten biliyor. Bizim hep sıkıntımız şey oldu zaten bir metin yayınlanıyor bir yazı var çok bilgi ama tabii ne oluyor okuması gereken insanlar okumuyor sen ben okuyoruz. Bir şey değişiyor mu değişmiyor. Bunların biraz doğru kişilerle paylaşılması gerekiyor. Ben paylaştığımda evet diyorum ki işte bunu cahil kuzenim görecektir o görecektir bu görecektir. Onları düşünerek aslında paylaşıyorum çünkü onların görmesi gerekiyor. O yüzden gidip de ODTÜ içinde gidip fizikte gidip Şule Çet oldu oraya gidiyor böyle böyle bağırarak... Onlar zaten duyuyor burada görmese başka yerden görülecek.

Mahkeme önüne çağrı yapıldı Şule Çet için sen katıldın mı?

Katılmadım. Burada biraz da görevden kaçış. Makinadan dolayı.

Zamanın olsa katılır mıydın?

Zamanım olsa ya da geçerken görsem katılırdım. Kadınların olduğu kadın ölümleri vs. onlara biraz daha çok destek veriyorum. Diğer şeylerden çok. Diğerleri biraz siyasete kaçıyor. Kadın ölümlerinde de tabi ki siyasi nedenler var ama artık bir yerde kesinlikle doğru bir şeyi savunuyorsun. Çünkü sen orada bir partiyi bir şeyi savunmuyorsun. Bir kadın öldürülmüş. Ortada bir cinayet var. Cinayet toplumun psikolojisiyle ilgili. Ve bu toplum psikolojisi bu böyle gitmez değiştirin. Şeyin köpeklerinin deneyleri gibi. Bir insana ne kadar caydırıcı ceza verirsen ve bunun ne kadar kötü bir şey olduğunu anlatırsan şey olmaz. Bir kadın öldüğünde ona verilen ceza olmamalı. Bir apartmandasın yukarda kavga oluyor biliyorsun ki komşundaki adam kadını dövüyor. Polisi aradığında polis senden bunun kanıtını istememeli. O yüzden ben kadınların olduğu cinayet davalarına denk gelirim zamanım olursa gerçekten destek vermeye çalışıyorum. Adana da bir kere işte yazın hatırlıyorum repeate kalmıştım. Eylül sınavına hazırlanıyordum. Adana'daki kütüphaneye gidiyordum. Adana'daki kütüphaneye gitmek için Adana adliyesinin önünden geçiyorsun. Adana adliyesinde maşallah tam bir olayların olduğu adliye. Her gün bir olay var orada. Kız çocuğunun taciz davası vardı. Onunla ilgili bir kadın grubu pankart falan kaldırılıyordu. Bir anda denk geldim. Sosyal medyada da görmüştüm. Bir anda geçtim pankartı tuttum. Bir yerde kararsız kalamayacağın bir durum. Parti olayları biraz daha kararsız kalabileceğimiz durumlar. O kadar da hayati meseleler değil. Mesele ben bir olaya AKP'yi eleştiren bir gruba destek versem bile ne kadar değişecek ki? AKP bunu biliyor zaten. Bir yerde gerçekten kötü olayların üstüne gitmelisin ki insanlar kötü olduğunu görsün. O yüzden kadın cinayetleri çocuk vakaları falan.

Sen ODTÜ'de öğrencilerin özgürce yaşayabildiklerini düşünüyor musun?

Ben tam düşünmüyorum. Ya çünkü bizim mühendislerin ciddi şey kaygısı var ben mesela şu eylemlere katılırsam görüntülenirsem yarın ASELSAN'a alınırken benim fotoğrafım onlarla match edilir.

Sen korkmuyor musun?

Kokuyorum o yüzden savunduğum şeyin... Mesela kadın savunmasına kimse bir şey diyemez. Aselsan çalışanın bile ben bir şey diyebileceğini düşünmüyorum. Evet, kız doğru bir konuda savunmuş der. Başka olaylar oluyor işte. Örgütlere katılırsak yürüyüşlere katılırsak görüntülerimiz yarın öbür gün oralarda dolandır. Bu korkudan dolayı birçok mühendis öğrencisinin ben siyasi olan topluluklara katılmak yerine hep böyle sıfır siyaset ya iş kariyer iş kariyer de olmak zorunda değil. Onlara falan katılmayı tercih ediyorlar. Bir korku var yani.

Mesela şey okulda bir sürü afiş asılıyor. Hiç dikkatini çekiyor mu nasıl buluyorsun onları ele aldığı konular vs.

Aslında hepsi önemli de dediğim gibi biraz şey olması önemli o konuyu biraz gündem yapabilmek önemli. Bazen düşünüyorum bakıyorum önemli. İşte ona biraz zaman ayırmak gerekiyor. Toplantı oluyor bir şeyler oluyor. İş şeye dönüyor yani Türkiye'nin siyaseti şöyle bir şey bu değiştirilmeli el atılmalı o zaman diyorsun ki abi o zaman ben niye mühendislik okuyorum benim görevim siyaset değil bunu siyaset bölümündekiler düşünsün diyorsun uzaklaşmaya başlıyorsun.

Bu sadece siyaset bölümü öğrencilerinin işi midir diyorsun?

Evet biraz. Orada ilerde işte şu düşünce olmalı konu benim alanıma gelince ben destek vermeliyim diyorsun. Üniversite tam geçiş dönemi. O mesleğini kendinle bütünleştirmeye başlıyorsun. Ben suçuyum ben bucuyum. Bu benimle alakalı mı değil. Olay buna dönüyor. Ben de böyle oluyor.

Ders yükü hakkında ne düşünüyorsun?

Bu bizim bölümün en büyük tartışılan konusu. Bizim hocalar şöyle düşünüyor: biz aynı eğitimi aldık çok iyi eğitim aldık, bu sistemden geçtik, biz Amerika'ya çok iyi en iyi şirketlere gittiğimizde bile bilgi eksikliği hiç çekmedik. Konuşabiliyorduk edebiliyorduk. Mezun olmadan önce bile kendimizi pazarlayabiliyorduk diyor. O yüzden kıyamıyorlar. Yani işte konular hafifletilsin diyor şu konuyu kaldıralım mı deniyor hoca ama onu öğrenmeden olmaz diyor bak yarın biri bir şey der altta kalır

unutursa da şeyi düşünsünler biz bunu öğrenmiştik şu kitaptaydı. Unutacağımızı bile bile müthiş bir eğitim var. Bu eğitim azalırsa bizim Gazi'den ne farkımız kalıyor. Gazi de çok kolay çok straightforward soru sorup geçiyor. Bizim kolaylaştırılırsa bu sefer elimizdeki özelliğimiz gitmiş oluyor. Durability dediğimiz şeyi arttırıyor. Yavaş yavaş oluşan bir yapıyız. Nasıl alışırız öyle gideceğiz. Nasıl şımarık çocuklar para içinde büyüyen çocuklar nasıl alışırız hep öyle devam etmek istiyor fakir hayatı yaşayamaz. Bizim ders açısından da öyle. Ne kadar yükü biz kaldıracak isek iş hayatında o kadar rahat edildiğini görüyoruz veya rahat edilmiyorsa da daha iyi yol alınıp hani diğer insanların 10 sene geldiği yer sen 3 sene geliyorsun.

Fakirler var zenginler var. Bir insanın fakir olması kendi suçu mudur?

Kesinlikle ailemizi kendimiz seçmiyoruz. Tamamen şans. Çocuklar eşit bir şekilde durmuyor. Bazen diyorum annemle babam keşke biraz daha huzurlu olsalardı ben de huzurlu bir şekilde büyüdüm falan ama sonra diyorum ki ben buralara başarılı şekilde gelmem mantıklı düşünmem rahatça insanları eleştirmem belki bu karşılaştığım sorunlardan kaynaklanıyor. Mesela babamla annem kavga ediyor biz işte araya giriyoruz sakinleştirmeye çalışıyoruz tamam durun sen git falan gerektiği zaman ben iki üç kere polisi aradım. Onların eksik yanları da var. O ayrı konu. Sert çam ağaçları soğuk rüzgârda büyür muhabbeti. ODTÜ'de bunu yapmaya çalışıyor. Sert condition veriyor siz buradan survive yaparsanız tamamdır diyor. Sizin strengthiniz yüksek olur. O yüzden artıları var eksileri var.

Ders notlarını paylaşır mısın hiç çalışmadığını düşündüğün biriyle?

Evet ya bu aslında bir insan bunu ne kadar yaptı çünkü insanların şeye hakkı var bu kadar yoğunluk insanların biraz psikolojisini bozuyor. En iyi üniversitelerde en çok intiharlar oluyor Oxford'a bakıldığında ODTÜ'ye bakıldığında. Kaçınıcı intihar oldu. İnsanlar bun alıyor vs. buradan güçlü bir şekilde ayrılalım derken psikolojimiz de kaybetmemiz gerekiyor. Ben mesela diyelim her zaman derse geliyorum bugün gelmedim evde yatasım geldi tatil yapasım geldi çok gerekli işler de yapmadım. Ama böyle bir şey olduğunda ben arkadaşşımdan istediğimde arkadaşşım bana veriyor. Çünkü şeyi biliyor bu kız hani geliyor bu sefer gelmedi gelmediyse gerçekten şey bir

durum var. Tamamen hiç derse gelmiyorsa vermek istemezsin çabalayan insanı ben oldum olası sevmem.

Ortak projeler vs. oluyor. Bunun hakkında ne düşünüyorsun?

Endüstride en sevmediğim olay buydu. Endüstride her şey grup oluyor. Bireysel senin bir şey yapmana izin vermiyor. Her grupta mutlaka adaletsizlik oluyor. Erkek arkadaşım işte dizayn grubu var o öyle çocuk her şeyi yönetiyor ediyor ama grupta bir sürü yapmayan insanlar var. Burada şey de önemli oluyor yöneten insanın buna müsaade etmemesi gerekiyor. Bir yerde müsaade etmese bile bakıyor o onu yapamaz o uygulamayı bilmiyor solid works'ü bilmiyor çizemez. Hani bir yerde nokta buraya geliyorsa o zaman işte grubun hepsi aynı puanı almamalı. Birçok grup ödevinde hep bir şey oluyor 10 puan arkadaş değerlendirmesinden gelir. Birileri gerçekten bir şey yapmıyorsa o 10 puandan almıyor. Ben de mesela intro dersi aldım 4 kişiydik. Birimiz baya yapmadı. Üçümüze ba gelirken çocuğa cb geldi. Bunun nedeni bir yerde acısı çıkıyor. Cb almaya da hakkı yok aslında. İş yerinde de olacak bu. Birileri yatarak alacak o maaşı. Bu adaletsizliğe de biraz ses çıkarmak gerekiyor.

Mezun olduktan sonra aileden daha iyi bir durumda olacağını düşünüyor musun?

Kesinlikle düşünüyorum. Ama hükümeteşel olarak dezavantajları bazı dönemlerde olacak. Ben mesela girmek istediğim TÜBİTAK-SAGE'ye ben değil ama Konya Üniversitesi'nde hiç çaba harcamayan çocuğun alınacağına olacak.

Buna bir şey yapmak gerekmiyor mu?

Şey biraz medeni toplum muhabbeti biraz da oradan geliyor. Diğer ülkelere bakıldığında torpil bu kadar işlemiyor. Tabi bizden daha kötü olanlar da var Azerbaycan bizden çok çok kötü durumda. Onla karşılaştırmıyorum. Doğru duvar yıkılmaz muhabbeti. Bir yerde bununa acısı çıkıyor. Bundan 3 sene önce AKP'liler yerinden fetöcü vardı. Bir sürü üniversitelerden bir sürü öğretim görevlileri hapse girdi. ODTÜ' de değişen bir şey var mıydı? Yoktu. Böyle bir şeyi biz içimize sokmadık böyle bir hataya düşmediğimiz için biz darbeden sonra en ceza almayan en rahat okuyan, sırtı rahat olan, düşüncesi rahat olan üniversite olur. Yarım acısını çekerim belki bir sene belki kötü bir şirkette çalışırım ama öbür gün ben ödülünü

alacağımı düşünüyorum. Ben doğru ve bilgili insanın bir gün hakkı yenilse bile diğer gün ödülünü alacağını düşünüyorum

Devlet memuru olmak mı daha iyi özel sektörde mi?

Ya işte özel sektörün ne kadar kapitalist sistemde çalışmasıyla alakalı bizim hunharca savunma sanayi istemesinin sebebi hiç birimizin adam öldürmek değil hiçbirimiz füze yapalım şu kadar adam öldürelim değil. Tamamen daha şey bir sistem olması kapitalist sistemin pek o şirketlere gelmemesi. Aselsan Roketsan özel şirket. Ama kapitalist bir düzen yok benim duyduğum kadarıyla. İşte benim en yakın insan erkek arkadaşım general elektrik GE dünyanın belki en büyük şirketi olabilir Amerika bazlı tam bir kapitalizm yuvası doğuşu bile GE'den olabilir. Öyle bir şirketteki çalışma temposunu anlatıyor insanları anlatıyor staj yaptı aday mühendis oldu. Şimdi Roketsan'da aday mühendislik yapıyor. Anlatıyor işte roketsan'da çocuk diyor yatıyor bazen instagrama giriyor bazen dinleniyor kendini öyle çok yormuyor psikolojik bir mobbing hissetmiyorsun savunma sanayinde. Buna rağmen diyor onlardan belki bir tık fazla alıyorsun veya aynı alıyorsun. Özel şirkete gittiğin zaman şeysin yani düzen bile yuvarlak bir masa var herkesin bilgisayarını yan yana idari birimlerde arkanda sıralanmış. Sen istemsizce sen onların sana bakıp bakmadığını görmüyorsun hep gözün senin üstünde olduğunu hissediyorsun bu da senin hep bir çalışan psikolojin bozuk olsa bile çalışmak zorunda kalıyorsun. Ciddi bir hiç kimsenin bir şey demesine gerek yok direk mobbing kapitalist sistem kimsenin maaşı belli değil. Ne kadar ürünü hızlı pazarlarsan ne kadar yaparsan sana ne işi geldiğini bile bilmiyorsun. Yanındaki arkadaşına ne iş verildiğini bile bilmiyorsun. Ne kadar para alıyor bilmiyorsun. Onlarda savunma sanayi GE'de savunma sanayi. İkisi de bakıldığında özel. Hangi özel? Ne kadar kapitalist. Kapitalist şirketlere kesinlikle karşı bir insanım. İnsanın psikolojisini bu kadar şey yaparsan yarım öbür gün kafası atar silahı alır Amerika'da sık karşılaşılan bir olay sıkır vurur. Çünkü insanlara sürekli bencillik aşıyorsun. Sensin diyorsun sadece sen diğerleri hiç diyorsun. Bu yarışa sokarsan kaybeden insanın bir gün kafası atar, öldürür yani. Bizdeki kim kimi çat diye toplum olarak taradı ki hep bir ya PKK'dı FETÖ'ydü bilmem neydi böyle tarandı. Bireysel olarak kadınlar öldürüldü. Toplumsal olarak bizim toplum kindar bir toplum değil. Bunun nedeni de Amerika'daki kapitalist sistemin bize tam girmemiş olması.

Kariyer zirveleri vs. oluyor. Sence bir üniversite için önemli etkinlikler mi bunlar?

Ben mesela eskiden verimlilik topluluğuna gitmiştim. Orada biraz gerekli mi gereksiz mi olduğunu içeri girince daha iyi oluyorsun. Onların birçoğu şişirilme etkinlikler. Şirketler kandırılıyor aslında. Topluluk olarak biz şirketleri kandırıyoruz. Diyoruz ki sen gel senin hep 3. 4. Sınıf öğrencilerle alakan olacak. Bak buradan toplayabileceksin. Biz direk ODTÜ öğrencisini onlara pazarlıyoruz. İşte geliyor diyor ki ben bir kâğıt dağıtacağım sadece isim mail kaçınıcı sınıf olduğunu alacağım diyor şirket bizden bunu talep ediyor. Biz tamam diyoruz katılımcılara bunu veriyoruz. Katılanların yarısı zaten topluluk. Ben hazırlıkken bile o kâğıtlara 4.sınıf yazdığımı biliyorum. Sırf gelen şirketi kandırmak için. Neden? O şirket buraya geldiğinde topluluk para kazanıyor. Yani ben hatırlıyorum Bosch geliyor topluluğa 5bin lira veriyor. Mm-25 b-Bosch'a ayarlanıyor. Bosch kendini 4.sınıflarla konuştuğunu zannediyor ama konuştuğu insanlar 1 sınıf. Bu kadarına gerek var mı? Bu kadarına yok ama gerek var mı? Gerek var. Mesela kariyer fuarına gerçekten gerek var. Bir sürü insan oradan staj buluyor. Ve şey olarak aslında bizim zamanımız yok. Ne araştırmaya ne de bir stajın başvurusundaki o formu doldurmak bile bazen o kadar ağır geliyor ki. Yani diyorsun bir dakika ödevim var, ödevi yetiştirmem lazım. Bazen sözlü görüşmeler falan istiyorlar. Kim ayarlayacak randevuyu. O biraz rahatlatıyor yükümüzü. Birebir direk görüşüyorsun direk mailini alıyorsun maile CV'ni atıyorsun. İş daha kolaylaşıyor. Diğer türlü onlar gelmese yüz yüze görüşmesek başka üniversitelerin arasında kaynayacaksın belki. Bu kadar olması bence gereksiz. Kandırıyoruz. Orada işte bizim toplulukların çıkarları oluyor. Hiçbir şirket buraya gelip bedavaya konuşmuyor. CEO ne yapıyor Bosch söyleyiz böyleyiz bize gelin bizde çalışın Türk Traktör geliyor o da aynı şeyi anlatıyor. Gidecek olan insan gidecek zaten. Advertising olarak görüyorlar. Danışmanlık şirketlerine sormak lazım ne kadar işe yarıyor.

Arkadaşlarıyla muhabbetleriniz nelerdir?

Hazırlıktayken biraz daha farklı oluyordu da şu an hep bölüm ne yapacağız ne edeceğiz akademik mi gideceğiz şu ders nasıl bu sınav nasıl artık iyice hayatımız bölüm oldu.

Sosyal medyada haber takip ediyor musun?

Biraz takip etmeye çalışıyorum ama az oluyor.

Gördüğün haberden etkilenir misin?

Çocuk ve kadın haberlerinden baya etkileniyorum hatta bakmasam diye bile düşünüyorum. Bunun muhabbeti yapılıyor mu bölümlerde yapılmıyor. İnsanlar yeterince derdim var daha da dert çekemem diyor. Yakın arkadaşım ile konuşuyorum bazen.

Mühendis olacaksın. Kazdağları'ndaki maden arayan bir şirketin makine mühendisliği kısmında çalışıyorsun. Kazdağları projesinin altına imza atar mısın?

Atmam.

Ama atmazsam belki atılacaksın.

İşte ben bu yüzden çok çalıştım. Çok çalışayım seçme şansım olsun. Ne kadar çok çalışırsam kadar istenen olurum. Ben hep bu kafayla çalıştım. Bir şirkete mecbur kalmak zorunda kalmayayım. Diyelim ki çok çok mecbur kaldım aslında şeye bakarım illa biri atacaksa gerçekten bunun bir çözümü yoksa belki yaparım.

Stadyumda devrim yazması sana bir şey ifade ediyor mu? Başka bir kelime yazsa daha iyi mi olurdu?

Yok devrim yazması iyi. Hoşuma gidiyor. Sorgulatabilme çağrıştırıyor. Sorgulamışsın sistemi. Bunun yanlış olduğunu duyurmuşsun. Bir şeyleri değiştirmişsin veya değiştirmeye çalışmışsın. Kendi çağında da bir devrim olabilir. O koyun gibi yetişmediğimizin göstergesi. O yazıyı her gördüğümde biz koyun değiliz

kim olursa olsun onun yaptıklarını eleştiririz gerekirse değiştirmeye çalışırız. O sana bir özgüven veriyor. Bence iyi bir şey.

-Koronadan sonra gerçekleşen ek görüşme

Genel olarak bu 7 ayda neler yaptın hayatında neler değişti?

Ankara'daydım zaten öğrenci evim vardı o yüzden orada kalma kararı aldım çünkü yıllar öncesinden aile evinden koptuğumuz için hani bir odamız bir şeyimiz falan yok terk edilmiş evlat gibi bir şeyiz. O yüzden de öğrenci evinde kalma kararı aldım derslerim kötü etkilenmesin diye. Sürecin ne olacağı çok belirsizdi. Sürekli son dakika haberi çıkıyor. Gidip de dönmek var sonuçta(gülüşmeler) insanlar sonra çok pişman oldu kitaplarını yanına alamadılar falan çok sıkıntı yaşadılar. O sıralarda doğru bir karar aldığımı düşünüyordum ama sonrasında da maliyet denen bir gerçek var o da zorladı biraz.

Bu dönemde bursların vs. devam etti mi?

Bursum devam etti o yüzden bir sıkıntı olmadı Eczacıbaşı'ndan özel bir burs alıyordum kadın mühendisleri destekleme bursu. Belki küçük bir firma olsaydı sıkıntı yaşayabilirdim. Aldığım bursu ODTÜ bursu olarak geçiyor ODTÜ'nün ayarladığı bir burs. O yüzden 9 ay var. En son haziran ayında yatıyor, o burslardan yani. O biraz beni yazın sıkıntıya sokuyor. Üstüne bir de pandemi olayının olması birçok gelir kapım olan ablam ve anneme de yansdı.

Çalışmadılar mı bu süreçte?

Annem çalışıyordu normalde baklava ustasıydı işleri çok ciddi azaldı küçük esnaf annem. O yüzden sıkıntıya girdi maddiyat olarak.

Ablan dış hekimiydi sanırım.

Evet, ablam diş hekimi. Onların da şöyle bir şey oldu: sadece acil müdahaleler hariç dişlerin yapılmaması kararı alındı pandemide. Doktorların devletteki sistemi şöyle oluyor baya düşük bir temel maaşları var 3 bin gibi. Üstüne hastanenin döner sermayesi ekleniyor. Diş yapmadıkları için hastanenin döner sermayesi olmadı. Öyle olunca 3.5 gibi temel bir maaş aldılar normalde 6-6.5 alıyordu. Filiasyonu yine diş hekimlerden yaptıkları için bir ara ablam filiasyona katılma kararı aldı dönerden bir şey alabilmek için. Gece gündüz filiasyon yapıyorlar gölbaşında ama sadece eski maaşını alabiliyor.

Ankara'dayken neler yaptın?

Pek dışarı çıkmıyordum ilk başlarda. Ful zaten dersimiz vardı ödev, sınav, proje. O da haziranın sonuna kadar sürdü. Sokağa çıkma yasağı kalkınca da çıkmıyordum. Proje yetiştireceğim, ödev yetiştiricem diye sokağa çıkma yasaklarını takip etmiyordum. Sürekli bilgisayarım ve ben. Bir ara bir hafta içinde 4 sınavım vardı Ramazan Bayramından sonra. Ramazan bayramında da 4 gün sokağa çıkma yasağı vardı. Ben dedim ki bu 4 gün eve gömülür ders çalışırım o 4 sınavdan sağ çıkmaya çalışırım diyordum. Sonra bilgisayarım çat diye gitti, bir üzüldüm bir üzüldüm. Uzaktan eğitim bilgisayar elim ayağım. Aksilik oldu. Sonra onu etraftan çözmeye çalıştım. Komşulardan falan istedim. Sokağa çıkma yasağı var apartmanda kapısını çalacağım komşulardan başka kimse yok. Şansıma bir tane bir adam firması varmış 3 tane falan laptopu vardı evinde. Birini bana verdi. O yüzden şanslıydım o yönden. İdare etmeye çalıştım. Ama şey zor oldu bazı mühendislik programlarımız uygulamalarımız oluyor çizim falan onlar falan olmuyor bilgisayarda o beni biraz sıkıntıya düşürdü. Arkadaşlarımın bilgisayarımı falan kullandım, onlar bana geldi onlarınkinden hallettik bazı şeyleri.

Komşulardan başka çalacak kapımız olmuyor dedin ya, bu anlamda kolektif yaşam birbirimize bağlı olmamız korona süreci biraz da öyle bir şeydi ya bireysellik kolektiflik konusunda bir değişiklik oldu mu sence?

Bu süreçte bazı kesimler kısmi olarak daha çok bireysel oldu daha çok içine kapandı. Bazı kesimler de pimpirikli olmayan bu olayı aşırı tuttuğum dalı da siliyim orayı da

amaşır sulayayım amaşır suyuyla banyo yapayım tipler tam tersine kolektiflięi biraz varsa o bile gitti Őu an bireysellięe dnd. Normalde Birikimi varsa kenarda duran arabası yoksa ya ben iŐte metroyla idare ediyorum diyen adam o yatırımı araba alma kararı aldı. Bireysel ben tek başıma gidip geleceęim diyen insanlar ok olmaya başladı. Onun haricinde benim gibi abartılı olmayan tuttuęu dalı silmeyen insanlar komşuların kapısını alma taraftarı oldum. Yeni yeni tanıştıęım komşularım var. apraz komşum avukatmış mesela bilmiyordum.

Yardım etme vs. gibi bir Őey yaptın mı peki?

Biz Őey yaptık ana giriŐte kapı önnde sosyal medyada ok göryrdük yaşıllar varsa yardım edebiliriz gibisinden ona hani biz de girelim muhabbeti yaptık sonra baktık başkası yapmış onun altına numaramızı ekledik. Ama kimse aramadı. ok yaşı yokmuş demek ki onu anladım. O yüzden de sokaęa ıkma yasaęı var marketler kapalı soęana ihtiyacın var soęansız bir Őey olmuyor. Orada komşunun soęanı 50tl dese veririm yani. Ben onun soęanına o benim tuzuma muhta oluyor. O yüzden de komşuculuk eski usul gelmeye başladı ama bu dedięim gibi tam tersi olan insanlar da var normalde böyle olup pandemi dneminde kapısını amayan insanlar da var. Korkuyor ünkü. Muhatap olmak istemiyor. Öyle yani ama yine de genel anlamda kolektiflik daha ok arttı. Bir kiři bireyselleŐiyorsa üç kiři kolektifleŐiyor.

Trkiye'nin ierisinden getięi sreci nasıl deęerlendiriyorsun? Nasıl mcadele ediyoruz koronavla?

Őyle bundan 2 senence Amerika'ya Work and Travel'a gitmiştim. Saęlık sorunu onun kanayan yarası eskiden beri bilinen bir Őeydi bu ama önceden de gittięimde Őeyi fark etmiştim biz gerçekten ucuza ok güzel saęlık hizmeti alıyormuşuz. Doktorlarımız bizim ok iyiymiş gerçekten. Bunun aslında en büyük sebebi de Amerika'daki doktorların kötü olmasından ziyade Amerika her Őeyi böyle ben sana dava aarım dava ederim tarzında bir lke olduęu iin Almanya'da Őey de Avrupa lkeleri de böyle daha modern sosyal lke dedięimiz lkelerde doktor ok topa girmiyor. Doktor sen idrar yolları yaşamışsın diye bir tahmini var ama belki deęildir hani belki beni dava eder diye kendi üstüne sorumluluk almak istemiyor. Bizde

doktorlar böyle değil eskiden beri abi bak sende şöyledir biz şöyle yapalım böyle yapalım yanlış bir şey olduğunda da biz de doktorun üzerine çok fazla ekşimedik. Ben de zamanında birebir yaşadım bunu. Tümörüm vardı düzenli olarak görünüyordum yenilenme durumu vardı. Bakıyordu bir şey yok bir şey yok diyordu görmüyordu. Bir ara bir rahatsızlandım bir bakmışız ki daha farklı bir yerde konumlanmış 12 cm boyutunda kocaman bir tümörüm varmış. Ama gidip de doktora sen bunu görmedin ben seni dava edeceğim demedim. Yani çünkü o da bir insan, göremeyebilir. Makineler çok iyi değil vs. o yüzden biz toplum olarak birbirimizin açığını kapatan bir toplumduk eskiden beri. Bu pandemi döneminde biraz işe yaradı. Ablamdan duyduğum bu pandemi hastalarına verilen ilaçlar var. Bazı ilaçların normalde günlük 8 tablet falan içilmesi gerektiğini söylüyormuş ablamgiller. 8 tablet içmek demek böbrek ve karaciğerini 1 ay sonra çöpe at demek gibi bir şey oluyor. Onlar o süreç çok odaklanmışlar. Atlatsınlar diye. Görüyorlar yani bu hasta ölecek içmezse diye. Bizim doktorlar bunun altına giriyorlar. Bir şekilde bunu açıklıyorlar da bunun sıkıntısı olabilir ama senin durumun kritik bunu iç diyorlar. Amerika'da bunu yapmıyor olabilirler.

Alınan önlemler açısından yeterli mi Türkiye?

Yeterli değil önlem açısında. Şu an ekonomisi ayakta dursun diye birçok şeye müsaade ediliyor. Evet, gerçekten onlar tutunamasa biz de tutunamayacağız. Bir yerde o işlerin yürümesi gerekiyor. Bir yerde şehirlerarası insanların seyahat etmesi gerekiyor anası babası var işleri var. Bazı işler gerçekten beklemiyor ama insanlar şu an fütursuzca eğleniyor. Temel ihtiyaçtan ziyade artık eğlence sektörüne biraz dur denmesi lazım. Eğlence sektöründen de para yiyen insanlar var o insanlar için temel ama o insanlar için bütçe ayrılması gerekiyor. Tamam, buradaki restorandaki adam uzaktan yemek sepeti yoluyla hayatını sürdürebilir ama düğün salonu işi yapan bu sektör kapatılınca yiyecek ekmek bulamaz yemek sepetiyle falan da kurtaramaz o adam. O adam için hayati olduğu için ona destek çıkılması gerekiyor. Devletin bütçe ayırması gerekiyor. Sağlık sektöründe doktorlar olarak şanslıyız. Ama bu şu anki hükümetin yaptığı bir yatırım değil bizim yıllardan beri çok fazla doktorumuz ve bu yönde bir emeğimiz var. Sağlık sektörüne direk önem veren bir toplumuz. Şu anki lüks hastaneler olmasa bile benim dedem de doktordu zamanında kapı kapı gezip insanlara hizmet veriyormuş.

Sađlıđa bir ilgimiz var Őaman kltrndendir belki. Őu an devletin yatırımları olarak baŐarısız olarak grmyorum ama biraz saraya verilen o kadar personelin biraz kısılması gerekiyor, gereksiz. Cumhurbaşkanlıđı sarayının ktphanesine gittiniz mi bilmiyorum ama adım baŐı personel, bir kiŐiye 5 personel dŐyor. Ben dergi kısmına girdim mkemmel ilgi, mkemmel hizmet var. Byle bir hizmet yok, ben hayatımda hiŐ byle hizmet grmemiŐtim. Kadın peŐimi bırakmıyor, ben size yardım edeyim diyor. Teknoloji dergilerine bakmıŐtım dedim kadın o rafa gidiyor bu rafa gidiyor nme 10 tane dergi serdi falan. Mkemmel bir ilgi var ama boŐ duran kiŐi baŐı 5 tane eleman var. Onların maaŐından kısılıp onlar ŐalıŐmıyor bir yararı yok boŐ duruyorlar gidip daha yararlı olacak mesleklere verilmesi gerekiyor. Őu an đretmenlerin maaŐını kesmek yerine đretmen dediđin toplumu byten kesim onlardan kesmek yerine saraydaki personel sayısı azaltılsın. Devletin kendi kiŐiselliđinden Őıkıp artık biraz daha halka btŐe ayırması gerekiyor. İban gndermemesi gerekiyor. Bu arada ona da kızmadım aslında. Daldan dala atlıyor olabilirim ama. Bizim Trkiye’de iŐler adamcı yryor ya. Hkmet baŐa geldiđinde en az altında beslenen 20 tane Őirket oluyor. Vakıfbank, Halkbank, bilmem bir Őey holdingleri... Bu Őirketlerin hkmetle yakın olması gerekiyor ihaleleri vs. alabilmek iŐin. Orada aslında Tayyip’in yaptıđı gzel bir Őey. İban atarak kydeki adamın danasını istemiyor adam aslında istediđi Őey ben byle bir Őey yapıyorum alttan benden beslenen Őirketler sıkıyorsa katkı yapmayın, buyurun efendim yapın. Orada bir yarıŐ yapıyor. Vakıfbank mutsuz bir Őekilde 50 milyon TL bađıŐ yapıyor adam. Sıkıyorsa yapma yarın ihalelerde grŐecek. Bu Őey gibi ođlum evleniyor adamlar durun cumhurbaşkanının ođlu evleniyor biz Őu kadar bilezik takalım. Bu tamamen aynı muhabbet. O yzden iban atmasının en byk yararı bunlar. Byle Őirketler elini cebine atıyor. Devletten Őıkmasından Őirketlerden Őıkıyor. Zamanında devletin parasını yemiŐ Őirketler bunlar zaten. O parayı bir Őekilde geri gnderiyor. Burada benim kızdıđım zaten 3 kuruŐ paran var dananı niye veriyorsun. Biraz halk biraz safa geliyor. Bırakın byk Őirketler yarıŐa girsin. Vakıfbank veriyor, Ziraat de yapıŐtırıyor biraz ufaktan sidik yarıŐı ben yararlı buldum. GeŐen benzerini Őeyde de yaptık 1 Eyll’de av yasađı kalktı ya Karadeniz’e gidip hayırladılar kurdele kestiler falan. 1 kasa balıđı kendisi mi tutmuŐ, bindiđi tekne mi tutmuŐ ama sanki Tayyip tutmuŐ gibi satılıyor o anda bir kasa balık. Ben byle anlam veremedim bunlar neye 1 milyon 700 veriyor. Orada hkmetten beslenen Karadenizli olan bazı firmalar var genelde mteahhit firmaları Karadeniz’de olduđu iŐin. Orada iŐte aa Tayyip gelmiŐ

yanında bulunalım yalnız bırakmayalım diye oradalar. Sonra adam hazır iş adamları gelmiş biz bunlardan nasıl para koparıyoruz deyip orada random bir tane balık satıyor. 5 saat daha durursa bozulacak bir şeyi 1 milyon 700 bine sattı. Orada bilmem ne şirketine verdi. O şirketin olayı zaten ihalelelerden hazineden beslenen bir firma. Aslında böyle atakları şirketlerin önüne attıkları yemi seviyorum sıkıyorsa yapma ben ortaya koyuyorum açtım kasayı falan muhabbeti. Biz halk olarak bunu üstümüze alınmamız gerekiyor çok fazla cumhurbaşkanı aşkıyla dolmamız gerekiyor.

Peki, tüm bu sürecin sonunda memleketin geleceğinde bir şeyin değişeceğini düşünüyor musun?

Çok düşünmüyorum açıkçası. Birbirimize biraz kolektif olarak yardımlaştık ettik ama bu süreç yeni bir pandemi olmazsa, biterse en fazla bir iki sene sürer. Ekonomiler belki çatlayabilir, zarar görebilir. Belki tekrar toparlanır. Genç nüfusu çok fazla kaybetmediğimiz sürece ekonomide çok da değişen bir şey yok. Yaşlı nüfusun ekonomiye zaten çok büyük bir katkısı yok. En fazla maddi zorluklar çekeriz ama 1-2 sene sonra 2019 da neyse ona döneriz gibi geliyor.

Herhangi bir parti değişimi yönetim değişimi olacağını düşünüyor musun?

Şu anki cumhurbaşkanının da bir ömrü var. Tekrar seçilse bile son 5-6 yılı olabilir. Yani aslında pandemi bitip bir değişimler olması bu adamın başımızdan gitmesi aynı döneme denk gelebilir diye düşünüyorum. İlla bir ara değişecek siyaset olarak değişecek. Cumhurbaşkanı sonuçta bir robot değil ömrü var gidecek. Yerine birileri gelecek. Kim gelecek, nasıl gelecek bilmiyorum. Bunun pandeminin hemen arkasına olacağını düşünmüyorum çünkü reklam yapmayı çok iyi beceren veya diğer reklamların çok güzel önünü kesen bir hükümet var karşımızda. O yüzden ben pandemi bittiğinde 2021’de bir erken seçim olursa ben yine bir değişiklik olacağını düşünmüyorum. Zaten bunun en büyük şeyi sürekli doğu Akdeniz milliyetçilik falan bakın biz şöyle yapıyoruz biz böyle vatanseveriz reklamları falan belki içi dolu belki içi boş ama reklam yapıldığında sonuçta insanlar etkileniyor. Ben bile etkileniyorum bazen Yunanistan kim köpek falan diyorum bazen (gülüşmeler)

Çok genç nüfusu olan bir ülke bunları kaybetmediğimiz sürece ekonomimiz düzelebilir dedin ya yurtdışına gitmek istiyor musun? Kalıcı olmak istiyor musun? 2-3 hafta önce sevgilimden ayrıldım bunun sebebi de onun yurtdışına gitmek istemesi benim istemem. Yakın zamanda istemediğim içindi daha doğrusu. Aslında bizim yıllardır olan mesela geçende ODTÜ yeni öğrenciler için reklam yaptı mezunlarımız bu kadar yurtdışında falan Kanada'da 5 bin Amerika'da 6 bin gibisinden böyle sayılar var güzel haritalandırmışlar. Bizim ODTÜ'de ekonominin çok daha kötü olduğu zamanlarda bile darbe olduğu zamanlar bile bizim hocalar helal olsun iyi cesaret bir şekilde gitmişler yurtdışına kendilerini geliştirmişler. Biz teknoloji olarak sınırlı bir ülkeyiz kendini ülkende geliştiremezsin akademik düşünen insanlar akademik çünkü hep yeni bir şeyler icat edeceğim yeni buluşlar yapacağım diyen insanlara göre Türkiye pek uygun değil. Benim erkek arkadaşımın çatıştığımız nokta çeliştığımız nokta burasıydı. O akademik düşünen ve yeni bir şeyler yapmak isteyen bir insandı. Ben bugüne kadar çok şey bulunmuş bunlar topluma ne kadar geçmiş olay asıl bu. Zaten şu ana kadar bulunanları topluma geçirmek biraz daha hayata geçirme kısmında aktif olacağımı düşünüyorum. Yurtdışına gitmeyi düşünmüyor değilim, düşünüyorum. Çünkü çok güzel işler yapılıyor bazı şirketlerde. Ama biz ilk mezun olduğumuzda biraz eğitim alma döneminde oluyoruz. 2-3 sene belki şirkette sürekli bir şeyler öğreniyoruz. Biz Türk milleti olarak daha doğrusu Türkiye'de yaşayan millet olarak daha doğrusu birbirimize çok yardımcı oluyoruz şirketlerde de. Amerika'da küçük bir işte de çalışsan insanlar orada bir kez anlatıyor asla tekrar etmiyorlar bencil insanlar. Kendilerine de öyle. Sadece sen yurtdışından geldiğin için değil. Birbirlerine yardımcı olup bir şeyler öğretmeye çalışmıyorlar. Bahsettiğim ülkeler Küba falan değil tabi ki Amerika Almanya falan daha kapitalist ülkeler. Ama bizim ülkede bir şirkete girdiğimde ben ya Hasan abi sen şu sorunu nasıl hallettin, meral teyze sen şunu nasıl yaptın diye rahatça sorabiliyoruz. Birbirimize biraz daha yardımcı olan bir milletiz, bencil kindar bir toplum değiliz.

O süreci burada yaşayıp öyle mi gitmek istiyorsun?

Evet, burada yaşayayım bir. Türkiye'nin şeyini de görmek istiyorum gerçekten katlanılmayacak bir ülke mi, gerçekten aldığım para bu kadar mı uçacak hiçbir şey yapamayacak mıyım? En azından bir tatmak istiyorum tavsiyelerle yola çıkmak

istemiyorum. Bir yaşayarak görmek istiyorum o yüzden de hemen çıkmak istemiyorum. Baktım gerçekten olmuyor, dedikleri gibiymiş. O zaman gideyim derim. Ama en azından tecrübeli gideceğim için... Gittiğimizde de 3. 4. Sınıf vatandaş oluyoruz. Bunu çok yerde görüyoruz belki en az yaşayacağımız yer Amerika veya Kanada olabilir. Oralarda Türk olduğun için kötü muamele görmüyorsun ama yurtdışından geldiğin için ve hani şey düşünüyorlar sen zaten bizim ülkemize, paramıza muhtaçsın gözüyle bakıyor. Orada kendi vatandaşından 1 bekliyorsan senden 3 bekliyorlar bu o kadar bilinen bir gerçek ki. Oradaki vatandaşlar gibi hiçbir zaman olmayacaksın.

Bunlarda seni ilk olarak burada denemeye mi itiyor?

Sen her zaman daha çok çalış, sana öğretmeye çalışmayacaklar belki burada bir günde öğreneceğin şeyi orada bir haftada, bir ayda deli gibi kendi başına çabalayarak öğreneceksin, birileri sana destek olmayacak. Yeni mezun biri olarak ben iş hayatını düşünüyorum insanları yurtdışındakileri düşünüyorum beni neden alsın tecrübesiz, deneyimsiz bir insanım. Şu anda böyle bir şeyim yok açıkçası belki ilerde olursa bilmiyorum. Baktım ülke gerçekten kötüye gidiyor, siyasi olarak çukura girdik çıkamıyoruz o zaman olabilir.

Ülke siyasi olarak çukura girdiği zaman bu çukurdan çıkmak herhangi bir mücadelenin yeterli olmayacağını düşündüğün için mi yurtdışına gitmek istiyorsun? Doğru mu anladım?

Yani aslında şöyle tamamen bir şey yapabilecek miyim ben eğer bir şey yapamayacaksam... Ama eğer bir şey yapıp kurtarabileceksek dururum neden durmayayım zamanında insanlar canlarını vermiş bu topraklar için satmamışlar vs. hani biz neden yapmayalım ama. Baktım ki olmuyor benim çabalarım veya birkaç kişinin çabasıyla bir şey değişmiyorsa o zaman gitmek isterim. Ama kastettiğim siyasi çukur ülke savaşa gidiyor ülkeyi kaybedeceğiz insanlar ölecek falan kastettiğim bu değil, kastettiğim ekonomik kriz. Ekonomik krizde hani sadece içerde biz çabalarız acıyı çekeriz geçer biter zamanında çok fazla krizde oldu böyle oluyor içerdeysen o krizi yaşıyorsun zorluklar yaşıyorsun zamanla geçiyor ama geçtiğinden sen 60-70

yaşında oluyorsun olan sana olabiliyor. Sadece ekonomik bir krizse giderim ama ülkeyi savunmak, savaşmak gerekiyorsa o zaman gidilmez evet. Orada biraz daha vicdanen olay hani milliyetçi ülkücü olmaya gerek yok yaşadığımız topraklar biraz bağımız olması gerekiyor. Benim de açıkçası var yok diyemem. O zaman tabi dururum. Ekonomik kastettiğim.

D. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Tüm dünyanın radikal ve hızlı bir şekilde değiştiği ve dönüştüğü günümüzde “tüm toplumsal yeniden üretim süreçlerinin kavşağında” (Furlong ve Cartmel, 2007:3) yer alan gençlerin yaşam deneyimleri ve kurdukları tüm ilişkiler de buna paralel olarak değişmekte ve dönüşmektedir. 1980'li yıllarda uygulanmaya başlanan neoliberal ekonomik modelin yarattığı yeni emek rejimine ve bu rejime eşlik eden ideolojik, siyasi ve kültürel iklime bakmak, günümüz gençliğinin yaşam deneyimlerini anlamak ve onun özelliklerini ortaya koymak açısından hayati önem taşımaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, gençliği ve siyaset alanıyla ilişkisini ve içinde yaşadıkları toplumun dönüşümlerini ele almayı amaçlayan bu tez çalışması üniversite gençliği içinde yer alan ODTÜ mühendislik öğrencilerinin neoliberal otoriter bir rejim altında siyaseti nasıl tanımladıklarını, siyasal alanını nasıl algıladıklarını ve siyasal alanla kurdukları ilişkinin karakteristiğini incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu kapsamda, Türkiye'nin başkenti Ankara'da bulunan ODTÜ Mühendislik Fakültesi'nde okuyan 20 öğrenci ile yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine görüşme gerçekleştirilmiştir.

5 farklı bölümden oluşan bu tezin giriş bölümünde gençlik çalışmaları alanında gençlerin siyasete katılımı ile ilgili teorik yaklaşımlar özetlenmekte ve tezin amacından, öneminden ve araştırma yönteminden bahsedilmektedir. Türkiye'de gençliğin siyasetle kurduğu ilişki hem niceliksel ve niteliksel olarak önemlidir. TÜİK'in 2021 verilerine göre bugün Türkiye'de 12 milyon 893 bin 750 genç yaşamaktadır.¹¹² Diğer bir deyişle, Türkiye nüfusunun %15,4'ü 15-24 yaş arası gençlerden oluşmaktadır. Gençlerin sayısının diğer ülkelere göre oldukça fazla olduğu Türkiye'de gençlerin siyasete katılımı önemli bir konudur. Üniversite gençliği ise Türkiye'deki genç nüfusun önemli bir bölümünü oluşturmaktadır. 2019-2020 eğitim öğretim yılında yükseköğretim net kayıt oranı %43,4'tür. Bu, Türkiye'deki genç nüfusun neredeyse yarısının üniversitelerde okuduğu anlamına gelmektedir. Aynı zamanda, gençliğin siyasete en fazla dahil olduğu 1950-1980 yılları arasında üniversite

¹¹² (TÜİK Instutive, 2021)

gençliği önemli bir rol oynamıştır. O dönemin gençlik hareketinin ve Türkiye siyasetinin belirleyicisi olmuştur. Bu nedenle günümüz üniversite gençliğinin siyasetle ilişkisinin karakterini anlamak, neoliberal otoriter süreçlerin gençlik ve kurduğu ilişkiler üzerindeki etkilerini ortaya koymak açısından da önemlidir. Bu çalışmanın alan araştırmasının gerçekleştirildiği ODTÜ, Türkiye'nin toplumsal mücadele tarihinde kritik bir yere sahiptir. Bir bakıma, ODTÜ tarihi bir toplumsal mücadeleler tarihidir. 1950'li yıllarda artan toplumsal mücadele ile birlikte gençlik mücadelesi ODTÜ bünyesinde gelişmeye ve güçlenmeye başlamıştır. Bugün gençliğin siyasetle ilişkisinin karakterindeki farklılığın ortaya çıkarılmasında ODTÜ önemli bir alan oluşturmaktadır. Bu anlamda ODTÜ'de gelişen gençlerin mücadele deneyimlerine bakmak, dönemin siyasal alanını ve gençlerin siyasete bakış açısını anlamak için önemli bir örnektir. Mevcut ODTÜ öğrencilerinin siyasete ve siyaset alanına yönelik algı ve tutumlarını anlamak, neoliberal dönüşümün gençlik üzerindeki etkilerini anlamak için de çok önemlidir. Bugün Türkiye'deki birçok üniversiteden farklı olarak ODTÜ, siyasi hayatın devam ettiği bir üniversite olduğu için bu çalışma için özel bir anlam taşımaktadır. Öğrenciler herhangi bir siyasi organizasyona dahil olmasalar bile diğer üniversitelerdeki öğrencilere göre çeşitli siyasi örgütlerin afişlerini görebilir, bildirilerini okuyabilir ve onlar hakkında daha fazla bilgi sahibi olabilirler. ODTÜ'nün gündelik hayattaki siyasal faaliyetin gençliğin siyasal bakış açısına etkisinin incelenmesi açısından da kritik bir alan araştırma alanı olduğu düşünülmektedir. Bu yüzden tezin saha alanı olarak ODTÜ seçilmiştir. Mühendislik yüksek statülü bir meslek olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu fakültede okuyan öğrencilerin mezuniyete yakın yıllarda güvensizlik tehdidini nasıl algıladıkları ve işsizlik tehdidinin siyasete bakışını nasıl etkilediği önemli bir bakış açısı olabileceği düşünülmektedir. Ayrıca piyasanın teknik eleman yetiştirme anlayışına uygun eğitim sisteminden en çok mühendislik fakültesi öğrencilerinin etkilendiği düşünülmektedir. Tüm bunlar göz önünde bulundurularak çalışma ODTÜ mühendislik fakültesi öğrencileri ile gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde, 1950'lerden günümüze gençliğin siyaset alanıyla ilişkisinin tarihsel gelişimi ortaya koyulmaktadır. Bu bölümde ilk olarak gençlik hareketinin en örgütlü olduğu 1950'lerden 1980'lere kadar olan süreç gençlerin mücadele gündemleri, pratikleri ve siyasal alanla kurdukları ilişki bağlamında incelenmekte ve bu zaman diliminde gerçekleşen gençlik hareketleri dönemin siyasi,

ekonomik ve siyasi gelişmeleri ile birlikte ele alınmaktadır. Günümüzde gençliğin politik alanla kurduğu ilişkideki değişimin anlaşılabilmesi açısından gençliğin politik örgütlülüğünün en yüksek olduğu bu dönem gençlik mücadelesi açısından incelenmiştir. 1950'lerle başlayan ve 1980'e kadar devam eden yılların en önemli özelliği günümüzden farklı olarak tüm toplumun Türkiye tarihinde hiç olmadığı kadar siyasallaşması ve siyasal alana dahil olmasıdır. Gençlik bu dönemde toplumun tüm kesimleriyle birlikte mücadele etmiş, eğitim alabilme şansına sahip azınlık olarak ülkenin sorunlarına "ülkenin geleceği" olma sorumluluğuyla sahip çıkmıştır. Gençlik mücadelesinin bu dönemde gündemlerini anti- emperyalizm ve bağımsızlık mücadelesi oluşturmuştur. Demokratik ve özgür üniversite mücadelesi veren gençlik, tüm Türkiye'nin sorunu olarak tanımlanan gündemleri kendi gündemleriyle birleştirmiş ve toplumun politizasyonunda ana aktörlerden biri haline gelmiştir. Bu dönemin gençliğin örgütlenme formlarını siyasi partilerden siyasi dernekler ve örgütler oluşturmaktadır. Bu dönemde seçimlere katılım oranlarının giderek azalması önemli bir noktadır. Toplumun bu kadar politize olduğu bir zamanda, ortaya çıkan bu sonuç şaşırtıcı gibi görünse de temelde bu durumun iki önemli nedeni vardır. Birinci neden, yaşanan siyasi, politik ve ekonomik krizlerin etkisiyle Türk toplumunun meclise ve siyasi partilere olan güveninin azalmasıdır. İkinci neden, toplumun siyasi katılımı için başka araçların ve talepleri için mücadele edebileceği başka kanalların var olmasıdır. Seçimlere odaklı bir şekilde ilerleyen günümüz siyasetinin geçmişe göre farkı da bu nedenlerde ortaya çıkmaktadır. Günümüzde, geçmişle benzer şekilde siyasi partilere ve temsilcilerine güven azalmıştır. Ancak hali hazırda başka bir alternatif olmadığı ya da oluşturulamadığı için seçimler ve sandıklar, itirazların dile getirilmesi için tek adres haline gelmiştir. Bu durumun üzerinde yaşanan otoriterleşme sürecinin etkisi göz ardı edilemez. Otoriter yönetim pratiklerinin iyice ağırlaştığı günümüz Türkiye'sinde itirazları ve tepkileri dile getirmenin en güvenilir aracını seçimler oluşturmaktadır. Bu sebeple Türkiye'de politikaya katılımın diğer türlerinde belirgin bir azalma olsa da gençlerin seçimlere katılımı pek çok Avrupa ülkesine göre hala yüksektir. Bu noktada toplumun sözünü söyleyip taleplerini iletebileceği kanalların var olmasının gençliğin ve tüm toplumun politikaya katılımı üzerindeki olumlu etkisi göz ardı edilemez. Darbe sonrası özellikle muhalif örgütlü kesimlere uygulanan baskılar, yaygın tutuklama ve gözaltılar örgütlenmenin ve siyasal alanın tehlikeli bir alan olarak algılanmasına sebep olurken, bir yandan da neoliberalizmin kendi

ideolojisi, deęerleri ve depolitizasyon politikaları etrafında siyasal ve toplumsal yaşamı yeniden yapılandırması sonucunda siyasal örgütlenmenin öneminde ve deęerinde olumsuz bir dönüşüme neden olmuştur. Bu dönemden sonra toplumsal kesimlerin siyasi örgütlenmelerden uzaklaşmaya başlamıştır. Yaşanan durum sadece üniversite gençliğine özgü olmayıp toplumun genelinde gözlemlenmektedir. 1980'lerden sonra gelişen süreçte sadece gençlere deęil tüm topluma uygulanan bilinçli depolitizasyon politikaları sonucunda bugünkü tablo ortaya çıkmıştır. Ancak depolitizasyon politikalarının başarılı olduğunu söylemek ve yeni gençliğin apolitik bir gençlik olduğu sonucuna varmanın yanlış olduğu iddia edilmektedir.

Neoliberal otoriterleşme sürecinin gençlerin siyasal alana ilişkin tanımlarını ve algılarını deęiştirdiđi açıktır. 1980 sonrası gençlerin siyasetle ilişkisinde yaşanan deęişim birçok çalışmada apolitikleşme olarak deęerlendirilmiştir. Ancak alan araştırmasının bulgularının da gösterdiđi gibi, gençler siyasal alanla mesafeli bir ilişki sürdürmekle birlikte siyaseti takip etmekte ve siyasal alanın temsilcileri üzerinde kendi görüşlerini oluşturmaktadır. Bu durum AKP'nin popülist bir parti olarak deęerlendirilmesi vb. birçok örnekte gözlemlenebilmektedir. AKP döneminde yaşanan otoriterleşmenin gençlerin siyasete yönelmelerinde bir etken olabileceđi göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır. Gençlerin günlük yaşamlarında giderek daha fazla otoriter politikalara maruz kalmaları, hayatlarını etkileyen politika ve politikaları izlemelerine neden olmaktadır. Türkiye'deki gençlerin diđer ülkelere göre daha yüksek oy oranlarına sahip olması da bununla bağlantılı görünmektedir. Bu tez kapsamında yapılan görüşmelerde gençlerin tamamı oy kullandığını ifade etmiştir. Dikkate alınması gereken bir diđer nokta da muhalefetteki gençlerin oy kullanmaya önem vermesi ve otoriter bir yönetim altında AKP'ye muhalefetini onlara ifade etmenin en güvenilir yolunun oy kullanmak olmasıdır. Türkiye'de 1980 yılında neoliberalizme geçişle başlayan ve son 20 yılda AKP iktidarı ile hızlanan siyasal, ekonomik ve siyasal yapılarıdaki deęişim, tüm toplum ve siyaset arasındaki ilişki açısından bir kırılma noktası olmuştur. Dolayısıyla günümüzde ODTÜ öğrencileri ile siyaset arasındaki ilişkinin karakterini belirleyen temel unsurun neoliberal otoriterizmin şekillendirdiđi ideolojik, siyasal ve kültürel iklim olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

Bu kapsamda tezin 3. Bölümünde ODTÜ gençliğinin siyasal alanı nasıl tanımladıklarını, siyasal alanın ve temsilcilerinin gençler tarafından nasıl algılandığını,

siyasal gündemlerinin temel meseleleri yapılan saha araştırmasının bulgularından doğru incelenmektedir. Gençlik çalışmaları alanında, neoliberal dönüşümle birlikte gençliğin apolitik bir gençliğe dönüşmesi üzerine birçok tartışma yapılmıştır. Neoliberal otoriter dönüşümün gençlik ve siyaset arasındaki ilişkinin karakterini değiştirdiği bir gerçektir ancak bu tezde ortaya çıkan ilk sonuç, ODTÜ gençliğinin günümüzde apolitik gençlik olarak nitelendirilemeyeceğidir. Gençler siyaseti takip etmekte, siyaset sahnesindeki gelişmelerden haberdar olmakta ve siyaset sahasının temsilcileri hakkında kendi görüşlerini oluşturmaktadır. Günümüz ODTÜ gençliğinin siyasal alanın bilgisine sahip olduğu, onu takip ettiği ve kendi görüşleri çerçevesinde yorumladığı görüşülen kişilerin tezde yer verilen açıklamalarından görülmektedir. Giriş kısmında yer verilen gençlik çalışmaları literatüründeki bir başka tartışma gençliğin siyasal gündemlerinin geleneksel olmayan gündemlerle yer değiştirdiğine ilişkin argüman üzerinden ilerlemektedir. Bu tartışmalar kapsamında bakıldığında ODTÜ gençliğinin hem geleneksel hem de geleneksel olmayan siyasi gündemlere sahip olduğu görülmektedir. Tarihsel rekorlar kıran genç işsizliği, ekonominin genel hali ve neoliberal sistemin yarattığı esnek, parçalı, güvencesiz emek rejimi gibi gündemler gençliğin günümüzün sorunları olarak tanımladıkları konulardır. Mezunların nispeten daha kolay iş bulabildiği ve daha iyi maaş alabildiği ODTÜ'de bile gençlerin gelecek kaygısının çok yüksek olduğunu ve ekonominin genel durumunun ana gündemlerinin başında geldiği görülmektedir. Buradan da anlaşılacağı üzere gençliğin siyasi gündemleri hala geleneksel siyasi gündemleri barındırmaktadır. Aynı zamanda birçok öğrenci kadın hakları, çevre hakları, LGBTİ+ hakları gibi gündemlerden bahsetmektedir. Buradan da anlaşılacağı üzere ODTÜ gençliğinin siyasi gündemleri hem geleneksel hem de geleneksel olmayan siyasi gündemleri içermektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında ODTÜ gençliğinin siyasi gündemlerinin 1980 öncesi gençliğe göre tamamen değiştiği söylenemez. Ancak siyasi gündemlerinin genişlediği gözlemlenmektedir. Hatta, literatürün aksine, Türkiye gençliği için mevcut ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi kriz altında gençlerin siyasi gündemlerinde geleneksel gündemlerin ağırlık kazandığını iddia etmek mümkündür.

ODTÜ gençliğinin siyasi alan tanımına bakıldığında meclisteki siyasi partileri sınırlı olduğu görülmektedir. Bu algı, toplumu depolitize etmeyi ve siyaset alanını sadece parlamento ile sınırlandırmayı hedefleyen neoliberal politikaların bir sonucudur. ODTÜ öğrencileri siyasi partileri ve gençlik örgütlerini diğer üniversitelere göre

meclis dışında daha fazla görse de bu hareketlerin etkili ve yaygın olmaması, ODTÜ öğrencilerinin siyasi alanı da meclisteki siyasi partilerle sınırlı olarak tanımlamasına neden olmuştur. Dünyadaki genel eğilime paralel şekilde ODTÜ gençliğinin siyasi alanın temsilcisi olan siyasi partilere güvenmemektedir.

İktidar ya da muhalefet (AKP ya da CHP) fark etmeksizin siyaset arenasını ODTÜ gençliği tarafından çıkar ilişkilerinin egemen olduğu ve ortak çıkar yerine kişisel çıkarların gözetildiği yoz bir alan olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Muhalefetin son dönemdeki eylemlerinin (ideolojisinden vazgeçme vb. gibi) muhalefete oy kazandırabileceğini düşünmelerine rağmen bu durumun kendisinin gençler açısından muhalefetin yaşamak istedikleri ülkeyi kurabilecek bir alternatif olarak görmemelerine sebep olmaktadır. Gençlerin parlamento dışı sol hakkındaki bilgileri oldukça yüzeysel ve yetersiz olduğu görülmektedir. Parlamentodaki partilere ve politikacılara göre sol politikacılara daha olumlu baktıklarını söylemek mümkün ancak genel eğilim olarak siyasal olarak etkisiz olduklarını bu yüzden bir alternatif olmadıklarını düşünmektedirler. Ancak ikinci bölümde bahsedildiği üzere gençlerin siyasal alana olan güvensizlikleri geçmişte de var olan bir durumdur. Gençlik mücadelesinin en yoğun döneminde bile gençliğin, siyasi partilere güvenmedi ve onlara karşı mesafeli bir tutum sergilediği görülmektedir. Ancak bu durum, 1980'ler öncesi gençlerin siyasetten uzaklaşmalarına neden olmamış, aksine kendi örgütleri aracılığıyla siyaset alanının temsilcisi haline gelmelerini sağlamıştır. Bu noktadan hareketle günümüz gençliğinin siyasetle olan mesafeli ilişkisinin sebebini siyasal alanın temsilcilerine olan güvensizlikleri üzerinden açıklamanın eksik olacağı düşünülmektedir. ODTÜ gençliğinin siyaset sahnesinin korkulması ve dolayısıyla kaçınılması gereken bir yer olarak algıladığı ortaya çıkan bir başka sonuçtur. Giderek otoriterleşen AKP iktidarının yarattığı korku ve baskı ortamı, günümüzde gençliğin siyasetle ilişkisi üzerindeki etkisi saha araştırmasında da görülmüştür. Bu durum, yalnızca geleneksel katılım biçimlerinde değil, gençlerin siyasal alana katılımının yeni biçimleri arasında sayılan Twitter'ın kullanımında da kendini göstermektedir. Görüşülen kişilerin çoğu Twitter kullandıklarını belirtirken, hesaplarının gizli olduğunu ve siyasi bir konu hakkında tweet atarken iki kere düşündüklerini de belirtmişlerdir. Ancak 1980'lerden önce gençler artan baskı ve şiddet ortamına daha fazla örgütlenerek direnmeyi tercih ederken, günümüzde bu baskı ve şiddet ortamı gençlerin örgütlenmeden uzaklaşmasına ve korkmasına neden olmuştur. Bu anlamda gençlerin baskı ve korku

iklimine karşı tepkilerinde deęişimin nedenleri üzerinde daha geniş hegemonik süreçlerin etkili olduęu iddia edilmektedir.

Tezin dördüncü bölümünde neoliberal otoriterleşme sürecinin gençlerin örgütlenmeye bakış açısına etkisi incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Türkiye'de yaşayan gençlerin bugün örgütlenmeyi nasıl algıladıkları ve siyasi alanla olan mesafeli ilişkilerinin altında yatan dinamikler ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Örgütlenmeyi nasıl algıladıklarına bakıldığında günümüz gençliğinin siyasi alanla ilişkisinin geçmişe göre mesafeli olduęu saha araştırmasında da gözlemlenmiştir. Görüşmecilerin tamamı AKP rejimine karşı olduklarını belirtse de AKP rejimine karşı olan parti, kuruluş veya topluluklarla da birlikte hareket etmemektedir. Siyasi alanla yalnızca oy kullanma üzerinden ilişki kurmaktadırlar. Neoliberalizmin yarattığı istikrarsız, esnek, parçalı ve geçici emek rejimi etrafında şekillenen akışkan, hızlı, sürekli deęişen ve dönüşen toplumsal yapının, gençliği, karakterini ve kurduęu ilişkileri etkilediği gözlemlenmiştir. Neoliberalizmin “uzun vade yok” ilkesinin gençlerin kendini güvende hissetmemesine sebep olmaktadır. Bu çalışmada farklı görüşmeciler tarafından sıklıkla kullanılan "Önce kendimi kurtarmam lazım", "önce kendi hayatımı ve ekonomik gücümü kazanmam lazım" gibi cümleler gençlerin geleceğe dair duydukları güvensizliğin ve hissettikleri gelecek kaygısının dışavurumudur.

Neoliberalizmin yarattığı yeni ekonomik düzenin ilkelerine göre şekillenen toplumun değerleri, gençlerin bir şeye uzun süre baęlı kalmasının, sadakat göstermesinin, bir şeyin sorumluluęunu almasının kötü bir şey olduęu algısını yaratmaktadır. Bu algı, bir topluluęa ait olma duygusunu, onunla duygusal baęlar kurmayı, başkalarıyla aynı kaderi ve ihtiyaçları paylaşmayı ve siyasal katılımın temel motivasyonu olan aidiyet hissini etkilemektedir. Aidiyet duygusundaki bu dönüşüm, gençleri ve siyasal alanla olan ilişkilerini de etkilemiştir. Günümüz gençliği kendilerini memleketlerine ait hissetmemekte ve sonuç olarak ülkeyi daha iyi bir yer haline getirme konusunda kendilerine bir sorumluluk atfetmemektedirler. Görüşülen kişilerin çoğunluęu kendilerini ülkeden çok ODTÜ'ye ait hissettiklerini belirtmektedirler. Ayşe'nin “Kendimi ODTÜ dışında (ülkede) deplasmanda hissediyorum” sözlerinde ya da Bilal'in 15.000 ODTÜ öğrencisinin tamamının yurtdışına gitmesi gerektiği şeklinde yaptıęı öneride çarpıcı bir şekilde ortaya konan bu durum, 1980'lerden önce siyasal alana kendilerini ait hissettikleri ülkeyi koruma ve geliştirme sorumluluęuyla dahil

olan nesil ile bugünkü gençler arasında farkı ortaya koymaktadır. Türkiye'nin otoriter bir rejim tarafından yönetilmesinin bir sonucu olan korkunun gençlerin ülkeye aidiyetini azalttığı ve örgüte karşı mesafeli bir tavır almasına neden olduğu görülmektedir.

1980'lere kadar değerlendirilen dönemde ikinci bölümde gençliğin toplumla ilişkisinden bahsedilmiştir. Bu tez kapsamında ortaya çıkan bir diğer sonuç gençlerin toplumla kurduğu ilişkide olumsuz bir değişimin olduğu gerçeğidir. Gençlerin toplumun diğer kesimlerine karşı(özellikle kendileriyle benzer düşünmeyen) oldukça olumsuz bir tavır aldıkları görülmektedir. Halk gençler tarafında cahil, bilinçsiz, kolay aldatılabilen olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu durumun topluma ait olma hissi üzerinde etkisi göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır. Burada neoliberalizmin yarattığı bireysel toplumsal düzen ile korkunun geçmişin gençlik hareketlerinden farklı olarak bireysel bir tepkiye (yurt dışına çıkma) ya da tepkisizliğe yol açması arasındaki ilişki de önemlidir. Öğrencilerin farklı kelimelerle ifade ettikleri bu durum, neoliberal ideolojik söylemin yeni anlatısının ve yeni karakterinin bir sonucu olduğu düşünülmektedir. Neoliberalizmin "uzun vade yok" ilkesinde bağlılık, adanma veya aidiyet için yer ve zaman yoktur. Bu ilke, başarılı olmak için risk alması gereken, kendini sürekli geliştirmesi gereken, başarısından veya başarısızlığından kendi sorumlu olan ve bu nedenle sürekli başkalarıyla rekabet etmek zorunda kalan bir karakter yaratan neoliberalizmin bireyselleşme ilkesiyle birleşmektedir. Bu durum bağlılık, kendini adama gibi değerleri aşındırmaktadır. Bu da gençlik ve siyaset ilişkisini doğrudan etkilemektedir. Aidiyetin sorumluluk almak, zaman ve emek harcamak, kişinin kendinden önce ait olduğu yerin önceliklerini göz önünde bulundurmak ve kendini adama ile ilgili olduğu düşünüldüğünde, görüşülen kişilerin ifade ettikleri ODTÜ aidiyetinin niteliği de tartışmalıdır. Bu durum, ODTÜ aleyhine gelişen olaylarda toplu bir tepkiye yol açsa da öğrencilerin ODTÜ içindeki siyasi topluluklar ve örgütler içerisinde yer almalarına neden olmamaktadır. Dolayısıyla söz konusu aidiyet duygusunun sorumluluk alma, zaman ayırma, kendini üniversite savunmasına adama gibi şekillerde değil, kısa süreli, reaktif, geleceğini ve hayatını tehlikeye atmayacak şekilde gerçekleştiği söylenebilir. Elif'in "Eğer bir gruba bağlıysanız, o grup size görevler verir. Kulüplerimizde bile etkinlik afişlerini asma görevi var. Bir mühendislik öğrencisi olarak zaten bir sürü ödevim var. Kendi görevlerim yüzünden zaten depresif hissediyorum. Hatta iç çamaşırını almaya vaktim yok, başka işlerle de uğraşamıyorum."

cümlelerinde de ifade edildiği gibi bu durumun sadece siyasi aidiyet kurmada değil, aynı zamanda okul topluluklarına dahil olmada da ortaya çıktığı görülmektedir.

Bu çalışmanın vurguladığı bir başka nokta ODTÜ öğrencilerinin AKP'den memnun olmamasına ve değişiklik talep etmesine rağmen bu değişikliğin olabileceğine inanmamasıdır. Neoliberalizmin 20 yıldır iktidarda olan otoriter AKP rejimiyle birlikte “başka bir alternatif yok” söylemini yerleştirmesinin gençlerin değişim inancını olumsuz etkilediği görülmektedir. 1980 öncesi gençlik hareketlerine bakıldığında, gençlerin mücadelelerin sonunda kendi güçlerine inandıkları ve “yarın devrim olacak” umuduna sahip oldukları görülmektedir. 20 yıldır iktidarda olan AKP döneminde Türkiye'nin neoliberal otoriter dönüşümünün gençlerin geleceğe yönelik umutlarını ve değişime olan inançlarını olumsuz etkilediği görülmektedir. AKP'den başka iktidar olmaması neoliberalizmin “alternatifi yok” söylemiyle birleşince gençlerin değişime olan inancını ve umutlarını zedelediği görülmektedir. Bu durum örgütlenmeye karşı mesafeli tutumla doğrudan ilişkilidir. Ayrıca görüşülen kişilerin çoğunluğu hükümet değişse bile ülkenin yaşamak isteyeceği bir ülke haline gelmeyeceğini ifade etmiştir. Değişime olan ve farklı bir geleceğin mümkün olabileceğine inanmama, gençlerin kurtuluş için bireysel yollar aramasına neden olmaktadır. Castell'in (Castel, 2003:390) belirttiği gibi, “Mücadele bir kolektivitenin ve bir gelecek projesinin varlığını gerektirir.” Bunun olmadığı durumlarda gençler bireysel kurtuluş yollarını yönelmektedir. Ayşe'nin “Bu ülkenin değişmesi için yapacak bir şey yok, tek yol yurt dışına çıkmak” ya da Hasret'in “Bu ülkede yaşamak yerine iltica etmeye bile 'iyiyim' ifadesi değişime inancı olmayan gençlerin bireysel yollarla kurtuluşlarını aramalarına örnek olarak verilebilir. Bu durum kendisini en çarpıcı şekilde yurtdışına gitme isteğinde kendini göstermektedir. Alan araştırmasında öğrencilerin tamamı yurt dışına gitmek istediklerini belirtmişlerdir. Bazıları eğitim amaçlı geçici olarak gitmek istese de bazıları Türkiye'de yaşamının imkânsız olduğunu ve kalıcı olarak gitmek istediklerini belirtmişlerdir. Öğrencilerin çoğu neoliberalizmin bireyselleştirilmiş risk alma yaklaşımına paralel olarak ülkenin sorunlarının bireylerin kendilerini geliştirmeleriyle çözülebileceğini düşünmektedirler. Bu anlamda “herkes kendi kapısının önünü süpürse” mantığının gençler arasında karşılık bulduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Değişimin kolektif bir mücadele ile mümkün olabileceğine inandığını belirten öğrencilerin kendilerini bu mücadelenin bir parçası olarak konumlandırmadıklarını da belirtmekte fayda var. Bir

şeylerin deęişmesi için kolektif bir siyasi mücadeleye ihtiyaç olduğunu düşünen Deniz, kendisini "tatlı su" solcusu olarak tanımlamakta ve siyasi örgütlenmeleri desteklediğini ancak bu mücadelenin bir parçası olmayacağını çünkü bir mühendis olarak daha faydalı olabileceğine inandığını ifade etmektedir. Bu paradoksal durum, neoliberalizmin yarattığı karakterle de doğrudan ilgilidir.

Neoliberalizm tarafından kolektif yapıların ve kolektif kimliklerin yok edildiği yeni toplumsal düzende gençlerin karşılaştığı sorunlarla baş etme yöntemlerinin oldukça bireysel olduğu bir gerçektir. Yeni çalışma rejiminin parçalanmış, bireyselleştirilmiş özellikleri ve bağıllık, özveri, sadakat gibi değerler üzerindeki erozyonunun, gençlerin kendilerini kolektif bir özne olarak görmelerini, kolektif yollara başvurmalarını zorlaştırdığı görülmektedir. Bu durum gençlerin siyasal bilinçlerinin siyasal güce dönüşmesinde olumsuz etki oluşturmaktadır. Gençlik, genel olarak siyasi alana, onun temsilcilerine ve tebaasına karşı eleştirel bir tavır almakta, ancak ülke siyasetini bir gözlemci olarak değerlendirmektedir. Bahsettikleri sorunların nasıl çözüleceği ile ilgili sorulan tüm sorular için sorumluluğu kendileri dışındaki yerlere ve kişilere atmaları kendilerini sorunların çözümünde bir özne olarak konumlandırmadıklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Geçmişten farklı olarak bu dönemde gençlerin kendilerini siyasi alanın öznesi olarak görmediklerini söylemek mümkündür. Mevcut siyasi partilerden ve siyasi alanın temsilcilerinden memnun olmamalarına rağmen alternatif yaratmakta ilgili kendilerini sorumlu hissetmemekteler. Son olarak, neoliberalizmin yarattığı hızla artan genç işsizliği, güvencesiz istihdam koşulları ve gençlerin her geçen gün artan borçları, gençlerde bir öfke duygusunu açığa çıkarmaktadır. 2011'den sonra ortaya çıkan hareketlere bakarak öfkenin umutla birleşerek bir siyasal güç oluşturması için gerekli yolların kapanmadığını söylemek mümkün. İkinci bölümde detaylı olarak bahsedilen gençlerin ana öznesi olduğu AKP'ye karşı en büyük isyan olan Gezi Direnişi, yeni dönemin değerlerinin tam tersi olan dayanışmaya dayalı bir alternatif yaratırken, AKP hükümetine muhalefetini dile getirmiştir. ODTÜ örneğinden de görüldüğü gibi kendilerine özgü koşullara sahip olmalarına rağmen, gençler, iddia edilen aksine, deęişim umudu görebilecekleri, sorumluluk hissedebilecekleri ve aidiyet hissedebilecekleri alanlarda örgütlenme ve kolektif eyleme dahil olabiliyorlar. Henüz bildiğimiz şekliyle tüm toplumu etkileyen bir siyasi hareket yaratabilen militan bir gençlikten bahsetmiyor olsak da gençler kolektif eylem kapasitelerini saklı tutmaktadırlar. Gençlerin ülke siyasetinde gözlemci konumundan katılımcı konuma

geçişinin nasıl sağlanabileceğini anlamak ve bu potansiyeli eyleme dönüştürmenin yollarını bulmak için gençlerin siyasi katılımı açısından mevcut siyasi kanalların durumunu da ele alan daha geniş bir araştırma ve değerlendirmeye ihtiyaç vardır.

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